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Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing

Oxford University Press (2007)

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  1. Continuous Glucose Monitoring as a Matter of Justice.Steven R. Kraaijeveld - 2021 - HEC Forum 33 (4):345-370.
    Type 1 diabetes (T1D) is a chronic illness that requires intensive lifelong management of blood glucose concentrations by means of external insulin administration. There have been substantial developments in the ways of measuring glucose levels, which is crucial to T1D self-management. Recently, continuous glucose monitoring (CGM) has allowed people with T1D to keep track of their blood glucose levels in near real-time. These devices have alarms that warn users about potentially dangerous blood glucose trends, which can often be shared with (...)
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  • The Ethical Potential of Love in the Wake of Sexual Violence.Morgan Gagnon - 2021 - The Journal of Ethics 25 (4):429-448.
    The myth that sexual violence is perpetrated by strangers in dark alleyways has long since been debunked; the vast majority of sexual assaults are committed by someone known to the victim. This article examines how individuals and communities nevertheless experience epistemic and moral barriers when reacting to reports of sexual violence levelled against community members, friends, and loved ones. Love can, for example, cloud our moral and epistemic oughts when responding to sexual violence, through such avenues as mutual identity constitution (...)
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  • The Compliment of Rational Opposition: Disagreement, Adversariality, and Disputation.David Godden - 2021 - Topoi 40 (5):845-858.
    Disputational models of argumentation have been criticized as introducing adversariality into argumentation by mistakenly conceiving of it as minimally adversarial, and, in doing so, structurally incentivizing ancillary adversariality. As an alternative, non-adversarial models of argumentation like inquiry have been recommended. In this article I defend disputational, minimally adversarial models of disagreement-based argumentation. First, I argue that the normative kernel of minimal adversariality is properly located in the normative fabric of disagreement, not our practices of disputation. Thus, argumentation’s minimal adversariality is (...)
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  • Remembrance and Denial of Genocide: On the Interrelations of Testimonial and Hermeneutical Injustice.Melanie Altanian - 2021 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 29 (4):595-612.
    Genocide remembrance is a complex epistemological/ethical achievement, whereby survivors and descendants give meaning to the past in the quest for both personal-historical and social-historical truth. This paper offers an argument of epistemic injustice specifically as it occurs in relation to practices of (individual and collective) genocide remembrance. In particular, I argue that under conditions of genocide denialism, understood as collective genocide misremembrance and memory distortion, genocide survivors and descendants are confronted with hermeneutical oppression. Drawing on Sue Campbell’s relational, reconstructive account (...)
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  • Themes From Testimonial Injustice and Trust: Introduction to the Special Issue.Melanie Altanian & Maria Baghramian - 2021 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 29 (4):433-447.
    This is the introduction to the special issue "Themes from Testimonial Injustice and Trust" for the International Journal of Philosophical Studies.
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  • Articulating Understanding: A Phenomenological Approach to Testimony on Gendered Violence.Charlotte Knowles - 2021 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 29 (4):448-472.
    ABSTRACT Testimony from victims of gendered violence is often wrongly disbelieved. This paper explores a way to address this problem by developing a phenomenological approach to testimony. Guided by the concept of ‘disclosedness’, a tripartite analysis of testimony as an affective, embodied, communicative act is developed. Affect indicates how scepticism may arise through the social moods that often attune agents to victims’ testimony. The embodiment of meaning suggests testimony should not be approached as an assertion, but as a process of (...)
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  • Trust, Authority and Epistemic Responsibility.Gloria Origgi - 2008 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 23 (1):35-44.
    In this paper I argue that the epistemology of trust and testimony should take into account the pragmatics of communication in order to gain insight about the responsibilities speakers and hearers share in the epistemic access they gain through communication. Communication is a rich process of information exchangein which epistemic standards are negotiated by interlocutors. I discuss examples which show the contextual adjustment of these standards as the conversation goes on. Our sensitivity to the contextual dimension of epistemic standards make (...)
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  • Mapping out epistemic justice in the clinical space: using narrative techniques to affirm patients as knowers.Leah Teresa Rosen - 2021 - Philosophy, Ethics, and Humanities in Medicine 16 (1):1-6.
    Epistemic injustice sits at the intersection of ethics, epistemology, and social justice. Generally, this philosophical term describes when a person is wrongfully discredited as a knower; and within the clinical space, epistemic injustice is the underlying reason that some patient testimonies are valued above others. The following essay seeks to connect patterns of social prejudice to the clinical realm in the United States: illustrating how factors such as race, gender identity, and socioeconomic status influence epistemic credence and associatively, the quality (...)
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  • Injustice in Bioethics Research Funding: Going Further Upstream.Himani Bhakuni, Rieke van der Graaf & Seye Abimbola - 2021 - American Journal of Bioethics 22 (1):33-35.
    Fabi and Goldberg have helpfully shed some light on the wrongs perpetuated by the current funding architecture on research, sponsorship, and career development in the field of bioethics. The...
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  • Bioethics, (Funding) Priorities, and the Perpetuation of Injustice.Rachel Fabi & Daniel S. Goldberg - 2021 - American Journal of Bioethics 22 (1):6-13.
    If funding allocation is an indicator of a field’s priorities, then the priorities of the field of bioethics are misaligned because they perpetuate injustice. Social justice mandates priority for the factors that drive systematic disadvantage, which tend not to be the areas supported by funding within academic bioethics. Current funding priorities violate social justice by overemphasizing technologies that aim to enhance the human condition without addressing underlying structural inequalities grounded in racism, and by deemphasizing areas of inquiry most frequently pursued (...)
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  • “You are Not Qualified—Leave it to us”: Obstetric Violence as Testimonial Injustice.Sara Cohen Shabot - 2021 - Human Studies 44 (4):635-653.
    This paper addresses epistemic aspects of the phenomenon of obstetric violence—which has been described as a kind of gender violence—mainly from the perspective of recent theories on epistemic injustice. I argue that what is behind the dismissal of women’s voices in labor is mainly how the birthing subject, in general, is conceived. Thus, I develop a link between the phenomenon of testimonial injustice in labor and the marked irrationality that is seen as a core characteristic of birthing subjects: an irrationality (...)
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  • The Epistemology of Anger in Argumentation.Moira Howes & Catherine Hundleby - forthcoming - Symposion. Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences.
    Moira Howes and Catherine Hundleby ABSTRACT: While anger can derail argumentation, it can also help arguers and audiences to reason together in argumentation. Anger can provide information about premises, biases, goals, discussants, and depth of disagreement that people might otherwise fail to recognize or prematurely dismiss. Anger can also enhance the salience of certain premises...
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  • Burgerschapseducatie zal ons niet redden.Michael S. Merry - 2021 - Pedagogiek 41 (3):272-295.
    In dit artikel onderzoek ik of de standaardbenaderingen van burgerschapsonderwijs in de Lage Landen geschikt zijn om jonge mensen voor te bereiden om de huidige politieke realiteiten tegemoet te treden, laat staan om onrecht te bestrijden. Ik laat zien waarom een nadruk op ‘democratische principes’ of de rechtsstaat de status quo waarschijnlijk niet zal veranderen zolang opvoeders er niet in slagen de aandacht voor de waarheid te cultiveren die nodig is om te kunnen oordelen over rivaliserende normatieve claims. Met name (...)
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  • The Psychology of Epistemic Judgment.Jennifer Nagel & Jessica Wright - forthcoming - In Sarah K. Robins, John Symons & Paco Calvo (eds.), Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology, 2nd Edition.
    Human social intelligence includes a remarkable power to evaluate what people know and believe, and to assess the quality of well- or ill-formed beliefs. Epistemic evaluations emerge in a great variety of contexts, from moments of deliberate private reflection on tough theoretical questions, to casual social observations about what other people know and think. We seem to be able to draw systematic lines between knowledge and mere belief, to distinguish justified and unjustified beliefs, and to recognize some beliefs as delusional (...)
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  • Are "Epistemic" and "Communicative" Models of Silencing in Conflict?Leo Townsend & Dina Lupin Townsend - 2021 - Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 7 (10):27-32.
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  • Introduction to the Special Issue on Philosophy of Medicine.Saana Jukola & Anke Bueter - 2021 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 17 (2):(SI1)5-8.
    This article is an introduction to the special issue on philosophy of medicine. Philosophy of medicine is a field that has flourished in the last couple of decades and has become increasingly institutionalized. The introduction begins with a brief overview of some of the most central recent developments in the field. It then describes the six articles that comprise this issue.
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  • Vrijednosti u psihijatriji i pojam mentalne bolesti (Eng. Values in psychiatry and the concept of mental illness).Luca Malatesti & Marko Jurjako - 2016 - In Snježana Prijić-Samaržija, Luca Malatesti & Elvio Baccarini (eds.), Moralni, Politički I Društveni Odgovori Na Društvene Devijacije (Eng. Moral, Political, and Social Responses to Antisocial Deviation). Rijeka: University of Rijeka. pp. 153-181.
    The crucial problem in the philosophy of psychiatry is to determine under which conditions certain behaviors, mental states, and personality traits should be regarded as symptoms of mental illnesses. Participants in the debate can be placed on a continuum of positions. On the one side of the continuum, there are naturalists who maintain that the concept of mental illness can be explained by relying on the conceptual apparatus of the natural sciences, such as biology and neuroscience. On the other side (...)
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  • Procedural Justice and the Problem of Intellectual Deference.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij - unknown
    It is a well-established fact that we tend to underestimate our susceptibility to cognitive bias on account of overconfidence, and thereby often fail to listen to intellectual advice aimed at reducing such bias. This is the problem of intellectual deference. The present paper considers this problem in contexts where educators attempt to teach students how to avoid bias for purposes of instilling epistemic virtues. It is argued that recent research in social psychology suggests that we can come to terms with (...)
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  • Studying While Black: Trust, Opportunity and Disrespect.Sally Haslanger - 2014 - Du Bois Review: Social Science Research on Race 11 (1):109-136.
    How should we explore the relationship between race and educational opportunity? One approach to the Black-White achievement gap explores how race and class cause disparities in access and opportunity. In this paper, I consider how education contributes to the creation of race. Considering examples of classroom micropolitics, I argue that breakdowns of trust and trustworthiness between teachers and students can cause substantial disadvantages and, in the contemporary United States, this happens along racial lines. Some of the disadvantages are academic: high (...)
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  • Trust, Testimony, and Prejudice in the Credibility Economy.Gerald Marsh - 2011 - Hypatia 26 (2):280-293.
    In this paper I argue for a special kind of injustice I call “trust injustice.” Taking Miranda Fricker's work on epistemic injustice as my starting point, I argue that there are some ethical constraints on trust relationships. If I am right about this, then we sometimes have duties to maintain trust relationships that are independent of the social roles we play.
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  • Partial Relationships and Epistemic Injustice.Ji-Young Lee - forthcoming - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-14.
    In moral and political philosophy, topics like the distributive inequities conferred via special partial relationships – family relationships, for example – have been frequently debated. However, the epistemic dimensions of such partiality are seldom discussed in the ethical context, and the topic of partial relationships rarely feature in the realm of social epistemology. My view is that the role of partial relationships is worth exploring to enrich our understanding of epistemic injustice and its transmission. I claim that epistemic features typical (...)
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  • Radical epistemology, structural explanations, and epistemic weaponry.Richard Pettigrew - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):289-304.
    When is a belief justified? There are three families of arguments we typically use to support different accounts of justification: arguments from our intuitive responses to vignettes that involve the concept; arguments from the theoretical role we would like the concept to play in epistemology; and arguments from the practical, moral, and political uses to which we wish to put the concept. I focus particularly on the third sort, and specifically on arguments of this sort offered by Clayton Littlejohn in (...)
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  • Understanding What It's Like To Be (Dis)Privileged.Nicholas Wiltsher - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly.
    Can a person privileged in some respect understand what it is like to be disprivileged in that respect? Some say yes; some say no. I argue that both positions are correct, because ‘understand what it is like to be disprivileged’ is ambiguous. Sometimes, it means grasp of the character of particular experiences of disprivileged people. Privileged people can achieve this. Sometimes, it means grasp of the general character shared by experiences of disprivileged people. Privileged people cannot achieve this. However, there (...)
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  • There is a Distinctively Epistemic Kind of Blame.Cameron Boult - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (3):518-534.
    Is there a distinctively epistemic kind of blame? It has become commonplace for epistemologists to talk about epistemic blame, and to rely on this notion for theoretical purposes. But not everyone is convinced. Some of the most compelling reasons for skepticism about epistemic blame focus on disanologies, or asymmetries, between the moral and epistemic domains. In this paper, I defend the idea that there is a distinctively epistemic kind of blame. I do so primarily by developing an account of the (...)
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  • Culpability, Blame, and the Moral Dynamics of Social Power.Catriona Mackenzie - 2021 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 95 (1):163-182.
    This paper responds to recent work on moral blame, which has drawn attention to the ambivalent nature of our blaming practices and to the need to ‘civilize’ these practices. It argues that the project of civilizing blame must engage with a further problematic feature of these practices, namely, that they can be implicated in structures of social oppression, and distorted by epistemic and discursive injustice. The paper also aims to show that engaging with this problem raises questions about the Strawsonian (...)
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  • Epistemic Trust and Liberal Justification.Michael Fuerstein - 2013 - Journal of Political Philosophy 21 (2):179-199.
    In this paper I offer a distinctive epistemic rationale for the liberal practice of constant and ostentatious reason-giving in the political context. Epistemic trust is essential to democratic governance because as citizens we can only make informed decisions by relying on the claims of moral, scientific, and practical authorities around us. Yet rational epistemic trust is also uniquely fragile in the political context in light of both the radical inclusiveness of the relevant epistemic community (i.e., everyone who participates in the (...)
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  • The Epistemic Risk in Representation.Stephanie Harvard & Eric Winsberg - forthcoming - Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal.
    Both the distinction between the 'internal' and 'external' phases of science and the concept of 'inductive risk' are core constructs in the values in science literature. However, both constructs have shortcomings, which, we argue, have concealed the unique significance of values in scientific representation. We defend three closely- related proposals to rectify the problem: i) to draw a conceptual distinction between endorsing a 'fact' and making a decision about representation; ii) to employ a conception of inductive risk that aligns with (...)
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  • Prejudice in Testimonial Justification: A Hinge Account.Anna Boncompagni - 2021 - Episteme 1 (Early view).
    Although research on epistemic injustice has focused on the effects of prejudice in epistemic exchanges, the account of prejudice that emerges in Fricker’s (2007) view is not completely clear. In particular, I claim that the epistemic role of prejudice in the structure of testimonial justification is still in need of a satisfactory explanation. What special epistemic power does prejudice exercise that prevents the speaker’s words from constituting evidence for the hearer’s belief? By clarifying this point, it will be possible to (...)
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  • Practical Identity and Duties of Love.Berit Brogaard - 2021 - Disputatio 13 (60):27-50.
    This paper defends the view that we have special relationship duties that do not derive from our moral duties. Our special relationship duties, I argue, are grounded in what I call close relationships. Sharing a close relationship with another person, I suggest, requires that both people conceive of themselves as being motivated to promote the other’s interests. So, staying true to oneself demands being committed to promoting the interests of those with whom we share a close relationship. Finally, I show (...)
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  • Hobbes’ Frontispiece: Authorship, Subordination and Contract.Janice Richardson - 2016 - Law and Critique 27 (1):63-81.
    In this article I argue that the famous image on Hobbes’ frontispiece of Leviathan provides a more honest picture of authority and of contract than is provided by today’s liberal images of free and equal persons, who are pictured as sitting round a negotiating table making a decision as to the principles on which to base laws. Importantly, in the seventeenth century, at the start of modern political thought, Hobbes saw no contradiction between contractual agreement and subordination. I will draw (...)
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  • Silencing and Assertion.Alessandra Tanesini - 2019 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press. pp. 749-769.
    Theories of assertion must explain how silencing is possible. This chapter defends an account of assertion in terms of normative commitments on the grounds that it provides the most plausible analysis of how individuals might be silenced when attempting to make assertions. The chapter first offers an account of the nature of silencing and defends the view that it can occur even in contexts where speakers’ communicative intentions are understood by their audience. Second, it outlines some of the normative commitments (...)
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  • Believing on eggshells: epistemic injustice through pragmatic encroachment.Julius Schönherr & Javiera Perez Gomez - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-21.
    This paper defends the claim that pragmatic encroachment—the idea that knowledge is sensitive to the practical stakes of believing—can explain a distinctive kind of epistemic injustice: the injustice that occurs when prejudice causes someone to know less than they otherwise would. This encroachment injustice, as we call it, occurs when the threat of being met with prejudice raises the stakes for someone to rely on her belief when acting, by raising the level of evidential support required for knowledge. We explain (...)
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  • A New Argument for the Non-Instrumental Value of Truth.Veli Mitova - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-23.
    Many influential philosophers have claimed that truth is valuable, indeed so valuable as to be the ultimate standard of correctness for intellectual activity. Yet most philosophers also think that truth is only instrumentally valuable. These commitments make for a strange pair. One would have thought that an ultimate standard would enjoy more than just instrumental value. This paper develops a new argument for the non-instrumental value of truth: inquiry is non-instrumentally valuable; and truth inherits some of its value from the (...)
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  • The Epistemic Value of Testimony.Matthew Chick - forthcoming - Contemporary Political Theory.
    This article brings together two sets of insights about deliberative democracy and uses them to develop a novel epistemic justification for the importance of testimony. Some democratic theorists have argued persuasively that a deliberative process limited to formal argumentation is exclusionary and thus undermines democratic legitimacy; they have made a compelling case for testimony on grounds of democratic inclusion. Others have made the case that deliberation has important epistemic benefits. Those theorists emphasize the give and take of reasons as a (...)
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  • What’s Wrong with Epistemic Trespassing?Joshua DiPaolo - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):223-243.
    Epistemic trespassers are experts who pass judgment on questions in fields where they lack expertise. What’s wrong with epistemic trespassing? I identify several limitations with a seminal analysis to isolate three desiderata on an answer to this question and motivate my own answer. An answer should explain what’s wrong in the cases that motivate inquiry into epistemic trespassing, should explain what’s wrong with epistemic trespassing even if trespassers do not acknowledge their trespassing, and these explanations should not be independent of (...)
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  • Epistemic Collaborativeness as an Intellectual Virtue.Alkis Kotsonis - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-16.
    Despite the recent growth of studies in virtue epistemology, the intellectual virtue of epistemic collaborativeness has been overlooked by scholars working in virtue theory. This is a significant gap in the literature given the import of well-motivated and skillful epistemic collaboration for the flourishing of human societies. This paper engages in an in-depth examination of the intellectual virtue of epistemic collaborativeness. It argues that the agent who possesses this acquired character trait is highly motivated to engage in epistemic collaboration, competent (...)
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  • Applying Moral Caution in the Face of Disagreement.Jonathan D. Matheson - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice:1-18.
    In this paper I explore an epistemic asymmetry that sometimes occurs regarding the moral status of alternative actions. I argue that this asymmetry is significant and has ramifications for what it is morally permissible to do. I then show how this asymmetry often obtains regarding three moral issues: vegetarianism, abortion, and charitable giving. In doing so, I rely on the epistemic significance of disagreement and the existence of moral controversy about these issues.
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  • Reliabilism Without Epistemic Consequentialism.Kurt L. Sylvan - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (3):525-555.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
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  • Offending White Men: Racial Vilification, Misrecognition, and Epistemic Injustice.Louise Richardson-Self - 2018 - Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 4 (4):1-24.
    In this article I analyse two complaints of white vilification, which are increasingly occurring in Australia. I argue that, though the complainants (and white people generally) are not harmed by such racialized speech, the complainants in fact harm Australians of colour through these utterances. These complaints can both cause and constitute at least two forms of epistemic injustice (willful hermeneutical ignorance and comparative credibility excess). Further, I argue that the complaints are grounded in a dual misrecognition: the complainants misrecognize themselves (...)
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  • A Modified Self-Knowledge Model of Thought Insertion.Sruthi Rothenfluch - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (1):157-181.
    Thought insertion is a condition characterized by the impression that one's thoughts are not one’s own and have been inserted by others. Some have explained the condition as resulting, in part, from impaired or defective self-knowledge, or knowledge of one’s mental states. I argue that such models do not shed light on the most puzzling feature of thought insertion: the patient’s experience that an introspected thought does not feel like her own. After examining ways in which existing versions of the (...)
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  • Epistemic Diversity and the Question of Lingua Franca in Science and Philosophy.Federico Gobbo & Federica Russo - 2020 - Foundations of Science 25 (1):185-207.
    Epistemic diversity is the ability or possibility of producing diverse and rich epistemic apparati to make sense of the world around us. In this paper we discuss whether, and to what extent, different conceptions of knowledge—notably as ‘justified true belief’ and as ‘distributed and embodied cognition’—hinder or foster epistemic diversity. We then link this discussion to the widespread move in science and philosophy towards monolingual disciplinary environments. We argue that English, despite all appearance, is no Lingua Franca, and we give (...)
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  • The Nature of Silence and Its Democratic Possibilities.Mónica Brito Vieira, Theo Jung, Sean W. D. Gray & Toby Rollo - 2019 - Contemporary Political Theory 18 (3):424-447.
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  • The Roles We Make Others Take: Thoughts on the Ethics of Arguing.Katharina Stevens - 2019 - Topoi 38 (4):693-709.
    Feminist argumentation theorists have criticized the Dominant Adversarial Model in argumentation, according to which arguers should take proponent and opponent roles and argue against one another. The model is deficient because it creates disadvantages for feminine gendered persons in a way that causes significant epistemic and practical harms. In this paper, I argue that the problem that these critics have pointed out can be generalized: whenever an arguer is given a role in the argument the associated tasks and norms of (...)
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  • Buses and Breaking Point: Freedom of Expression and the ‘Brexit’ Campaign.Andrew Reid - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (3):623-637.
    In the aftermath of the ‘Brexit’ referendum two pieces of campaign material used by the successful Leave campaign proved controversial: a slogan on the side of a bus fallaciously implying that leaving the EU would necessarily free up £350 million a week for the NHS; and a poster stating that Britain was at “Breaking Point” – purportedly due to an influx of migrants – that was redolent of Nazi propaganda. This paper analyses and develops some criticisms that were levelled at (...)
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  • The Ordinary Language Argument Against Skepticism—Pragmatized.Sinan Dogramaci - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (4):879-896.
    I develop a new version of the ordinary language response to skepticism. My version is based on premises about the practical functions served by our epistemic words. I end by exploring how my argument against skepticism is interestingly non-circular and philosophically valuable.
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  • Microaggressions: A Kantian Account.Ornaith O’Dowd - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (5):1219-1232.
    In this paper, I offer an explanation of the moral significance of microaggressions, seemingly minor incidents in which someone is demeaned in virtue of an oppressed social identity, often without the full awareness of the perpetrator. I argue for a broadly Kantian account of the wrongs of microaggressions and the moral responsibilities of various actors with respect to these incidents.
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  • Autonomy-Based Reasons for Limitarianism.Danielle Zwarthoed - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (5):1181-1204.
    This paper aims to provide autonomy-based reasons in favour of limitarianism. Limitarianism affirms it is of primary moral importance that no one gets too much. The paper challenges the standard assumption that having more material resources always increases autonomy. It expounds five mechanisms through which having too much material wealth might undermine autonomy. If these hypotheses are true, a theory of justice guided by a concern for autonomy will support a limitarian distribution of wealth. Finally, the paper discusses two issues (...)
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  • The Effects of Social Ties on Coordination: Conceptual Foundations for an Empirical Analysis. [REVIEW]Giuseppe Attanasi, Astrid Hopfensitz, Emiliano Lorini & Frédéric Moisan - 2014 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 13 (1):47-73.
    This paper investigates the influence that social ties can have on behavior. After defining the concept of social ties that we consider, we introduce an original model of social ties. The impact of such ties on social preferences is studied in a coordination game with outside option. We provide a detailed game theoretical analysis of this game while considering various types of players, i.e., self-interest maximizing, inequity averse, and fair agents. In addition to these approaches that require strategic reasoning in (...)
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  • Medical Knowledge in a Social World: Introduction to the Special Issue.Bennett Holman, Sven Bernecker & Luciana Garbayo - 2019 - Synthese 196 (11):4351-4361.
    Philosophy of medicine has traditionally examined two issues: the scientific ontology for medicine and the epistemic significance of the types of evidence used in medical research. In answering each question, philosophers have typically brought to bear tools from traditional analytic philosophy. In contrast, this volume explores medical knowledge from the perspective offered by social epistemology.While many of the same issues are addressed, the approach to these issues generates both fresh questions and new insights into old debates. In addition, the broader (...)
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  • Amoral, Im/Moral and Dis/Loyal: Children’s Moral Status in Child Welfare.Zlatana Knezevic - 2017 - Childhood 4 (24):470-484.
    This article is a discursive examination of children’s status as knowledgeable moral agents within the Swedish child welfare system and in the widely used assessment framework BBIC. Departing from Fricker’s concept of epistemic injustice, three discursive positions of children’s moral status are identified: amoral, im/moral and dis/loyal. The findings show the undoubtedly moral child as largely missing and children’s agency as diminished, deviant or rendered ambiguous. Epistemic injustice applies particularly to disadvantaged children with difficult experiences who run the risk of (...)
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