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  1. Williamson on Counterpossibles.Berto Francesco, David Ripley, Graham Priest & Rohan French - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (4):693-713.
    A counterpossible conditional is a counterfactual with an impossible antecedent. Common sense delivers the view that some such conditionals are true, and some are false. In recent publications, Timothy Williamson has defended the view that all are true. In this paper we defend the common sense view against Williamson’s objections.
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  • Able to Do the Impossible.Jack Spencer - 2017 - Mind 126 (502):466-497.
    According to a widely held principle—the poss-ability principle—an agent, S, is able to only if it is metaphysically possible for S to. I argue against the poss-ability principle by developing a novel class of counterexamples. I then argue that the consequences of rejecting the poss-ability principle are interesting and far-reaching.
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  • A Reconsideration of an Argument against Compatibilism.Thomas J. McKay & David Johnson - 1996 - Philosophical Topics 24 (2):113-122.
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  • Impossible Worlds: A Modest Approach.Daniel Nolan - 1997 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (4):535-572.
    Reasoning about situations we take to be impossible is useful for a variety of theoretical purposes. Furthermore, using a device of impossible worlds when reasoning about the impossible is useful in the same sorts of ways that the device of possible worlds is useful when reasoning about the possible. This paper discusses some of the uses of impossible worlds and argues that commitment to them can and should be had without great metaphysical or logical cost. The paper then provides an (...)
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  • The Consequence Argument.Peter van Inwagen - 1991 - In Peter van Inwagen & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Metaphysics: The Big Questions. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
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  • Outline of a theory of truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
    A formal theory of truth, alternative to tarski's 'orthodox' theory, based on truth-value gaps, is presented. the theory is proposed as a fairly plausible model for natural language and as one which allows rigorous definitions to be given for various intuitive concepts, such as those of 'grounded' and 'paradoxical' sentences.
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  • The irrelevance of the consequence argument.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2008 - Analysis 68 (1):13–22.
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  • Free will remains a mystery.Peter Van Inwagen - 2000 - Philosophical Perspectives 14:1-20.
    This paper has two parts. In the first part, I concede an error in an argument I have given for the incompatibility of free will and determinism. I go on to show how to modify my argument so as to avoid this error, and conclude that the thesis that free will and determinism are compatible continues to be—to say the least—implausible. But if free will is incompatible with determinism, we are faced with a mystery, for free will undeniably exists, and (...)
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  • Van Inwagen on free will.Peter Van Inwagen - 2004 - In Joseph Keim Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & David Shier (eds.), Freedom and Determinism. Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.
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  • Compatibilism and the notion of rendering something false.Benjamin Sebastian Schnieder - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 117 (3):409-428.
    In my paper I am concerned with Peter van Inwagen's Consequence Argument. I focus on its probably best known version. In this form it crucially employs the notion of rendering a proposition false, anotion that has never been made sufficiently clear. The main aim of my paper is to shed light on thisnotion. The explications offered so far in thedebate all are based on modal concepts. Iargue that for sufficient results a ``stronger'', hyper-intensional concept is needed, namely the concept expressed (...)
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  • The consequence argument ungrounded.Marco Hausmann - 2018 - Synthese 195 (11):4931-4950.
    Peter van Inwagen’s original formulation of the Consequence Argument employed an inference rule that was shown to be invalid given van Inwagen’s interpretation of the modal operators in the Consequence Argument. In response, van Inwagen recently suggested a revised interpretation of his modal operators. Following up on a debate between Blum and Schnieder, I analyze van Inwagen’s revised interpretation in terms of explanatory notions and I argue that van Inwagen faces a dilemma: he either has to admit that beta entails (...)
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  • Syntactical Treatments of Modality, with Corollaries on Reflexion Principles and Finite Axiomatizability.Richard Montague - 1963 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 40 (4):600-601.
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  • .Peter van Inwagen - 1988
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  • What Truth Depends on.Hannes Leitgeb - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 34 (2):155-192.
    What kinds of sentences with truth predicate may be inserted plausibly and consistently into the T-scheme? We state an answer in terms of dependence: those sentences which depend directly or indirectly on non-semantic states of affairs (only). In order to make this precise we introduce a theory of dependence according to which a sentence φ is said to depend on a set Φ of sentences iff the truth value of φ supervenes on the presence or absence of the sentences of (...)
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  • Incompatibilism proved.Alexander R. Pruss - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (4):430-437.
    (2013). Incompatibilism proved. Canadian Journal of Philosophy. ???aop.label???
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  • Towards a logic 0f type-free modality and truth.Hannes Leitgeb - 2007 - In C. Dimitracopoulos, L. Newelski & D. Normann (eds.), Logic Colloquium 2005: Proceedings of the Annual European Summer Meeting of the Association for Symbolic Logic, Held in Athens, Greece, July 28-August 3, 2005. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 28--68.
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