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Reduction in real life

In Jakob Hohwy & Jesper Kallestrup (eds.), Being Reduced: New Essays on Reduction, Explanation, and Causation. New York: Oxford University Press (2008)

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  1. (4 other versions)Causation.D. Lewis - 1986 - In David K. Lewis (ed.), Philosophical Papers Vol. II. Oxford University Press. pp. 159-213.
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  • (1 other version)Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1955 - Philosophy 31 (118):268-269.
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  • Explanation: a mechanist alternative.William Bechtel & Adele Abrahamsen - 2005 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 36 (2):421-441.
    Explanations in the life sciences frequently involve presenting a model of the mechanism taken to be responsible for a given phenomenon. Such explanations depart in numerous ways from nomological explanations commonly presented in philosophy of science. This paper focuses on three sorts of differences. First, scientists who develop mechanistic explanations are not limited to linguistic representations and logical inference; they frequently employ diagrams to characterize mechanisms and simulations to reason about them. Thus, the epistemic resources for presenting mechanistic explanations are (...)
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  • Who is a Modeler?Michael Weisberg - 2007 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (2):207-233.
    Many standard philosophical accounts of scientific practice fail to distinguish between modeling and other types of theory construction. This failure is unfortunate because there are important contrasts among the goals, procedures, and representations employed by modelers and other kinds of theorists. We can see some of these differences intuitively when we reflect on the methods of theorists such as Vito Volterra and Linus Pauling on the one hand, and Charles Darwin and Dimitri Mendeleev on the other. Much of Volterra's and (...)
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  • Dimensions of scientific law.Sandra D. Mitchell - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (2):242-265.
    Biological knowledge does not fit the image of science that philosophers have developed. Many argue that biology has no laws. Here I criticize standard normative accounts of law and defend an alternative, pragmatic approach. I argue that a multidimensional conceptual framework should replace the standard dichotomous law/ accident distinction in order to display important differences in the kinds of causal structure found in nature and the corresponding scientific representations of those structures. To this end I explore the dimensions of stability, (...)
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  • The Disorder of Things: Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of Science.John Dupré - 1993 - Harvard University Press.
    With this manifesto, John Dupré systematically attacks the ideal of scientific unity by showing how its underlying assumptions are at odds with the central conclusions of science itself.
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  • Reduction of mind.David K. Lewis - 1994 - In Samuel D. Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: Blackwell. pp. 412-431.
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  • The Structure of scientific theories.Frederick Suppe (ed.) - 1974 - Urbana,: University of Illinois Press.
    Suppe, F. The search for philosophic understanding of scientific theories (p. [1]-241)--Proceedings of the symposium.--Bibliography, compiled by Rew A. Godow, Jr. (p. [615]-646).
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  • The scientific image.C. Van Fraassen Bas - 1980 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    In this book van Fraassen develops an alternative to scientific realism by constructing and evaluating three mutually reinforcing theories.
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  • Representations: philosophical essays on the foundations of cognitive science.Jerry A. Fodor - 1981 - Cambridge: MIT Press.
    Introduction: Something on the State of the Art 1 I. Functionalism and Realism 1. Operationalism and Ordinary Language 35 2. The Appeal to Tacit Knowledge in Psychological Explanations 63 3. What Psychological States are Not 79 4. Three Cheers for Propositional Attitudes 100 II. Reduction and Unity of Science 5. Special Sciences 127 6. Computation and Reduction 146 III. Intensionality and Mental Representation 7. Propositional Attitudes 177 8. Tom Swift and His Procedural Grandmother 204 9. Methodological Solipsism Considered as a (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Fact, Fiction, and Forecast.Nelson Goodman - 1983 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
    In his new foreword to this edition, Hilary Putnam forcefully rejects these nativist claims.
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  • (1 other version)Supervenience.Karen Bennett & Brian McLaughlin - 2005 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • The inference to the best explanation.Gilbert H. Harman - 1965 - Philosophical Review 74 (1):88-95.
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  • The strategy of model-based science.Peter Godfrey-Smith - 2006 - Biology and Philosophy 21 (5):725-740.
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  • The mindreader and the scientist.Heidi Maibom - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (3):296-315.
    Among theory theorists, it is commonly thought that folk psychological theory is tacitly known. However, folk psychological knowledge has none of the central features of tacit knowledge. But if it is ordinary knowledge, why is it that we have difficulties expressing anything but a handful of folk psychological generalisations? The reason is that our knowledge is of theoretical models and hypotheses, not of universal generalisations. Adopting this alternative view of (scientific) theories, we come to see that, given time and reflection, (...)
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  • From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief.Stephen P. Stich - 1983 - MIT Press.
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  • Does a rock implement every finite-state automaton?David J. Chalmers - 1996 - Synthese 108 (3):309-33.
    Hilary Putnam has argued that computational functionalism cannot serve as a foundation for the study of the mind, as every ordinary open physical system implements every finite-state automaton. I argue that Putnam's argument fails, but that it points out the need for a better understanding of the bridge between the theory of computation and the theory of physical systems: the relation of implementation. It also raises questions about the class of automata that can serve as a basis for understanding the (...)
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  • (2 other versions)The Mechanical Mind: A Philosophical Introduction to Minds, Machines and Mental Representation.Tim Crane - 1995 - New York: Routledge.
    This edition has been fully revised and updated, and includes a new chapter on consciousness and a new section on modularity. There are also guides for further reading, and a new glossary of terms such as mentalese, connectionism, and the homunculus fallacy.
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  • (1 other version)Philosophy of Mind and Cognition.David Braddon-Mitchell & Frank Jackson - 1996 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell. Edited by Frank Jackson.
    The philosophy of mind and cognition has been transformed by recent advances in what is loosely called cognitive science. This book is a thoroughly up-to-date introduction to and account of that transformation, in which the many strands in contemporary cognitive science are brought together into a coherent philosophical picture of the mind. The book begins with discussions of the pre-history of contemporary philosophy of mind - dualism, behaviourism, and early versions of the identity theory of mind - and moves through (...)
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  • Can the mind change the world?Ned Block - 1990 - In George Boolos (ed.), Meaning and Method: Essays in Honor of Hilary Putnam. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 137--170.
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  • (2 other versions)Special sciences.Jerry A. Fodor - 1974 - Synthese 28 (2):97-115.
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  • Supervenience and mind: selected philosophical essays.Jaegwon Kim - 1993 - New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.
    Jaegwon Kim is one of the most preeminent and most influential contributors to the philosophy of mind and metaphysics. This collection of essays presents the core of his work on supervenience and mind with two sets of postscripts especially written for the book. The essays focus on such issues as the nature of causation and events, what dependency relations other than causal relations connect facts and events, the analysis of supervenience, and the mind-body problem. A central problem in the philosophy (...)
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  • Functional analysis.Robert E. Cummins - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (November):741-64.
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  • (1 other version)Theory and reality: an introduction to the philosophy of science.Peter Godfrey-Smith - 2003 - Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
    How does science work? Does it tell us what the world is "really" like? What makes it different from other ways of understanding the universe? In Theory and Reality , Peter Godfrey-Smith addresses these questions by taking the reader on a grand tour of one hundred years of debate about science. The result is a completely accessible introduction to the main themes of the philosophy of science. Intended for undergraduates and general readers with no prior background in philosophy, Theory and (...)
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  • What psychological states are not.Ned Block & Jerry A. Fodor - 1972 - Philosophical Review 81 (April):159-81.
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  • (1 other version)Psychophysical and theoretical identifications.David Lewis - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: a guide and anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • (1 other version)From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case against Belief.Stephen P. Stich - 1983 - Behaviorism 14 (2):159-182.
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  • (2 other versions)Special Sciences.Jerry A. Fodor - 1995 - In Paul K. Moser & J. D. Trout (eds.), Contemporary Materialism: A Reader. New York: Routledge. pp. 51-64.
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  • Thinking about mechanisms.Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden & Carl F. Craver - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):1-25.
    The concept of mechanism is analyzed in terms of entities and activities, organized such that they are productive of regular changes. Examples show how mechanisms work in neurobiology and molecular biology. Thinking in terms of mechanisms provides a new framework for addressing many traditional philosophical issues: causality, laws, explanation, reduction, and scientific change.
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  • The Structure of Scientific Theories.Frederick Suppe - 1977 - Critica 11 (31):138-140.
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  • Teleology and the logical structure of function statements.William C. Wimsatt - 1972 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 3 (1):1-80.
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  • Theory and Reality. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science.Peter Godfrey-Smith - 2005 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 67 (2):393-394.
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  • Folk psychology as a model.Peter Godfrey-Smith - 2005 - Philosophers' Imprint 5:1-16.
    I argue that everyday folk-psychological skill might best be explained in terms of the deployment of something like a model, in a specific sense drawn from recent philosophy of science. Theoretical models in this sense do not make definite commitments about the systems they are used to understand; they are employed with a particular kind of flexibility. This analysis is used to dissolve the eliminativism debate of the 1980s, and to transform a number of other questions about the status and (...)
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  • Physicalism from a Probabilistic Point of View.Elliott Sober - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):135-174.
    In what follows, I’ll discuss both the metaphysics and the epistemology of supervenience from a probabilistic point of view. The first half of this paper will explore how supervenience claims are related to other issues; these will include the thesis that physics is causally complete, the claim that there are emergent properties, the idea that mental properties are causally efficacious, and the notion that there are scientific laws about supervenient properties that generalize over systems that deploy different physical realizations of (...)
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  • Goodman’s Problem and Scientific Methodology.Peter Godfrey-Smith - 2003 - Journal of Philosophy 100 (11):573 - 590.
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  • Triviality arguments against functionalism.Peter Godfrey-Smith - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (2):273 - 295.
    “Triviality arguments” against functionalism in the philosophy of mind hold that the claim that some complex physical system exhibits a given functional organization is either trivial or has much less content than is usually supposed. I survey several earlier arguments of this kind, and present a new one that overcomes some limitations in the earlier arguments. Resisting triviality arguments is possible, but requires functionalists to revise popular views about the “autonomy” of functional description.
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  • Using models to represent reality.Ronald N. Giere - 1999 - In L. Magnani, Nancy Nersessian & Paul Thagard (eds.), Model-Based Reasoning in Scientific Discovery. Kluwer/Plenum. pp. 41--57.
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  • Discovering Complexity.William Bechtel, Robert C. Richardson & Scott A. Kleiner - 1996 - History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 18 (3):363-382.
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  • Beyond Reduction: What Can Philosophy of Mind Learn from Post-Reductionist Philosophy of Science?Steven Horst - 2010 - The Order Project: Online Discussion Papers.
    Recent debates about the metaphysics of mind have tended to assume that inter-theoretic reductions are the norm in the natural sciences. With this assumption in place, the apparent explanatory gaps surrounding consciousness and intentionality seem unique, fascinating, and perhaps metaphysically significant. Over the past several decades, however, philosophers of science have largely rejected the notions that inter-theoretic reduction is either widespread in the natural sciences or a litmus for the legitimacy of the special sciences. If we adopt a post-reductionist philosophy (...)
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  • Abstract.[author unknown] - 1998 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 29 (2):299-303.
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  • Modeling mechanisms.Stuart Glennan - 2005 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 36 (2):443-464.
    Philosophers of science increasingly believe that much of science is concerned with understanding the mechanisms responsible for the production of natural phenomena. An adequate understanding of scientific research requires an account of how scientists develop and test models of mechanisms. This paper offers a general account of the nature of mechanical models, discussing the representational relationship that holds between mechanisms and their models as well as the techniques that can be used to test and refine such models. The analysis is (...)
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  • Ecological Orbits: How Planets Move and Populations Grow.Lev Ginzburg & Mark Colyvan - unknown
    The main focus of the book is the presentation of the 'inertial' view of population growth. This view provides a rather simple model for complex population dynamics, and is achieved at the level of the single species without invoking species interactions. An important part of this account is the maternal effect. Investment of mothers in the quality of their daughters makes the rate of reproduction of the current generation depend not only on the current environment, but also on the environment (...)
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  • (1 other version)From folk psychology to cognitive science: The case against belief.Stephen Stich - 1982 - In a Woodfield (ed.), The Structure of Content. MIT Press. pp. 418-421.
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