(1938). The radiant heat spectrum from Herschel to Melloni.—II. The work of Melloni and his contemporaries. Annals of Science: Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 402-416.

Herschel's experiments on radiant heat are analysed to see how he understood the role of experiment and how he handled potential difficulties in measurement. He believed that experiments could answer essential questions about nature and was willing to change his mind in light of evidence. Potential problems with data did not shake his confidence in the results of his experiments. Herschel's critic, Leslie, had even less patience with experimental results that did not fit his theory. His harsh condemnations of Herschel's (...) work could not be empirically substantiated, but they pointed to problems of which Herschel was aware. Although the theories of both men about radiant heat have subsequently been abandoned, attempts to address their concerns and differences contributed to the development of the electromagnetic spectrum. The unification of radiant heat and light through the spectrum came about after better instruments made it possible to account for the rival claims of earlier experimenters. (shrink)

The ArgumentDuring the nineteenth century, physicists and chemists, using different linguistic modes of expression, sought to describe the world for different purposes; thus, both disciplines gradually were nudged toward demarcation and self-image identification. In the course of doing so the rich complexity of the empire of chemistry was born. The essential challenge was closely connected with analysis, synthesis, and chemical process: learning the art ofwatchingsubstances change andmakingsubstances change. Pursued in theory-poor and phenomenology-rich contexts chemistry nevertheless made itself intellectually, professionally, societally, (...) and industrially creditable and attractive. The developing links between physics and chemistry are examined in this paper from the perspective of the discipline of chemistry more specifically than from the side of physics. Chemists came to believe that essentially physics was no more than mechanics. All else belonged to the domain of chemistry.Not before the last decades of the century were firm collaborative links and genuine reciprocity fostered between physics and chemistry, and then primarily on account of the common utility of scientific research tools. At a more fundamental level physics and chemistry, in contradistinction to all the other natural sciences, experienced partial overlap and convergence because of unique mutual reliance on the construction of systems each according to its own theoretical conceptions. Still amalgamation was unthinkable. Eventually physical chemistry was loosened from chemistry in the same way that, somewhat later, chemical physics was emancipated from physics. The intrinsic messiness of chemistry, one might suggest, tends more readily to foster Bohr's opinion that “there is no rock bottom to the study of nature,” rather than Einstein's view that “we can realistically, ultimately, put it all together.”. (shrink)

A central figure in Victorian science, William Whewell held professorships in Mineralogy and Moral Philosophy at Trinity College, Cambridge, before becoming Master of the college in 1841. His mathematical textbooks, such as A Treatise on Dynamics, were instrumental in bringing French analytical methods into British science. This three-volume history, first published in 1837, is one of Whewell's most famous works. Taking the 'acute, but fruitless, essays of Greek philosophy' as a starting point, it provides a history of the physical sciences (...) that culminates with the mechanics, astronomy, and chemistry of 'modern times'. Volume 2 focuses on the rise and development of modern mechanics in the seventeenth century. Whewell shows how Galileo's laws of motion exemplify a paradigmatic shift from 'formal' to 'physical' sciences - a new approach concerned with explaining causes rather than merely observing phenomena. It also discusses the implications for physical astronomy of Newton's discoveries. (shrink)

The problem of natural kinds forms the busy crossroads where a number of larger problems meet: the problem of universals, the problem of induction and projectibility, the problem of natural laws and de re modalities, the problem of meaning and reference, the problem of intertheoretic reduction, the question of the aim of science, and the problem of scientific realism in general. Nor do these exhaust the list. Not surprisingly then, different writers confront a different ‘problem of natural kinds,’ depending on (...) which background issue is for them the principal issue at stake. The issues of essentialism, meaning, and reference, for example, have tended to dominate recent discussions of natural kinds. But evidently these are only part of the puzzle. (shrink)