Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. The Role of the Priority Rule in Science.Michael Strevens - 2003 - Journal of Philosophy 100 (2):55-79.
    Science's priority rule rewards those who are first to make a discovery, at the expense of all other scientists working towards the same goal, no matter how close they may be to making the same discovery. I propose an explanation of the priority rule that, better than previous explanations, accounts for the distinctive features of the rule. My explanation treats the priority system, and more generally, any scheme of rewards for scientific endeavor, as a device for achieving an allocation of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   99 citations  
  • Accuracy and the Laws of Credence.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - Oxford University Press UK.
    Richard Pettigrew offers an extended investigation into a particular way of justifying the rational principles that govern our credences. The main principles that he justifies are the central tenets of Bayesian epistemology, though many other related principles are discussed along the way. Pettigrew looks to decision theory in order to ground his argument. He treats an agent's credences as if they were a choice she makes between different options, gives an account of the purely epistemic utility enjoyed by different sets (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   91 citations  
  • The Advancement of Science: Science Without Legend, Objectivity Without Illusions.Philip Kitcher - 1993 - Oxford University Press.
    During the last three decades, reflections on the growth of scientific knowledge have inspired historians, sociologists, and some philosophers to contend that scientific objectivity is a myth. In this book, Kitcher attempts to resurrect the notions of objectivity and progress in science by identifying both the limitations of idealized treatments of growth of knowledge and the overreactions to philosophical idealizations. Recognizing that science is done not by logically omniscient subjects working in isolation, but by people with a variety of personal (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   511 citations  
  • The Credit Economy and the Economic Rationality of Science.Kevin J. S. Zollman - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (1):5-33.
    Theories of scientific rationality typically pertain to belief. In this paper, the author argues that we should expand our focus to include motivations as well as belief. An economic model is used to evaluate whether science is best served by scientists motivated only by truth, only by credit, or by both truth and credit. In many, but not all, situations, scientists motivated by both truth and credit should be judged as the most rational scientists.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • The Division of Cognitive Labor.Philip Kitcher - 1990 - Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):5-22.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   103 citations  
  • Truth and Confirmation.Michael Friedman - 1979 - Journal of Philosophy 76 (7):361-382.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • Is a Bird in the Hand Worth Two in the Bush? Or, Whether Scientists Should Publish Intermediate Results.Thomas Boyer - 2014 - Synthese 191 (1):17-35.
    A part of the scientific literature consists of intermediate results within a longer project. Scientists often publish a first result in the course of their work, while aware that they should soon achieve a more advanced result from this preliminary result. Should they follow the proverb “a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush”, and publish any intermediate result they get? This is the normative question addressed in this paper. My aim is to clarify, to refine, and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • On Fraud.Liam Kofi Bright - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):291-310.
    Preferably scientific investigations would promote true rather than false beliefs. The phenomenon of fraud represents a standing challenge to this veritistic ideal. When scientists publish fraudulent results they knowingly enter falsehoods into the information stream of science. Recognition of this challenge has prompted calls for scientists to more consciously adopt the veritistic ideal in their own work. In this paper I argue against such promotion of the veritistic ideal. It turns out that a sincere desire on the part of scientists (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • Reflection on Rules in Science: An Invisible-Hand Perspective.Thomas C. Leonard - 2002 - Journal of Economic Methodology 9 (2):141-168.
    Can successful science accommodate a realistic view of scientific motivation? The Received View in theory of science has a theory of scientific success but no theory of scientific motivation. Critical Science Studies has a theory of scientific motivation but denies any prospect for (epistemologically meaningful) scientific success. Neither can answer the question because both regard the question as immaterial. Arguing from the premise that an adequate theory of science needs both a theory of scientific motivation, and a theory of scientific (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique.Thomas Kelly - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):612–640.
    In this paper, I explore the relationship between epistemic rationality and instrumental rationality, and I attempt to delineate their respective roles in typical instances of theoretical reasoning. My primary concern is with the instrumentalist conception of epistemic rationality: the view that epistemic rationality is simply a species of instrumental rationality, viz. instrumental rationality in the service of one's cognitive or epistemic goals. After sketching the relevance of the instrumentalist conception to debates over naturalism and 'the ethics of belief', I argue (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   147 citations  
  • Epistemic Landscapes and the Division of Cognitive Labor.Michael Weisberg & Ryan Muldoon - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (2):225-252.
    Because of its complexity, contemporary scientific research is almost always tackled by groups of scientists, each of which works in a different part of a given research domain. We believe that understanding scientific progress thus requires understanding this division of cognitive labor. To this end, we present a novel agent-based model of scientific research in which scientists divide their labor to explore an unknown epistemic landscape. Scientists aim to climb uphill in this landscape, where elevation represents the significance of the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   89 citations  
  • How Much Evidence Should One Collect?Remco Heesen - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2299-2313.
    A number of philosophers of science and statisticians have attempted to justify conclusions drawn from a finite sequence of evidence by appealing to results about what happens if the length of that sequence tends to infinity. If their justifications are to be successful, they need to rely on the finite sequence being either indefinitely increasing or of a large size. These assumptions are often not met in practice. This paper analyzes a simple model of collecting evidence and finds that the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • The Independence Thesis: When Individual and Social Epistemology Diverge.Conor Mayo-Wilson, Kevin J. S. Zollman & David Danks - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (4):653-677.
    In the latter half of the twentieth century, philosophers of science have argued (implicitly and explicitly) that epistemically rational individuals might compose epistemically irrational groups and that, conversely, epistemically rational groups might be composed of epistemically irrational individuals. We call the conjunction of these two claims the Independence Thesis, as they together imply that methodological prescriptions for scientific communities and those for individual scientists might be logically independent of one another. We develop a formal model of scientific inquiry, define four (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  • Communism and the Incentive to Share in Science.Remco Heesen - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (4):698-716.
    The communist norm requires that scientists widely share the results of their work. Where did this norm come from, and how does it persist? Michael Strevens provides a partial answer to these questions by showing that scientists should be willing to sign a social contract that mandates sharing. However, he also argues that it is not in an individual credit-maximizing scientist's interest to follow this norm. I argue against Strevens that individual scientists can rationally conform to the communist norm, even (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Scientific Collaboration: Do Two Heads Need to Be More Than Twice Better Than One?Thomas Boyer-Kassem & Cyrille Imbert - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (4):667-688.
    Epistemic accounts of scientific collaboration usually assume that, one way or another, two heads really are more than twice better than one. We show that this hypothesis is unduly strong. We present a deliberately crude model with unfavorable hypotheses. We show that, even then, when the priority rule is applied, large differences in successfulness can emerge from small differences in efficiency, with sometimes increasing marginal returns. We emphasize that success is sensitive to the structure of competing communities. Our results suggest (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • The Epistemic Division of Labor Revisited.Johanna Thoma - 2015 - Philosophy of Science 82 (3):454-472.
    Some scientists are happy to follow in the footsteps of others; some like to explore novel approaches. It is tempting to think that herein lies an epistemic division of labor conducive to overall scientific progress: the latter point the way to fruitful areas of research, and the former more fully explore those areas. Weisberg and Muldoon’s model, however, suggests that it would be best if all scientists explored novel approaches. I argue that this is due to implausible modeling choices, and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  • The Epistemic Benefit of Transient Diversity.Kevin J. S. Zollman - 2010 - Erkenntnis 72 (1):17-35.
    There is growing interest in understanding and eliciting division of labor within groups of scientists. This paper illustrates the need for this division of labor through a historical example, and a formal model is presented to better analyze situations of this type. Analysis of this model reveals that a division of labor can be maintained in two different ways: by limiting information or by endowing the scientists with extreme beliefs. If both features are present however, cognitive diversity is maintained indefinitely, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   100 citations  
  • Expediting the Flow of Knowledge Versus Rushing Into Print.Remco Heesen - unknown
    Recent empirical work has shown that many scientific results may not be reproducible. By itself, this does not entail that there is a problem. However, I argue that there is a problem: the reward structure of science incentivizes scientists to focus on speed and impact at the expense of the reproducibility of their work. I illustrate this using a well-known failure of reproducibility: Fleischmann and Pons' work on cold fusion. I then use a rational choice model to identify a set (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Republic of Science.Michael Polanyi - 1962 - Minerva 1 (1):54-73.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   98 citations  
  • What’s Wrong with Invisible-Hand Explanations?David L. Hull - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64 (4):126.
    An invisible hand seems to play an important role in science. In this paper I set out the general structure of invisible-hand explanations, counter some objections that have been raised to them, and detail the role that they play in science. The most important issue is the character of the mechanisms that are supposed to bring about invisible-hand effects.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Science as a Process an Evolutionary Account of the Social and Conceptual Development of Science.David L. Hull - 1988 - University of Chicago Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   207 citations  
  • Scientific Sharing: Communism and the Social Contract.Michael Strevens - 2017 - In Thomas Boyer-Kassem, Conor Mayo-Wilson & Michael Weisberg (eds.), Scientific Collaboration and Collective Knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 3--33.
    Research programs regularly compete to achieve the same goal, such as the discovery of the structure of DNA or the construction of a TEA laser. The more the competing programs share information, the faster the goal is likely to be reached, to society's benefit. But the "priority rule"—the scientific norm mandating that the first program to reach the goal in question receive all the credit for the achievement—provides a powerful disincentive for programs to share information. How, then, is the clash (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Policing Epistemic Communities.Justin P. Bruner - 2013 - Episteme 10 (4):403-416.
    I examine how particular social arrangements and incentive structures encourage the honest reporting of experimental results and minimize fraudulent scientific work. In particular I investigate how epistemic communities can achieve this goal by promoting members to police the community. Using some basic tools from game theory, I explore a simple model in which scientists both conduct research and have the option of investigating the findings of their peers. I find that this system of peer policing can in many cases ensure (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations