This paper argues for a conception of the natural rights of non-human animals grounded in Kant’s explanation of the foundation of human rights. The rights in question are rights that are in the first instance held against humanity collectively speaking—against our species conceived as an organized body capable of collective action. The argument proceeds by first developing a similar case for the right of every human individual who is in need of aid to get it, and then showing why the (...) situation of animals is similar. I first review some of the reasons why people are resistant to the idea that animals might have rights. I then explain Kant’s conception of natural rights. I challenge the idea that duties of aid and duties of kindness to animals fit the traditional category of “imperfect duties” and argue that they are instead cases of “imperfect right.” I explain how you can hold a right against a group, and why it is legitimate to conceive of humanity as such a group. I then argue that Kant’s account of the foundation of property rights is grounded in a conception of the common possession of the Earth that grounds a right to aid and the rights of animals to be treated in ways that are consistent with their good. Finally, I return to the objections to the idea that animals have rights and offer some responses to them. (shrink)

Kant’s justification of possession appears to assume rather than prove its legitimacy. This apparent question-begging has been recapitulated or exacerbated but not resolved in the literature. However, Kant provides a sound justification of limited rights to possess and use things (qualified choses in possession), not of private property rights. Kant’s argument is not purely a priori; it is in Kant’s Critical sense ‘metaphysical’ because it applies the pure a priori ‘Universal Principles of Right’ to the concept of finite rational human (...) agency. This use implicitly involves a ‘Contradiction in Conception’ test, which I explicate in detail. The limited rights to possession and use justified by Kant’s argument suffice for his social contract argument for the legitimacy of the state. (shrink)

Contemporary liberalism, which prescribes state regulation of property for purposes of welfare but proscribes state regulation of the expression of thought and conscience, may seem inherently paradoxical. Kant's analysis of property, however, shows that political liberalism is coherent and indeed necessitated by Kantian moral principles. For property rights are constituted by interpersonal agreement to defer to an owner's claim to an object; and if such agreement is to be rightfully, that is, freely obtained, then it can only be obtained under (...) conditions of fairness that would make it rational for all affected by the claim to so defer, and can rightfully be restricted to such conditions by political means. Freedom of thought and expression, however, has no inherent dependence on the agreement of others, and thus gives rise to no right for the state to regulate it except in marginal cases which can be analyzed as ordinary action rather than thought and its expression. Fundamental differences in ontology thus give rise to fundamental differences in the rightful use of political regulation. Der heutige Liberalismus, der einerseits die staatliche Regulierung des Eigentums für Zwecke der Wohlfahrt fordert, andererseits die staatliche Regulierung des Ausdrucks von Gedanken und Gewissen verbieten möchte, könnte schon an sich selbst betrachtet als paradox erscheinen. Kants Deutung des Eigentums zeigt jedoch, daß der politische Liberalismus kohärent ist und aus Kants moralischen Prinzipien auch tatsächlich folgt. Eigentumsrechte entstehen aus der Übereinkunft zwischen Personen, die Ansprüche, die Eigentümer auf ihre Sachen erheben, auch anzuerkennen. Wenn eine derartige Übereinkunft rechtmäßig und also frei zustandekommen soll, kann sie nur unter der Bedingung der Fairneß zustandekommen, die es für alle Betroffenen als vernünftig erscheinen läßt, die fraglichen Eigentumsansprüche anzuerkennen. Deshalb kann die Übereinkunft auch durch politische Mittel auf die Bedingung der Fairneß eingeschränkt werden. Die Freiheit der Gedanken und des Ausdrucks von Gedanken dagegen steht in keiner inneren Abhängigkeit von der Zustimmung anderer, und das bedeutet, daß der Staat kein Recht hat, sie zu regulieren, außer in Randbereichen, in denen gewisse Äußerungen eher als Handlungen im gewöhnlichen Sinne denn als Ausdruck von Gedanken eingestuft werden können. Grundsätzliche Unterschiede in der Ontologie führen so zu grundsätzlichen Unterschieden im rechtmäßigen Gebrauch politischer Regulierung. (shrink)