- Submit
-
Browse
- All Categories
- Metaphysics and Epistemology
- Value Theory
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Science, Logic, and Mathematics
- Logic and Philosophy of Logic
- Philosophy of Biology
- Philosophy of Cognitive Science
- Philosophy of Computing and Information
- Philosophy of Mathematics
- Philosophy of Physical Science
- Philosophy of Social Science
- Philosophy of Probability
- General Philosophy of Science
- Philosophy of Science, Misc
- History of Western Philosophy
- Philosophical Traditions
- Philosophy, Misc
- Other Academic Areas
- More
Switch to: Citations
References in:
El fenómeno de la percepción en Aristóteles y Merleau-Ponty
Ideas Y Valores 67 (166):13-48 (2018)
Add references
You must login to add references.
|
|
|
|
|
|
This essay argues that the Putnam-Nussbaum thesis that modern functionalism is Aristotelian is false. It fails as an interpretation of Aristotle since it fails to notice that Aristotle’s conception of the material or physical side of the soul-body relation is one which no modern functionalist could share. The Putnam-Nussbaum thesis is examined within the context of the theory of perception. This involves the need to understand one of the most mysterious Aristotelian doctrines – the doctrine that in perception, the sense-organ (...) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Interpretations of Aristotle's account of the relation between body and soul have been widely divergent. At one extreme, Thomas Slakey has said that in the De Anima ‘Aristotle tries to explain perception simply as an event in the sense-organs’. Wallace Matson has generalized the point. Of the Greeks in general he says, ‘Mind–body identity was taken for granted.… Indeed, in the whole classical corpus there exists no denial of the view that sensing is a bodily process throughout’. At the opposite (...) |
|
|
Aristotle's discussion of perceiving that we perceive has points of contact with two contemporary debates about consciousness: the first over whether consciousness is an intrinsic feature of mental states or a higher-order thought or perception; the second concerning the qualitative nature of experience. In both cases, Aristotle's views cut down the middle of an apparent dichotomy, in a way that does justice to each set of intuitions, while avoiding their attendant difficulties. With regard to the first issue?the primary focus of (...) |
|
|
Aristotle's definition of the soul should be interpreted as: 'the soul is the entelechy of a natural body that serves as its instrument'. |
|
|
Interpretations of Aristotle's account of the relation between body and soul have been widely divergent. At one extreme, Thomas Slakey has said that in theDe Anima‘Aristotle tries to explain perception simply as an event in the sense-organs’. Wallace Matson has generalized the point. Of the Greeks in general he says, ‘Mind–body identity was taken for granted.… Indeed, in the whole classical corpus there exists no denial of the view that sensing is a bodily process throughout’. At the opposite extreme, Friedrich (...) |
|
|
Aristotle has qualms about the movement of the soul. He contends directly, indeed, that ‘it is impossible that motion should belong to the soul’ (DA 406a2). This is surprising in both large and small ways. Still, when we appreciate the explanatory framework set by his hylomorphic analysis of change, we can see why Aristotle should think of the soul's motion as involving a kind of category mistake-not the putative Rylean mistake, but rather the mistake of treating a change as itself (...) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This paper deals with a seeming contradiction that may seriously impair Aristotle’s definition of the soul in his De Anima. While this definiens has been widely regarded as providing a non-dualistic account of life-functions, grounded in a hylomorphic approach to living beings, Aristotle sticks to an instrumental language vis-à-vis the body, which he consistently refers to as a tool of the soul. It is argued that this philosophical way of talking should be taken at face value, without dismiss- ing it (...) |
|
|
Myles Burnyeat, Laurence Professor of Ancient Philosophy at Cambridge University, disputes functionalist interpretations of Aristotle. Moreover, he contends that a correct understanding of Aristotle’s philosophy of mind leads to the realization that the only thing to do with it is to reject it. This essay argues that Burnyeat has failed to refute either Aristotle or his functionalist interpreters. |
|
|
Discusses the sense of separability in Aristotle and how they apply to the separability of mind or nous. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Jonathan Barnes; VI*—Aristotle's Concept of Mind, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 72, Issue 1, 1 June 1972, Pages 101–114, https://doi.org/10.10. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
In De Anima, Aristotle addresses the problem of whether the mind is separable from the body. In book I, he broaches the broader question of whether the affections of the soul, including emotion, desire, and perception, are separable from the body. In book II, Aristotle follows his explication of the general definition of the soul with the remark that “neither the soul nor certain parts of it, if it naturally has parts, are separable from the body. Yet nothing prevents some (...) |
|
|
Partant du constat qu’il existe à la fois une très grande similitude entre les philosophies de la perception d’Aristote et de Merleau-Ponty, et une revendication de ce dernier de s’affranchir du cadre ontologique hérité, cet article cherche à définir où se situe exactement la différence entre les deux conceptions. Il écarte d’abord l’hypothèse d’une assimilation ontologique totale entre sentant et sensible dans l’indistinction de la chair, dans la mesure où ce tissu n’est pas un uniforme mais peut toujours présenter la (...) |
|
|
|
|
|
|
PhilPapers logo by Andrea Andrews and Meghan Driscoll.
This site uses cookies and Google Analytics (see our terms & conditions for details regarding the privacy implications). Use of this site is subject to terms & conditions.
All rights reserved by The PhilPapers Foundation
Server: philpapers-web-6f9648bdd6-l46rg uwo