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  1. The Paradox of Sufficient Reason.Samuel Levey - 2016 - Philosophical Review Recent Issues 125 (3):397-430.
    It can be shown by means of a paradox that, given the Principle of Sufficient Reason, there is no conjunction of all contingent truths. The question is, or ought to be, how to interpret that result: _Quid sibi velit?_ A celebrated argument against PSR due to Peter van Inwagen and Jonathan Bennett in effect interprets the result to mean that PSR entails that there are no contingent truths. But reflection on parallels in philosophy of mathematics shows it can equally be (...)
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  • A Subject with No Object.Zoltan Gendler Szabo, John P. Burgess & Gideon Rosen - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (1):106.
    This is the first systematic survey of modern nominalistic reconstructions of mathematics, and for this reason alone it should be read by everyone interested in the philosophy of mathematics and, more generally, in questions concerning abstract entities. In the bulk of the book, the authors sketch a common formal framework for nominalistic reconstructions, outline three major strategies such reconstructions can follow, and locate proposals in the literature with respect to these strategies. The discussion is presented with admirable precision and clarity, (...)
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  • Everything.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Perspectives 17 (1):415–465.
    On reading the last sentence, did you interpret me as saying falsely that everything — everything in the entire universe — was packed into my carry-on baggage? Probably not. In ordinary language, ‘everything’ and other quantifiers (‘something’, ‘nothing’, ‘every dog’, ...) often carry a tacit restriction to a domain of contextually relevant objects, such as the things that I need to take with me on my journey. Thus a sentence of the form ‘Everything Fs’ is true as uttered in a (...)
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  • Is Metaphysical Dependence Irreflexive?Carrie Jenkins - 2011 - The Monist 94 (2):267-276.
    The article explores the irreflexivity of metaphysical dependence in the physical structure of reality. It stresses that the word dependence denotes quasi-ireflexivity which affects the metaphysical relations of a physical structure. It focuses on the view that irreflexivity assumption has been made without discussion of the dependence relations on the structure of reality.
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  • E Pluribus Unum: Plural Logic and Set Theory.John P. Burgess - 2004 - Philosophia Mathematica 12 (3):193-221.
    A new axiomatization of set theory, to be called Bernays-Boolos set theory, is introduced. Its background logic is the plural logic of Boolos, and its only positive set-theoretic existence axiom is a reflection principle of Bernays. It is a very simple system of axioms sufficient to obtain the usual axioms of ZFC, plus some large cardinals, and to reduce every question of plural logic to a question of set theory.
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  • No Work for a Theory of Grounding.Jessica M. Wilson - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (5-6):535-579.
    It has recently been suggested that a distinctive metaphysical relation— ‘Grounding’—is ultimately at issue in contexts in which some goings-on are said to hold ‘in virtue of’’, be ‘metaphysically dependent on’, or be ‘nothing over and above’ some others. Grounding is supposed to do good work in illuminating metaphysical dependence. I argue that Grounding is also unsuited to do this work. To start, Grounding alone cannot do this work, for bare claims of Grounding leave open such basic questions as whether (...)
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  • Metaphysical Rationalism.Shamik Dasgupta - 2016 - Noûs 50 (2):379-418.
    The Principle of Sufficient Reason states that everything has an explanation. But different notions of explanation yield different versions of this principle. Here a version is formulated in terms of the notion of a “grounding” explanation. Its consequences are then explored, with particular emphasis on the fact that it implies necessitarianism, the view that every truth is necessarily true. Finally, the principle is defended from a number of objections, including objections to necessitarianism. The result is a defense of a “rationalist” (...)
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  • Pluralities and Sets.Øystein Linnebo - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy 107 (3):144-164.
    Say that some things form a set just in case there is a set whose members are precisely the things in question. For instance, all the inhabitants of New York form a set. So do all the stars in the universe. And so do all the natural numbers. Under what conditions do some things form a set?
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  • Objects of Thought.Arthur Norman Prior - 1971 - Oxford, England: Clarendon Press.
    Divided into two parts, the first concentrates on the logical properties of propositions, their relation to facts and sentences, and the parallel objects of commands and questions. The second part examines theories of intentionality and discusses the relationship between different theories of naming and different accounts of belief.
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  • Circularity and Paradox.Stephen Yablo - 2006 - In Thomas Bolander, Vincent F. Hendricks & Stig Andur Pedersen (eds.), Self-Reference. CSLI Publications. pp. 139--157.
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  • A Study of Spinoza's 'Ethics'.Jonathan Bennett - 1984 - Cambridge University Press.
    "With an astonishing erudition... and in a direct no-nonsense style, Bennett expounds, compares, and criticizes Spinoza’s theses.... No one can fail to profit from it. Bennett has succeeded in making Spinoza a philosopher of our time." --W. N. A. Klever, _Studia Spinoza_.
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  • Making Things Up.Karen Bennett - 2017 - Oxford University Press.
    We frequently speak of certain things or phenomena being built out of or based in others. Making Things Up concerns these relations, which connect more fundamental things to less fundamental things: Karen Bennett calls these 'building relations'. She aims to illuminate what it means to say that one thing is more fundamental than another.
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  • Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
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  • Necessitarian Propositions.Jonathan Schaffer - 2012 - Synthese 189 (1):119-162.
    Kaplan (drawing on Montague and Prior, inter alia) made explicit the idea of world and time neutral propositions, which bear truth values only relative to world and time parameters. There was then a debate over the role of time. Temporalists sided with Kaplan in maintaining time neutral propositions with time relative truth values, while eternalists claimed that all propositions specify the needed time information and so bear the same truth value at all times. But there never was much of a (...)
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  • An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
    "This is an important book, and no one interested in issues which touch on the free will will want to ignore it."--Ethics. In this stimulating and thought-provoking book, the author defends the thesis that free will is incompatible with determinism. He disputes the view that determinism is necessary for moral responsbility. Finding no good reason for accepting determinism, but believing moral responsiblity to be indubitable, he concludes that determinism should be rejected.
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  • The Principle of Sufficient Reason: A Reassessment.Alexander R. Pruss - 2006 - Cambridge University Press.
    The Principle of Sufficient Reason says that all contingent facts must have explanation. In this 2006 volume, which was the first on the topic in the English language in nearly half a century, Alexander Pruss examines the substantive philosophical issues raised by the Principle Reason. Discussing various forms of the PSR and selected historical episodes, from Parmenides, Leibnez, and Hume, Pruss defends the claim that every true contingent proposition must have an explanation against major objections, including Hume's imaginability argument and (...)
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  • Varieties of Indefinite Extensibility.Gabriel Uzquiano - 2015 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 56 (1):147-166.
    We look at recent accounts of the indefinite extensibility of the concept set and compare them with a certain linguistic model of indefinite extensibility. We suggest that the linguistic model has much to recommend over alternative accounts of indefinite extensibility, and we defend it against three prima facie objections.
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  • Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.
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  • A Logical Analysis of Some Value Concepts.Frederic Fitch - 1963 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 28 (2):135-142.
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  • The Principle of Sufficient Reason and Necessitarianism.Kris McDaniel - 2019 - Analysis 79 (2):230-236.
    Peter van Inwagen presented a powerful argument against the Principle of Sufficient Reason, which I henceforth abbreviate as ‘PSR’. For decades, the consensus was that this argument successfully refuted PSR. However, now a growing consensus holds that van Inwagen’s argument is fatally flawed, at least when ‘sufficient reason’ is understood in terms of ground, for on this understanding, an ineliminable premiss of van Inwagen’s argument is demonstrably false and cannot be repaired. I will argue that this growing consensus is mistaken (...)
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  • Emptying a Paradox of Ground.Jack Woods - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (4):631-648.
    Sometimes a fact can play a role in a grounding explanation, but the particular content of that fact make no difference to the explanation—any fact would do in its place. I call these facts vacuous grounds. I show that applying the distinction between-vacuous grounds allows us to give a principled solution to Kit Fine and Stephen Kramer’s paradox of ground. This paradox shows that on minimal assumptions about grounding and minimal assumptions about logic, we can show that grounding is reflexive, (...)
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  • “Knowability and Constructivism&Quot.Timothy Williamson - 1988 - Philosophical Quarterly 38 (53):422-432.
    If anti-realism is defined as the principle that all truths are knowable, then anti-realists have a reason to revise logic. For an argument first published by Fitch seems to reduce anti-realism to absurdity within classical but not constructivist logic. One might try to sever this link between anti-realism and revisionism in logic by giving either a modified version of anti-realism not vulnerable to Fitch's argument within classical logic or a modified version of Fitch's argument to which anti-realism is vulnerable within (...)
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  • Intuitionism Disproved?Timothy Williamson - 1982 - Analysis 42 (4):203--7.
    Perennial philosophers' hopes are unlikely victims of swift, natural deduction. Yet anti-realism has been thought one. Not hoping for anti-realism myself I here show it, lest it be underestimated, to survive the following argument, adapted from W. D.Hart pp. 156, 164-5; he credits first publication to Fitch).
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  • Knowability and Constructivism.Timothy Williamson - 1988 - Philosophical Quarterly 38 (153):422-432.
    There is an argument which seems to show that if all truths are knowable then all truths are known. It may be viewed as a "reductio ad absurdum" of certain forms of antirealism. However, The claim has been made elsewhere that the argument fails against antirealists who employ constructivist rather than classical logic. The paper defends and amplifies this claim against criticisms by crispin wright and others. Relations between knowability and time are discussed. Suggestions are also made about the proper (...)
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  • Objects of Thought.A. N. Prior, P. T. Geach & A. J. P. Kenny - 1971 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 165 (1):85-86.
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  • An essay on free will.Peter van Inwagen & A. Phillips Griffiths - 1985 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 175 (4):557-558.
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  • Appendix.[author unknown] - 1994 - Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft Und Geistesgeschichte 68 (1):289-289.
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  • A Study of Spinoza's Ethics.Jonathan Bennett - 1984 - Critica 16 (48):110-112.
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