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Norms of assertion.Jennifer Lackey - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):594–626.details
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Assertion, Knowledge, and Lotteries.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2009 - In P. Greenough & D. Pritchard (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 140--160.details
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Sosa on Knowledge, Assertion and Value.Christoph Kelp - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (1):229-237.details
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Knowledge and the norms of assertion.John Koethe - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):625-638.details
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Contextualism and the knowledge norm of assertion.Christoph Jäger - 2012 - Analysis 72 (3):491-498.details
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Two Ways to Put Knowledge First.Alexander Jackson - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):353 - 369.details
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Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):353-356.details
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Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Testimonial Knowledge in Early Childhood, Revisited1.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):1-36.details
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Anonymous assertions.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2013 - Episteme 10 (2):135-151.details
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Discursive justification and skepticism.Mikkel Gerken - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):373-394.details
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Epistemic injustice: power and the ethics of knowing.Miranda Fricker - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Michael Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language. [REVIEW]Hidé Ishiguro - 1974 - Philosophy 49 (190):438-442.details
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Assertion, Knowledge, and Rational Credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.details
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Assertion, knowledge, and rational credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.details
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Assertion: On the Philosophical Significance of Assertoric Speech.Sanford Goldberg - 2015 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.details
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A Taxonomy of Illocutionary Acts.John R. Searle - 1975 - In K. Gunderson (ed.), Language, Mind and Knowledge. University of Minnesota Press. pp. 344-369.details
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Without Justification.Jonathan Sutton - 2007 - MIT Press.details
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Knowledge and Practical Interests.Jason Stanley - 2006 - Critica 38 (114):98-107.details
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Assertion and isolated second-hand knowledge.Jennifer Lackey - 2011 - In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 251--276.details
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Assertion and the semantics of force-markers.Manuel Garcia-Carpintero - 2004 - In Claudia Bianchi (ed.), The Semantics/Pragmatics Distinction. CSLI Publications. pp. 133--166.details
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Assertion, norms, and games.Ishani Maitra - 2011 - In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 277--296.details
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Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.details
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.Brian Skyrms - 1980 - In The Role of Causal Factors in Rational Decision. Yale University Press.details
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Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.details
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Information and Assertoric Force.Peter Pagin - 2011 - In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.details
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What Is Assertion.John MacFarlane - 2011 - In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion. Oxford University Press.details
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Against Assertion.Herman Cappelen - 2011 - In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.details
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Dummett on Frege. [REVIEW]Leslie Stevenson - 1974 - Philosophical Quarterly 24 (97):349-359.details
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Ignorance: A Case for Scepticism.Peter Unger - 1975 - Philosophy 50 (194):489-490.details
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Putting the Norm of Assertion to Work: the Case of Testimony.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2011 - In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press.details
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The Knowledge Account of Assertion and the Conditions on Testimonial Knowledge.Sanford Goldberg - 2009 - In Duncan Pritchard & Patrick Greenough (eds.), Williamson on Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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