Two books bound together, from the religious period of one of the most renowned and representative thinkers. Written for laymen, thus easy to understand, it is penetrating and brilliant as well. Illuminations of age-old religious questions from a pragmatic perspective, written in a luminous style.

I present the foundational structure for a life-centered theory of environmental ethics. The structure consists of three interrelated components. First is the adopting of a certain ultimate moral attitude toward nature, which I call “respect for nature.” Second is a belief system that constitutes a way of conceiving of the natural world and of our place in it. This belief system underlies and supports the attitude in a way that makes it an appropriate attitude to take toward the Earth’s natural (...) ecosystems and their life communities. Third is a system of moral rules and standards for guiding our treatment of those ecosystems and life communities, a set of normative principles which give concrete embodiment or expression to the attitude of respect for nature. The theory set forth and defended here is, I hold, structurally symmetrical with a theory of human ethics based on the principle of respect for persons. (shrink)

Recent disclosures regarding the relationship between Heidegger’s thought and his own version of National Socialism have led me to rethink my earlier efforts to portray Heidegger as a forerunner of deep ecology. His political problems have provided ammunition for critics, such as Murray Bookchin, who regard deep ecology as a reactionary movement. In this essay, I argue that, despite some similarities, Heidegger’s thought and deep ecology are in many ways incompatible, in part because deep ecologists—in spite of their criticism of (...) the ecologically destructive character of technological modernity—generally support a “progressive” idea of human evolution. (shrink)

L'article prétend réfuter la phrase de Heidegger avec autant de gravité qu'il l'écoute. Dans ce hut, on l'examine d'abord brìèvement à la lumière des oppositions heideggeriennes ontologie fondamentale/ontologie régionale et métaphysique/pensée : on conclut que ce n'est pas de là que la phrase tire sa force. On prend donc plutôt en considération le propos de Heidegger sur l'herméneutique (dans Sein und Zeit et dans des textes plus tardifs) : on montre que dans cette caractérisation de la « bonne » pensée, (...) Heidegger exclut a priori la science dès lors qu'il n'accepte pas la possibilité d'une herméneutique formelle. On rattache alors cette exclusion à un rejet plus « général » du mode littéral pour l'élaboration herméneutique, et l'on juge que ce rejet est sans doute une clef pour ce qui a été l'attitude de Heidegger dans l'histoire. This article purports to examine Heidegger's phrase with due seriousness, and in the final analysis, to refute it. First of all, the phrase is considered in relation to the well known heideggerian oppositions of fundamental versus regional ontology and of metaphysics versus thought: the conclusion is that these opposition provide no justification for the virulence of Heidegger's formulation. We therefore proceed to a close examination of Heidegger's conception of hermeneutics (referring both to Sein und Zeit and to later writings): we show that as soon as Heidegger rejects the possibility of a formal hermeneutics science is a priori excluded from his positive standard of thought. In fact the exclusion of science stands from a more global rejection of any littéral mode of hermeneutics; in our view this rejection provides a key to an understanding of Heidegger's historical connection with Nazism. (shrink)

Covariant Realism Hermeneutic phenomenology of science implies a particular version of realism. It approaches scientific entities in a twofold perspective: in their relation to other parts of the theory (as elements in a theoretical "language"), and in relation to the lifeworld as mediated by laboratory practices; as "fulfilled" in laboratory situations that "produce" worldly objects. The question then arises of the relation between the two perspectives; as Ginev has pointed out, there is danger of a theoretical essentialism which is implied (...) when the mathematical projection is conceived as operationalized by experiment. Ginev's proposal to avoid this involves the concept of "inscription." This paper proposes another approach, covariant realism, which draws from Heidegger's notion of formal indication and which makes explicit the temporality of theoretical objects in the flow of the research process. Formal indication does not so much describe phenomena as call them to our attention in a way that we can activate ourselves (as in laboratory contexts); it characterizes phenomena which are understood to be provisionally grasped, already interpreted, and anticipated as able to show themselves differently in different contexts. The value of this approach suggests deeper possibilities for hermeneutic phenomenology of science than have hitherto been explored. (shrink)