- Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief.Miriam Schoenfield - 2014 - Noûs 48 (2):193-218.details
|
|
Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.details
|
|
Rational Reflection.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):121-140.details
|
|
Higher Order Evidence.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185-215.details
|
|
Conciliation, Uniqueness, and Rational Toxicity.David Christensen - 2014 - Noûs 50 (3):584-603.details
|
|
Imprecise Probabilities.Seamus Bradley - 2019 - In Claus Beisbart & Nicole J. Saam (eds.), Computer Simulation Validation: Fundamental Concepts, Methodological Frameworks, and Philosophical Perspectives. Springer Verlag. pp. 525-540.details
|
|
A plea for excuses.John Austin - 1957 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57:1--30.details
|
|
The normativity of content.Paul A. Boghossian - 2003 - Philosophical Issues 13 (1):31-45.details
|
|
Epistemic Rules.Paul A. Boghossian - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (9):472-500.details
|
|
Reason and belief.Brand Blanshard - 1974 - New Haven: Yale University Press.details
|
|
I.—A Plea for Excuses: The Presidential Address.J. L. Austin - 1957 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57 (1):1-30.details
|
|
Dispositional beliefs and dispositions to believe.Robert Audi - 1994 - Noûs 28 (4):419-34.details
|
|
Belief's Own Ethics.Jonathan Eric Adler - 2002 - MIT Press.details
|
|
Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Strangers to Ourselves: Discovering the Adaptive Unconscious.Timothy D. Wilson - 2002 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
|
|
Permission to believe : why permissivism is true and what it tells us about irrelevant influences on belief.Miriam Schoenfield - 2018 - In Jeremy Fantl, Matthew McGrath & Ernest Sosa (eds.), Contemporary epistemology: an anthology. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.details
|
|
The normativity of rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2013 - Dissertation, Humboldt University of Berlindetails
|
|
Unreasonable Knowledge.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):1-21.details
|
|
The Normativity of Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Epistemic Akrasia.Declan Smithies - 2019 - In The Epistemic Role of Consciousness. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 284–311.details
|
|
Action, Knowledge, and Will.John Hyman - 2015 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The Epistemic Role of Consciousness.Declan Smithies - 2019 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Epistemic Dilemmas Defended.Nick Hughes - 2021 - In Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Evidence-Coherence Conflicts Revisited.Alex Worsnip - 2021 - In Nick Hughes (ed.), Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
A plea for excuses.J. L. Austin - 1964 - In Vere Claiborne Chappell (ed.), Ordinary language: essays in philosophical method. New York: Dover Publications. pp. 1--30.details
|
|
Evidence and Bias.Nick Hughes - 2019 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. Routledge.details
|
|
A Plea for Epistemic Excuses.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - In Julien Dutant Fabian Dorsch (ed.), The New Evil Demon Problem. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The Rationality of Perception.Susanna Siegel - 2017 - Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Determined by Reasons: A Competence Account of Acting for a Normative Reason.Susanne Mantel - 2018 - New York, USA: Routledge.details
|
|
Internalism Explained.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):349-369.details
|
|
Making Morality Work.Holly M. Smith - 2018 - Oxford, Great Britain: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The Value of Rationality.Ralph Wedgwood - 2017 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The Importance of Being Rational.Errol Lord - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The Rationality of Perception.Susanna Siegel - 2017 - Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The Conflict of Evidence and Coherence.Alex Worsnip - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):3-44.details
|
|
Very Improbable Knowing.Timothy Williamson - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (5):971-999.details
|
|
Response to Cohen, Comesaña, Goodman, Nagel, and Weatherson on Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic.Timothy Williamson - 2013 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 56 (1):77-96.details
|
|
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.details
|
|
The Value of Rationality. [REVIEW]Ralph Wedgwood - 2019 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 73 (1):153-157.details
|
|
Two Arguments for Evidentialism.Jonathan Way - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (265):805-818.details
|
|
Reasons and Guidance.Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting - 2016 - Analytic Philosophy 57 (3):214-235.details
|
|
The Measure of Knowledge.Nick Treanor - 2012 - Noûs 47 (3):577-601.details
|
|
The Best Argument for 'Ought Implies Can' Is a Better Argument Against 'Ought Implies Can'.Brian Talbot - 2016 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 3.details
|
|
Stick to what you know.Jonathan Sutton - 2005 - Noûs 39 (3):359–396.details
|
|
Explaining doxastic transparency: aim, norm, or function?Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3453-3476.details
|
|
The No Guidance Argument.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2013 - Theoria 79 (1):279-283.details
|
|
The No Guidance Argument.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2012 - Theoria 79 (3):279-283.details
|
|
Normativity without Cartesian privilege.Amia Srinivasan - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):273-299.details
|
|
Are We Luminous?Amia Srinivasan - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):294-319.details
|
|
Using moral principles to guide decisions.Holly Smith - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):369-386.details
|
|