- Knowledge is the Norm of Assertion.Matthew A. Benton - 2024 - In Blake Roeber, Ernest Sosa, Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 329-339.details
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Assertion and convention.Mitchell S. Green - 2020 - In Goldberg Sanford (ed.), Oxford Handbook on Assertion. Oxford University Press.details
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Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications.John MacFarlane - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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To lie or to mislead?Felix Https://Orcidorg Timmermann & Emanuel Https://Orcidorg Viebahn - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (5):1481-1501.details
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Belief Attribution as Indirect Communication.Christopher Gauker - 2021 - In Ladislav Koreň, Hans Bernhard Schmid, Preston Stovall & Leo Townsend (eds.), Groups, Norms and Practices: Essays on Inferentialism and Collective Intentionality. Cham: Springer. pp. 173-187.details
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A Commitment-Theoretic Account of Moore's Paradox.Jack Woods - forthcoming - In An Atlas of Meaning: Current Research in the Semantics/Pragmatics Interface).details
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Silencing and assertion.Alessandra Tanesini - 2018 - In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press. pp. 749-769.details
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Proxy Assertion.Kirk Ludwig - 2018 - In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press.details
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Assertion and Modality.Fabrizio Cariani - 2018 - In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press. pp. 505-528.details
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Hedged Assertion.Matthew A. Benton & Peter Van Elswyk - 2018 - In Sanford C. Goldberg (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Assertion. Oxford University Press. pp. 245-263.details
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Lying, Belief, and Knowledge.Matthew A. Benton - 2018 - In Jörg Meibauer (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Lying. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford Handbooks. pp. 120-133.details
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Constitutive Rules: Games, Language, and Assertion.Indrek Reiland - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (1):136-159.details
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Inferentialism: Why Rules Matter.Jaroslav Peregrin - 2014 - London and New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.details
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Alternative Ways for Truth to Behave When There’s no Vicious Reference.Stefan Wintein - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (4):665-690.details
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True lies and Moorean redundancy.Alex Wiegmann & Emanuel Viebahn - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13053-13066.details
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A Model for Free Speech.Daniel Weston - 2022 - International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 35 (6):2211-2240.details
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Non-literal Lies.Emanuel Viebahn - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (6):1367-1380.details
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Lying with Presuppositions.Emanuel Viebahn - 2020 - Noûs 54 (3):731-751.details
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Communicating Testimonial Commitment.Alejandro Vesga - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10.details
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Retraction and Testimonial Justification: A New Problem for the Assurance View.Matthew Vermaire - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3959-3972.details
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Lying and Asserting.Andreas Stokke - 2013 - Journal of Philosophy 110 (1):33-60.details
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Two accounts of assertion.Martin Smith - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-18.details
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On the Pragmatics of Deep Disagreement.Matthew Shields - 2018 - Topoi (5):999-1015.details
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Jeux dialogiques et processus discursif. Conséquences du débat entre Habermas et Brandom.Yaël Sebban - 2020 - Dialogue 59 (2):305-344.details
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Constructivism and Three Forms of Perspective‐Dependence in Metaethics 1.Karl Schafer - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):68-101.details
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Don’t be deceived: bald-faced lies are deceitful assertions.Jakub Rudnicki & Joanna Odrowąż-Sypniewska - 2023 - Synthese 201 (6):1-21.details
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Assertion, justificatory commitment, and trust.Fernando Rudy Hiller - 2016 - Análisis Filosófico 36 (1):29-53.details
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Relativism, Retraction, and Evidence.Diana Raffman - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (1):171-178.details
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Deciding What We Mean.Andrew Peet - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Epistemic injustice in utterance interpretation.Andrew Peet - 2017 - Synthese 194 (9):3421-3443.details
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Assertoric content, responsibility, and metasemantics.Andrew Peet - 2021 - Mind and Language 37 (5):914-932.details
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Expressing first-person authority.Matthew Parrott - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2215-2237.details
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Inquiry and the doxastic attitudes.Michele Palmira - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):4947-4973.details
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Problems with Norms of Assertion.Peter Pagin - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):178-207.details
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Towards a Unified Theory of Illocutionary Normativity.Neri Marsili - 2023 - In Laura Caponetto & Paolo Labinaz (eds.), Sbisà on Speech as Action. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 2147483647-2147483647.details
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I—Richard Moran: Testimony, Illocution and the Second Person.Richard Moran - 2013 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):115-135.details
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Assertions, joint epistemic actions and social practices.Seumas Miller - 2016 - Synthese 193 (1):71-94.details
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Inference Claims as Assertions.Matthew William Mckeon - 2021 - Informal Logic 42 (4):359-390.details
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Your word against mine: the power of uptake.Lucy McDonald - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3505-3526.details
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The Definition of Assertion: Commitment and Truth.Neri Marsili - forthcoming - Mind and Language.details
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Rejectivism and the Challenge of Pragmatic Contradictions.Ben Martin - 2016 - Disputatio 8 (43):253-267.details
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Normative accounts of assertion: from Peirce to Williamson and back again.Neri Marsili - 2015 - Rivista Italiana di Filosofia del Linguaggio 2014:112-130.details
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Lying, speech acts, and commitment.Neri Marsili - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3245-3269.details
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Group Assertions and Group Lies.Neri Marsili - 2023 - Topoi 42 (2):369-384.details
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How to insult and compliment a testifier.Finlay Malcolm - 2018 - Episteme 15 (1):50-64.details
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Utterance Interpretation and Actual Intentions.Palle Leth - 2019 - Axiomathes 31 (3):1-20.details
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Utterance Interpretation and Actual Intentions.Palle Leth - 2021 - Axiomathes 31 (3):279-298.details
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Rational responsibility and the assertoric character of bald-faced lies.Patrick R. Leland - 2015 - Analysis 75 (4):550-554.details
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Normatívnosť tvrdenia.Ladislav Koreň - 2012 - Teorie Vědy / Theory of Science 34 (1):25-52.details
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Parentheticality, assertion strength, and polarity.Todor Koev - 2019 - Linguistics and Philosophy 44 (1):113-140.details
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