The creation of new wetlands along rivers as an instrument to mitigate flood risks in times of climate change seduces us to approach the landscape from a 'managerial' perspective and threatens a more place-oriented approach. How to provide ecological restoration with a broad cultural context that can help prevent these new landscapes from becoming nonplaces, devoid of meaning and with no real connection to our habitable world. In this paper, I discuss three possible alternative interpretations of the meaning of places (...) and place attachment in these ‘new nature’ projects, and show how all three imply a different view on human identity and history. (shrink)

If we are to assess whether our attitudes towards nature are morally, aesthetically or in any other way appropriate or inappropriate, then we will need to know what those attitudes are. Drawing on the works of Katie McShane, Alan Holland and Christine Swanton, I challenge the common assumption that to love, respect, honour, cherish or adopt any other sort of pro-attitude towards any natural X simply is to value X in some way and to some degree. Depending on how one (...) interprets ‘value’, that assumption is, I contend, either false or vacuous. I argue that to assess the appropriateness of a person’s pro-attitudes towards a natural entity one must in some cases appeal to the concepts of status and/or bond, and not just that of value. To develop my argument, I appeal to the works of two nature writers – Robert Macfarlane and J. A. Baker. (shrink)

I argue that our current understanding of the philosophical dimensions of environmental injustice neglects an important component of those injustices. Specifically, by focusing on distributive, participatory and recognitional injustice, we fail to respond to the ways that environmental exposures, even in the absence of physiological harms, can impact upon a person’s experience of herself as a political agent. This has important implications for interventions in cases of environmental injustice, but also for how we understand what is required for full participation (...) in a polity. (shrink)

An extension of Alasdair MacIntyre's concept of 'virtues of acknowledged dependence', to include relationships with the non-human world, offers an organising principle for environmental virtue ethics. It situates ecological virtue among more traditional virtues of inter-human relationships, and may thereby contribute to an ethical reconciliation of policies aimed at encouraging ecological virtue with those aimed at protecting the freedoms required for personal autonomy. Within this eudaimonist framework, ecological virtue may be understood and promoted as directly contributing to a good life.

Lever-Tracy (2010) concluded from a review of major international sociological journals that sociology is 'lagging behind' in terms of research on the challenges of global climate change. More recently, John Urry (2011) contributed a rather speculative book on 'post-carbon sociology', yet sociologists continue to lag behind geographers and psychologists in contemplating the social and cultural dimensions of climate-change adaptation. The findings of the present paper suggest that the sociology of climate-change adaptation could take its lead from the work of cultural (...) and human geographers on people-place relationships, and engage with art theory and practice to offer imaginative insights into the scope and scale of the climate-change challenge. Sociologists could also make a major contribution to current debate on the roles of community action and community engagement in climate-change adaptation, noting that the word 'community' is open to abuse and misunderstanding. Drawing on his own research on the challenges facing local communities in Australia and Sri Lanka, the author combines previously disconnected bodies of literature to identify some important points of departure for the journey towards Urry's 'post-carbon sociology'. (shrink)