- Expressivism, meaning, and all that.Sebastian Köhler - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (3-4):337-356.details
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The Alethic Platitudes, Deflationism, and Adverbial Quantification.Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (2):323-345.details
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Scientific Representation: An Inferentialist-Expressivist Manifesto.Kareem Khalifa, Jared Millson & Mark Risjord - 2022 - Philosophical Topics 50 (1):263-291.details
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Is deflationism compatible with compositional and tarskian truth theories?Lavinia Maria Picollo & Thomas Schindler - 2021 - In Carlo Nicolai & Johannes Stern (eds.), Modes of Truth: The Unified Approach to Truth, Modality, and Paradox. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Shadows of Syntax: Revitalizing Logical and Mathematical Conventionalism.Jared Warren - 2020 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.details
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Inheriting the World.Michel-Antoine Xhignesse - 2020 - Journal of Applied Logics 7 (2):163-70.details
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Deflationism and the Function of Truth.Lavinia Picollo & Thomas Schindler - 2018 - Philosophical Perspectives 32 (1):326-351.details
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Truth-Predicates Still Not like Pronouns: a Reply to Salis.Arvid Båve - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (5):1421-1429.details
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Pietro Salis, "Pratiche discorsive razionali. Studi sull'inferenzialismo di Robert Brandom", Milano-Udine, Mimesis Edizioni, 2016, pp. 332. [REVIEW]Giacomo Turbanti - 2018 - Aphex 17.details
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Anaphoric Deflationism, Primitivism, and the Truth Property.Pietro Salis - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (1):117-134.details
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Disagreement and the Normativity of Truth beneath Cognitive Command.Filippo Ferrari - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Aberdeendetails
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How can we come to know metaphysical modal truths?Amie L. Thomasson - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 8):2077-2106.details
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The Generality of Anaphoric Deflationism.Pietro Salis - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (2):505-522.details
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Truth Predicates, Truth Bearers, and their Variants.Friederike Moltmann - 2018 - Synthese (Suppl 2):1-28.details
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Is there a Commonsense Semantic Conception of Truth?Joseph Ulatowski - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (2):487-500.details
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Truth : a concept unlike any other.Jamin Asay - 2021 - Synthese 198 (Supplement issue 2):S605-S630.details
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Objects and Attitudes.Friederike Moltmann - forthcoming - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Contra-Axiomatics: A Non- Dogmatic And Non-Idealist Practice Of Resistance.Chris Henry - 2016 - Dissertation, University of Kentdetails
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From one to many: recent work on truth.Jeremy Wyatt & Michael Lynch - 2016 - American Philosophical Quarterly 53 (4):323-340.details
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Realism, inferential semantics, and the truth norm.Nicholas Tebben - 2017 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 4):955-973.details
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Correspondence via the Backdoor and Other Stories.Peter Alward - 2003 - Disputatio 1 (14):2-21.details
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Where the Paths Meet: Remarks on Truth and Paradox.Jc Beall - 2008 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):169-198.details
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Deflationism and Referential Indeterminacy.David E. Taylor - 2016 - Philosophical Review 126 (1):43-79.details
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Truth as a relational property.Douglas Edwards - 2016 - Synthese 198 (2):735-757.details
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Constituting assertion: a pragmatist critique of Horwich’s ‘Truth’.Andrew W. Howat - 2018 - Synthese 195 (3):935-954.details
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Reviews. [REVIEW]Susan Haack - 1977 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 28 (1):82-86.details
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THE TRANSCENDENTAL METAPHYSIC OF G.F. STOUT: HIS DEFENCE AND ELABORATION OF TROPE THEORY.Fraser Macbride - 2014 - In A. Reboul (ed.), Mind, Value and Metaphysics: Papers Dedicated to Kevin Mulligan. Springer. pp. 141-58.details
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Egocentric Content.Hartry Field - 2017 - Noûs 51 (3):521-546.details
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Truth, Meaning, and Circularity.Claire Horisk - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (2):269-300.details
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What Should Deflationism be when it Grows up?Claire Horisk - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 125 (3):371-397.details
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Deflationism And The Truth Conditional Theory of Meaning.Douglas Patterson - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 124 (3):271-294.details
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The many (yet few) faces of deflationism.Jeremy Wyatt - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly (263):362-382.details
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How Truth Behaves When There’s No Vicious Reference.Philip Kremer - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (4):345-367.details
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Does Moral Discourse Require Robust Truth?Fritz J. McDonald - 2009 - Logos Architekton 3.details
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Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings.David John Chalmers (ed.) - 2002 - New York: Oxford University Press USA.details
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Truth, Pretense and the Liar Paradox.Bradley Armour-Garb & James A. Woodbridge - 2015 - In T. Achourioti, H. Galinon, J. Martínez Fernández & K. Fujimoto (eds.), Unifying the Philosophy of Truth. Dordrecht: Imprint: Springer. pp. 339-354.details
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The Innocence of Truth.Cezary Cieśliński - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (1):61-85.details
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A Deflationist Error Theory of Properties.Arvid Båve - 2015 - Dialectica 69 (1):23-59.details
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Anaphoric Deflationism and Theories of Meaning.David Löwenstein - 2010 - In Theodora Achourioti, Edgar Andrade & Marc Staudacher (eds.), Proceedings of the Amsterdam Graduate Philosophy Conference. Meaning and Truth. Amsterdam, October 1-3, 2009. ILLC Publications. pp. 52-66.details
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A Correspondence Theory of Truth.Jay Newhard - 2002 - Dissertation, Brown Universitydetails
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Prosentence, Revision, Truth, and Paradox.Tim Maudlin - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (3):705-712.details
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International Handbook of Research in History, Philosophy and Science Teaching.Michael R. Matthews (ed.) - 2014 - Springer.details
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Pluralism and the absence of truth.Jeremy Wyatt - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Connecticutdetails
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∈ : Formal concepts in a material world truthmaking and exemplification as types of determination.Philipp Keller - 2007 - Dissertation, University of Genevadetails
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Deflationism and the Invisible Power of Truth.Andrea Strollo - 2013 - Dialectica 67 (4):521-543.details
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Charles Peirce's Limit Concept of Truth.Catherine Legg - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (3):204-213.details
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Is Truth an Epistemic Goal? A Conversationalist Approach.Federico Penelas - 2010 - Ideas Y Valores 59 (144):83–97.details
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El conversacionalismo y la verdad como norma de la aserción. El debate Rorty/Engel.Federico Penelas - 2009 - Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 34 (1):27-50.details
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Somehow Things Do Not Relate: On the Interpretation of Polyadic Second-Order Logic.Marcus Rossberg - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (3):341-350.details
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Against Truth.Jamin Asay - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (1):147-164.details
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