- Problems for Credulism.James Pryor - 2013 - In Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism. New York: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 89–131.details
|
|
Rational Self-Doubt and the Failure of Closure.Joshua Schechter - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):428-452.details
|
|
The Paradox of Graded Justification.Logins Arturs - forthcoming - Episteme:1-32.details
|
|
(1 other version)Interpretations of probability.Alan Hájek - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Legal proof: why knowledge matters and knowing does not.Andy Mueller - 2024 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):1-22.details
|
|
Belief about Probability.Ray Buchanan & Sinan Dogramaci - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.details
|
|
Logical Disagreement.Frederik J. Andersen - 2024 - Dissertation, University of St. Andrewsdetails
|
|
Prefaces, Knowledge, and Questions.Frank Hong - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10.details
|
|
Rational Polarization.Kevin Dorst - 2023 - Philosophical Review 132 (3):355-458.details
|
|
(1 other version)Epistemic Dilemmas: A Guide.Nick Hughes - forthcoming - In Essays on Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
A Causal Safety Criterion for Knowledge.Jonathan Vandenburgh - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-21.details
|
|
The Paradox of Graded Justification.Artūrs Logins - forthcoming - Episteme:1-29.details
|
|
What is Rational Belief?Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - 2024 - Noûs 58 (2):333-359.details
|
|
The uncoordinated teachers puzzle.Michael Cohen - forthcoming - Episteme:1-8.details
|
|
Epistemology Normalized.Jeremy Goodman & Bernhard Salow - 2023 - Philosophical Review 132 (1):89-145.details
|
|
Degrees of Assertability.Sam Carter - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):19-49.details
|
|
n-1 Guilty Men.Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - forthcoming - In Simon Kirchin (ed.), The Future of Normativity. Oxford:details
|
|
Coherence and Knowability.Luis Rosa - 2022 - The Philosophical Quarterly 72 (4):960-978.details
|
|
Deference Done Better.Kevin Dorst, Benjamin A. Levinstein, Bernhard Salow, Brooke E. Husic & Branden Fitelson - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):99-150.details
|
|
The rationality of epistemic akrasia.John Hawthorne, Yoaav Isaacs & Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):206-228.details
|
|
Knowledge from multiple experiences.Simon Goldstein & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (4):1341-1372.details
|
|
Fragile Knowledge.Simon Goldstein - 2022 - Mind 131 (522):487-515.details
|
|
Epistemology without guidance.Nick Hughes - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):163-196.details
|
|
Inexact knowledge and dynamic introspection.Michael Cohen - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):5509-5531.details
|
|
Be modest: you're living on the edge.Kevin Dorst - 2022 - Analysis 81 (4):611-621.details
|
|
The normality of error.Sam Carter & Simon Goldstein - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (8):2509-2533.details
|
|
Surprising Suspensions: The Epistemic Value of Being Ignorant.Christopher Willard-Kyle - 2021 - Dissertation, Rutgers University - New Brunswickdetails
|
|
Radical Externalism.Amia Srinivasan - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (3):395-431.details
|
|
Opaque Updates.Michael Cohen - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 50 (3):447-470.details
|
|
Higher-Order Evidence.Daniel Whiting - 2020 - Analysis 80 (4):789-807.details
|
|
(1 other version)Higher-Order Evidence.Kevin Dorst - 2024 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 176-194.details
|
|
Is it OK to Make Mistakes? Appraisal and False Normative Belief.Claire Field - 2019 - Dissertation, University of St Andrewsdetails
|
|
Do you see what I know? On reasons, perceptual evidence, and epistemic status.Clayton Littlejohn - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):205-220.details
|
|
Inexact Knowledge 2.0.Sven Rosenkranz & Julien Dutant - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (8):1-19.details
|
|
Is higher-order evidence evidence?Eyal Tal - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3157-3175.details
|
|
Rational Moral Ignorance.Zach Barnett - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):645-664.details
|
|
How Many Normative Notions of Rationality? A Critical Study of Wedgwood’s The Value of Rationality.Giacomo Melis - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):174-185.details
|
|
Random and Systematic Error in the Puzzle of the Unmarked Clock.Randall G. McCutcheon - manuscriptdetails
|
|
Justification, knowledge, and normality.Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (6):1593-1609.details
|
|
On the Normativity of Rationality and of Normative Reasons.Clayton Littlejohn & Julien Dutant - manuscriptdetails
|
|
Moore's Paradox and Assertion.Clayton Littlejohn - 2020 - In Goldberg Sanford (ed.), Oxford Handbook on Assertion. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):586-632.details
|
|
Higher-order uncertainty.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Higher-Order Defeat and Doxastic Resilience.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Dilemmic Epistemology.Nick Hughes - 2019 - Synthese 196 (10):4059-4090.details
|
|
Against epistemic partiality in friendship: value-reflecting reasons.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):2221-2242.details
|
|
(1 other version)Discussion of Susanna Siegel's “Can perceptual experiences be rational?”.Ori Beck, Mazviita Chirimuuta, T. Raja Rosenhagen, Susanna Siegel, Declan Smithies & Alison Springle - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (1):175-190.details
|
|
The Structure of Justification.Sven Rosenkranz - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):629-629.details
|
|
Diachronic Dutch Books and Evidential Import.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (1):49-80.details
|
|
(1 other version)Replies to Beck, Chirimuuta, Rosenhagen, Smithies, and Springle.Susanna Siegel - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (1):175-190.details
|
|