Gorgias ist - nach Umfang und Gehalt - einer der großen Dialoge Platons. In den Diskussionen des Sokrates geht es um das Verhältnis von Rhetorik, Macht, Gerechtigkeit und Glück, um die Beziehung zwischen der Lust und dem Guten und um die Frage nach der richtigen Lebensführung. Aus Kritik an den Politikern Athens entwickelt Platon Thesen einer guten und richtigen Politik. Ein Schlussmythos bestätigt die von Sokrates vertretenen Grundsätze. Die Übersetzung gibt Inhalt und Sprachduktus des Originals in zeitgemäßem Deutsch möglichst getreu (...) wieder. Der Kommentar ist so gestaltet, dass er auch für Leser ohne Griechischkenntnisse verständlich ist. Er enthält Erklärungen zum Inhalt, zur (philosophischen Fach-) Sprache und literarischen Gestaltung und stellt Bezüge her zu den anderen Schriften Platons sowie zu thematisch einschlägigen Aussagen von Autoren des 5. und 4. Jahrhunderts v. Chr. (shrink)

Bruno Latour was once asked : "Do you believe in reality?" This text is an attempt to answer this question.

From the book: What is to be done with political ecology? Nothing. What is to be done? Political ecology!

The last and most poignant of these essays is The Intruder, Nancys philosophical meditation on his heart transplant.

In this highly original work, Teed Rockwell rejects both dualism and the mind-brain identity theory. He proposes instead that mental phenomena emerge not merely from brain activity but from an interacting nexus of brain, body, and world. The mind can be seen not as an organ within the body, but as a "behavioral field" that fluctuates within this brain-body-world nexus. If we reject the dominant form of the mind-brain identity theory -- which Rockwell calls "Cartesian materialism" -- and accept this (...) new alternative, then many philosophical and scientific problems can be solved. Other philosophers have flirted with these ideas, including Dewey, Heidegger, Putnam, Millikan, and Dennett. But Rockwell goes further than these tentative speculations and offers a detailed alternative to the dominant philosophical view, applying pragmatist insights to contemporary scientific and philosophical problems. Rockwell shows that neuroscience no longer supports the mind-brain identity theory because the brain cannot be isolated from the rest of the nervous system; moreover, there is evidence that the mind is hormonal as well as neural. These data, and Rockwell's reanalysis of the concept of causality, show why the borders of mental embodiment cannot be neatly drawn at the skull, or even at the skin. Rockwell then demonstrates how his proposed view of the mind can resolve paradoxes engendered by the mind-brain identity theory in such fields as neuroscience, artificial intelligence, epistemology, and philosophy of language. Finally, he argues that understanding the mind as a "behavioral field" supports the new cognitive science paradigm of dynamic systems theory. (shrink)

In this highly original work, Teed Rockwell rejects both dualism and the mind-brain identity theory. He proposes instead that mental phenomena emerge not merely from brain activity but from an interacting nexus of brain, body, and world. The mind can be seen not as an organ within the body, but as a "behavioral field" that fluctuates within this brain-body-world nexus. If we reject the dominant form of the mind-brain identity theory -- which Rockwell calls "Cartesian materialism" -- and accept this (...) new alternative, then many philosophical and scientific problems can be solved. Other philosophers have flirted with these ideas, including Dewey, Heidegger, Putnam, Millikan, and Dennett. But Rockwell goes further than these tentative speculations and offers a detailed alternative to the dominant philosophical view, applying pragmatist insights to contemporary scientific and philosophical problems. Rockwell shows that neuroscience no longer supports the mind-brain identity theory because the brain cannot be isolated from the rest of the nervous system; moreover, there is evidence that the mind is hormonal as well as neural. These data, and Rockwell's reanalysis of the concept of causality, show why the borders of mental embodiment cannot be neatly drawn at the skull, or even at the skin. Rockwell then demonstrates how his proposed view of the mind can resolve paradoxes engendered by the mind-brain identity theory in such fields as neuroscience, artificial intelligence, epistemology, and philosophy of language. Finally, he argues that understanding the mind as a "behavioral field" supports the new cognitive science paradigm of dynamic systems theory. (shrink)