The notion of scope as it relates to a model of logical form is discussed. The inability of the accepted definition of scope to account for the contrast between priority scope - the logical priority of different quantifiers & other logical notions via rule ordering - & binding scope - the identification of the connection between variables of quantification & a particular quantifier - is demonstrated. The semantic ambiguity of this dichotomy of scope is explored via examination of donkey sentences. (...) A formal representation of this dichotomy is suggested. The government-binding approach & principle of compositionality that handle scope relations via the logical form is rejected due to the complexity of the mechanism by which syntactic form results in logical forms. A discourse representational approach is also rejected. It is concluded that the interaction of syntax & semantics is instead better represented by a game-theoretical treatment of scope & anaphora. 26 References. T. Rosenberg. (shrink)

The over-arching theme is that we can redeem Frege's key philosophical insights concerning (natural and real) numbers and our knowledge of them, despite Russell's famous discovery of paradox in Frege's own theory of classes. That paradox notwithstanding, numbers are still logical objects, in some sense created or generated by methods or principles of abstraction— which of course cannot be as ambitious as Frege's Basic Law U. These principles not only bring numbers into existence, as it were, but also afford a (...) distinctive form of epistemic access to them. The usual mathematical axioms governing the two kinds of numbers are to be derived as results in (higher-order) logic. These derivations will exploit appropriate definitions of the primitive constants, functions, and predicates of the brand of number theory concerned. (For example: 0, 1; s, +, x; (; N(z); R(z).) No supplementation by intuition or sensory experience will be needed in the derivations of these axioms. The trains of reasoning involved will depend only on our grasp of logical validities, supplemented by appropriate definitions. Result: logicism is vindicated; and the mathematical knowledge derived in this way is revealed to be analytic, not synthetic. (shrink)