This article offers a general discussion of the concept of false hope. Its ultimate aim is to clarify the meaning and the relevance of that concept for medicine and medical research. In the first part, the concept of hope is discussed. I argue that hope is more than a combination of a desire and a belief about the probability that the desire will be fulfilled. Imagination and anticipation are as well components of hope. I also discuss if hope implies orientation (...) to action. In the second part, I examine the concept of false hope. I show that hope is false if it cannot be justified epistemically. There is, I argue, an intimate relation between false hope and ignorance. Hope is justified—“realistic”—when the hoping person knows and accepts experts’ judgement about the probability of hope fulfillment. I then argue that what matters for evaluating a person’s hope is not only whether it is realistic, but also whether it is reasonable in the light of the aim and goals that a person strives for in his life. Part three goes into the question of what is morally wrong about having or causing false hope. In the fourth part, the relevance is shown of the insights from the previous parts for the debate on false hope in medicine and clinical research. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to introduce the false hope harms (FHH) argument, as a new concept in healthcare. The FHH argument embodies a conglomerate of specific harms that have not convinced providers to stop endorsing false hope. In this paper, it is submitted that the healthcare profession has an obligation to avoid collaborating or participating in, propagating or augmenting false hope in medicine. Although hope serves important functions—it can be ‘therapeutic’ and important for patients’ ‘self-identity as active agents’— (...) the presentation of false hope along the hope continuum entails a misconstrued balancing act. By not speaking up against unrealistic patient and family requests—including some requests for rights to try, resuscitative efforts in terminally ill patients, or other demands for non-beneficial treatments—healthcare providers precipitate harms, i.e., the FHH. These harms arise on both individual and communal levels and cannot be ignored. The goal of this paper is not to offer a definition of false hope, because the phenomenon of false hope is too complex for any simple definition. Instead, this paper seeks to make four points while outlining the FHH argument: consumer medicine and false hope are connected; providers and patients are very vulnerable in the system of consumer medicine; providers have a responsibility to stand up against false hope; and how the FHH argument could perhaps offer a footing to resist giving in to false hope. (shrink)

Treating physicians have key roles to play in expanded access to investigational drugs, by identifying investigational treatment options, assessing the balance of risks and potential benefits, informing their patients, and applying to the regulatory authorities. This study is the first to explore physicians’ experiences and moral views, with the aim of understanding the conditions under which doctors decide to pursue expanded access for their patients and the obstacles and facilitators they encounter in the Netherlands. In this mixed-methods study, semi-structured interviews (...) and a questionnaire were conducted with medical specialists across the country and analysed thematically. Typically, our respondents pursue expanded access in “back against the wall” situations and broadly support its classic requirements. They indicate practical hurdles related to reimbursement, the amount of time and effort required for the application, and unfamiliarity with the regulatory process. Some physicians are morally opposed to expanded access, with an appeal to safety risks, lack of evidence, and “false hope.” Some of these moral concerns and practical obstacles may be essential targets for change, if expanded access to unapproved drugs is to become available for wider groups of patients for whom standard treatment options are not—or no longer—available, on a more consistent and equal basis. (shrink)