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  1. (1 other version)Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
    Crispin Wright offers an original perspective on the place of “realism” in philosophical inquiry. He proposes a radically new framework for discussing the claims of the realists and the anti-realists. This framework rejects the classical “deflationary” conception of truth yet allows both disputants to respect the intuition that judgments, whose status they contest, are at least semantically fitted for truth and may often justifiably be regarded as true. In the course of his argument, Wright offers original critical discussions of many (...)
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  • (1 other version)Deflationist Views of Meaning and Content.Hartry Field - 2005-01-01 - In José Medina & David Wood (eds.), Truth. Blackwell.
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  • Theories of Truth: A Critical Introduction.Richard L. Kirkham - 1992 - Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
    Theories of Truth provides a clear, critical introduction to one of the most difficult areas of philosophy. It surveys all of the major philosophical theories of truth, presenting the crux of the issues involved at a level accessible to nonexperts yet in a manner sufficiently detailed and original to be of value to professional scholars. Kirkham's systematic treatment and meticulous explanations of terminology ensure that readers will come away from this book with a comprehensive general understanding of one of philosophy's (...)
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  • (1 other version)Language, Truth, and Logic.A. J. Ayer - 1936 - Philosophy 23 (85):173-176.
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  • (2 other versions)Philosophy of Logic.Michael Jubien & W. V. Quine - 1988 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 53 (1):303.
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  • (5 other versions)Truth.J. L. Austin, P. F. Strawson & D. R. Cousin - 1950 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 24 (1):111-172.
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  • Understanding Truth.Scott Soames - 1998 - Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press USA.
    In this book, Scott Soames illuminates the notion of truth and the role it plays in our ordinary thought as well as in our logical, philosophical, and scientific theories. Soames aims to integrate and deepen the most significant insights on truth from a variety of sources. He powerfully brings together the best technical work and the most important philosophical reflection on truth and shows how each can illuminate the other. Investigating such questions as whether we need a truth predicate at (...)
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  • (1 other version)Truth.Paul Horwich - 1990 - Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press. Edited by Frank Jackson & Michael Smith.
    Paul Horwich gives the definitive exposition of a prominent philosophical theory about truth, `minimalism'. His theory has attracted much attention since the first edition of Truth in 1990; he has now developed, refined, and updated his treatment of the subject, while preserving the distinctive format of the book. This revised edition appears simultaneously with a new companion volume, Meaning; the two books demystify central philosophical issues, and will be essential reading for all who work on the philosophy of language.
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  • (1 other version)Tracking Reason: Proof, Consequence, and Truth.Jody Azzouni - 2005 - Oxford, England: Oup Usa.
    When ordinary people - mathematicians among them - take something to follow from something else, they are exposing the backbone of our self-ascribed ability to reason. Jody Azzouni investigates the connection between that ordinary notion of consequence and the formal analogues invented by logicians. One claim of the book is that, despite our apparent intuitive grasp of consequence, we do not introspect rules by which we reason, nor do we grasp the scope and range of the domain, as it were, (...)
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  • A Dilemma for the Weak Deflationist about Truth.Glen Hoffmann - 2007 - Sorites 18:129-137.
    The weak deflationist about truth is committed to two theses: one conceptual, the other ontological. On the conceptual thesis (what might be called a ‘triviality thesis’), the content of the truth predicate is exhausted by its involvement in some version of the ‘truth-schema’. On the ontological thesis, truth is a deflated property of truth bearers. In this paper, I focus on weak deflationism’s ontological thesis, arguing that it generates an instability in its view of truth: the view threatens to collapse (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Language, truth and logic.Alfred Jules Ayer - 1936 - London,: V. Gollancz.
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  • (5 other versions)Truth.P. F. Strawson - 1948 - Analysis 9 (6):83-97.
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  • Horwich's minimalist conception of truth: some logical difficulties.Sten Lindström - 2001 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 9:161-181.
    Aristotle’s words in the Metaphysics: “to say of what is that it is, or of what is not that it is not, is true” are often understood as indicating a correspondence view of truth: a statement is true if it corresponds to something in the world that makes it true. Aristotle’s words can also be interpreted in a deflationary, i.e., metaphysically less loaded, way. According to the latter view, the concept of truth is contained in platitudes like: ‘It is true (...)
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  • (1 other version)Facts and Propositions.Frank P. Ramsey - 1927 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 7 (1):153-170.
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  • Truth.Paul Horwich - 2005 - In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 261-272.
    What is truth. Paul Horwich advocates the controversial theory of minimalism, that is that the nature of truth is entirely captured in the trivial fact that each proposition specifies its own condition for being true, and that truth is therefore an entirely mundane and unpuzzling concept. The first edition of Truth, published in 1980, established itself as the best account of minimalism and as an excellent introduction to the debate for students. For this new edition, Horwich has refined and developed (...)
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  • Meaning.Paul Horwich - 1998 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    In this new book, the author of the classic Truth presents an original theory of meaning, demonstrates its richness, and defends it against all contenders. He surveys the diversity of twentieth-century philosophical insights into meaning and shows that his theory can reconcile these with a common-sense view of meaning as derived from use. Meaning and its companion volume Truth (now published in a revised edition) together demystify two central issues in philosophy and offer a controversial but compelling view of the (...)
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  • (1 other version)A realist conception of truth.William P. Alston - 1996 - Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
    William P. Alston formulates and defends a realist conception of truth, which he calls alethic realism (from "aletheia", Greek for "truth").
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  • Correspondence and disquotation: an essay on the nature of truth.Marian Alexander David - 1994 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    They reject the correspondence theory, insist truth is anemic, and advance an "anti-theory" of truth that is essentially a collection of platitudes: "Snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white; "Grass is green" is true if and only if grass is green. According to disquotationalists, the only profound insight about truth is that it lacks profundity. David contrasts the correspondence theory with disquotationalism and then develops the latter position in rich detail - more than has been (...)
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  • (1 other version)Truth and objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
    Recasting important questions about truth and objectivity in new and helpful terms, his book will become a focus in the contemporary debates over realism, and ...
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  • (1 other version)Philosophy of logic.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1986 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Edited by Simon Blackburn & Keith Simmons.
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  • Response to commentators.Review author[S.]: Crispin Wright - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):911-941.
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  • Minimalism and truth.John O'Leary-Hawthorne & Graham Oppy - 1997 - Noûs 31 (2):170-196.
    This paper canvasses the various dimensions along which theories of truth may disagree about the extent to which truth is minimal.
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  • Weak deflationism.Matthew McGrath - 1997 - Mind 106 (421):69-98.
    Is truth a substantial feature of truth-bearers? Correspondence theorists answer in the affirmative, deflationists in the negative. Correspondence theorists cite in their defense the dependence of truth on meaning or representational content. Deflationists in turn cite the conceptual centrality of simple equivalences such as ''Snow is white' is true iff snow is white'' and 'It is true that snow is white iff snow is white'. The apparent facts to which these theorists appeal correspond to some of our firmest and most (...)
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  • Minimalism.Anil Gupta - 1993 - Philosophical Perspectives 7:359-369.
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  • Minimalism, the generalization problem and the liar.Bradley Armour-Garb - 2004 - Synthese 139 (3):491 - 512.
    In defense of the minimalist conception of truth, Paul Horwich(2001) has recently argued that our acceptance of the instances of the schema,`the proposition that p is true if and only if p', suffices to explain our acceptanceof truth generalizations, that is, of general claims formulated using the truth predicate.In this paper, I consider the strategy Horwich develops for explaining our acceptance of truth generalizations. As I show, while perhaps workable on its own, the strategy is in conflictwith his response to (...)
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  • The status of content.Paul A. Boghossian - 1990 - Philosophical Review 99 (2):157-84.
    An irrealist conception of a given region of discourse is the view that no real properties answer to the central predicates of the region in question. Any such conception emerges, invariably, as the result of the interaction of two forces. An account of the meaning of the central predicates, along with a conception of the sorts of property the world may contain, conspire to show that, if the predicates of the region are taken to express properties, their extensions would have (...)
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  • (1 other version)Deflationist views of meaning and content.Hartry Field - 1994 - Mind 103 (411):249-285.
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  • (1 other version)The Semantic Definition of Truth.Max Black - 1948 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 13 (3):150-151.
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  • On the Proposed Exhaustion of Truth.John Collins - 2002 - Dialogue 41 (4):653.
    Dans la première partie de cet article, je presente une thèse parapluie — la thèse de l'«exhaustion» — qui cerne bien l'élément central des diverses positions déflationnistes au sujet de la vérité : l'idée que le contenu du prédicat de vérité s'épuise entièrement dans le contenu de ce à quoi le prédicats'applique. Je soutiens que cette thèse n'est supportée que d'une manière triviale par l'idée courante que la vérite résiste à une analyse substantielle, car les prédicats en général ne se (...)
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  • (3 other versions)A Critique of Deflationism.Anil Gupta - 1993 - Philosophical Topics 21 (1):57-81.
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  • True to the facts.Donald Davidson - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (21):748-764.
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  • The truth of modest realism.Ernest Sosa - 1993 - Philosophical Issues 3:177-195.
    True, the believing could not in those cir- cumstances be there the object of belief being there. accept a notion of correspondence or reference according to which a word or a brain state of ours can refer to some external or or independent (This no more forces.
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  • (1 other version)Deflationism and the derivation game.Adam Kovach - 1997 - Mind 106 (423):575-579.
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  • (1 other version)Discussion. Deflationism and the derivation game.A. Kovach - 1997 - Mind 106 (423):575-579.
    The deflationary theory of truth for propositions aims to explain everything that needs to be explained about truth of propositions by reference to the propositional truth schema, _it is true that p, _if and only if p. Previous formulations of the theory, e.g., Horwich's _minimalism, have failed to provide adequate explanatory derivations of general facts about truth. Matthew McGrath's _weak deflationism attempts to correct this failure. It is shown that weak deflationism does not provide adequate derivations of general facts about (...)
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  • (5 other versions)Truth.P. F. Strawson - 2005-01-01 - In José Medina & David Wood (eds.), Truth. Blackwell.
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  • (1 other version)A Prosentential theory of truth.Dorothy L. Grover, Joseph L. Camp & Nuel D. Belnap - 1975 - Philosophical Studies 27 (1):73--125.
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  • The Incomplete Universe: Totality, Knowledge, and Truth.Aladdin M. Yaqub & Patrick Grim - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (2):339.
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  • Response to Commentators.Crispin Wright - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (4):911-941.
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  • (5 other versions)Truth.P. F. Strawson - 1955 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 20 (3):299-299.
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  • The truth about deflationism.Scott Soames - 1997 - Philosophical Issues 8:1-44.
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  • (3 other versions)A Critique of Deflationism.Anil Gupta - 2005-01-01 - In José Medina & David Wood (eds.), Truth. Blackwell. pp. 282–387.
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  • (2 other versions)VI.—Symposium: “Facts and Propositions.”.F. P. Ramsey & G. E. Moore - 1927 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 7 (1):153-206.
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  • (2 other versions)VI.—Symposium: “Facts and Propositions.”.F. P. Ramsey & G. E. Moore - 1927 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 7 (1):153-206.
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  • (1 other version)Philosophy of Logic. [REVIEW]P. F. Strawson - 1971 - Journal of Philosophy 68 (6):174-178.
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  • A Defense Of Minimalism.Paul Horwich - 2001 - Synthese 126 (1-2):149-165.
    My aim in this paper is to clarify and defend a certain ‘minimalist’ thesis about truth: roughly, that the meaning of the truth predicate is fixed by the schema, ’The proposition that p is true if and only if p’.1 The several criticisms of this idea to which I wish to respond are to be found in the recent work of Davidson, Field, Gupta, Richard, and Soames, and in a classic paper of Dummett’s.
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  • The Incomplete Universe: Totality, Knowledge, and Truth.Elliott Mendelson & Patrick Grim - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (176):409.
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  • (3 other versions)A Critique of Deflationism.Anil Gupta - 1993 - Philosophical Topics 21 (2):57-81.
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  • Explicating truth: Minimalism and primitivism. [REVIEW]Dirk Greimann - 2000 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 31 (1):133-155.
    This paper pursues two goals. The first is to show that Horwich's anti-primitivist version of minimalism must be rejected because, already for formal reasons, the truth-schema does not achieve a positive explication of any property of propositions. The second goal is to develop a more moderate primitivist version of minimalism according to which the truth-schema is admittedly powerless to underpin truth with something more basic but it still succeeds in giving a complete account of the necessary and sufficient conditions for (...)
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  • (1 other version)The Semantic Definition of Truth.Max Black - 1947 - Analysis 8 (4):49 - 63.
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  • The Incomplete Universe: Totality, Knowledge, and Truth.Patrick Grim - 1991 - Cambridge: Mass.: Mit Press.
    This is an exploration of a cluster of related logical results. Taken together these seem to have something philosophically important to teach us: something about knowledge and truth and something about the logical impossibility of totalities of knowledge and truth. The book includes explorations of new forms of the ancient and venerable paradox of the :Liar, applications and extensions of Kaplan and Montague's paradox of the Knower, generalizations of Godel's work on incompleteness, and new uses of Cantorian diagonalization. Throughout, the (...)
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