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  1. (6 other versions)Convention: A Philosophical Study.David Lewis - 1969 - Synthese 26 (1):153-157.
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  • Convention: A Philosophical Study.David Kellogg Lewis - 1969 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Wiley-Blackwell.
    _ Convention_ was immediately recognized as a major contribution to the subject and its significance has remained undiminished since its first publication in 1969. Lewis analyzes social conventions as regularities in the resolution of recurring coordination problems-situations characterized by interdependent decision processes in which common interests are at stake. Conventions are contrasted with other kinds of regularity, and conventions governing systems of communication are given special attention.
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  • Strategic Learning and its Limits.H. Peyton Young - 2004 - Oxford University Press UK.
    In this concise book based on his Arne Ryde Lectures in 2002, Young suggests a conceptual framework for studying strategic learning and highlights theoretical developments in the area. He discusses the interactive learning problem; reinforcement and regret; equilibrium; conditional no-regret learning; prediction, postdiction, and calibration; fictitious play and its variants; Bayesian learning; and hypothesis testing. Young's framework emphasizes the amount of information required to implement different types of learning rules, criteria for evaluating their performance, and alternative notions of equilibrium to (...)
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  • (1 other version)Evolution of the Social Contract.Brian Skyrms - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    In this pithy and highly readable book, Brian Skyrms, a recognised authority on game and decision theory, investigates traditional problems of the social contract in terms of evolutionary dynamics. Game theory is skilfully employed to offer new interpretations of a wide variety of social phenomena, including justice, mutual aid, commitment, convention and meaning. The author eschews any grand, unified theory. Rather, he presents the reader with tools drawn from evolutionary game theory for the purpose of analysing and coming to understand (...)
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  • Signals: Evolution, Learning, and Information.Brian Skyrms - 2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Brian Skyrms offers a fascinating demonstration of how fundamental signals are to our world. He uses various scientific tools to investigate how meaning and communication develop. Signals operate in networks of senders and receivers at all levels of life, transmitting and processing information. That is how humans and animals think and interact.
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  • Probe and Adjust.Simon M. Huttegger - 2013 - Biological Theory 8 (2):195-200.
    How can players reach a Nash equilibrium? I offer one possible explanation in terms of a low-rationality learning method called probe and adjust by proving that it converges to strict Nash equilibria in an important class of games. This demonstrates that decidedly limited learning methods can support Nash equilibrium play.
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  • (2 other versions)Learning to signal: Analysis of a micro-level reinforcement model.Brian Skyrms, Raffaele Argiento, Robin Pemantle & and Stanislav Volkov - manuscript
    We consider the following signaling game. Nature plays first from the set {1, 2}. Player 1 (the Sender) sees this and plays from the set {A, B}. Player 2 (the Receiver) sees only Player 1’s play and plays from the set {1, 2}. Both players win if Player 2’s play equals Nature’s play and lose otherwise. Players are told whether they have won or lost, and the game is repeated. An urn scheme for learning coordination in this game is as (...)
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  • Emergence of Information Transfer by Inductive Learning.Simon M. Huttegger & Brian Skyrms - 2008 - Studia Logica 89 (2):237-256.
    We study a simple game theoretic model of information transfer which we consider to be a baseline model for capturing strategic aspects of epistemological questions. In particular, we focus on the question whether simple learning rules lead to an efficient transfer of information. We find that reinforcement learning, which is based exclusively on payoff experiences, is inadequate to generate efficient networks of information transfer. Fictitious play, the game theoretic counterpart to Carnapian inductive logic and a more sophisticated kind of learning, (...)
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  • (1 other version)Evolution of the Social Contract.Brian Skyrms - 1997 - Philosophy 72 (282):604-606.
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  • (6 other versions)Convention: A Philosophical Study.David K. Lewis - 1971 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 4 (2):137-138.
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  • (2 other versions)Learning to signal with probe and adjust.Brian Skyrms - 2012 - Episteme 9 (2):139-150.
    This is an investigation of the emergence of signaling using one kind of trial and error learning: probe and adjust.Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about (...)
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  • Evolution and the explanation of meaning.Simon M. Huttegger - 2007 - Philosophy of Science 74 (1):1-27.
    Signaling games provide basic insights into some fundamental questions concerning the explanation of meaning. They can be analyzed in terms of rational choice theory and in terms of evolutionary game theory. It is argued that an evolutionary approach provides better explanations for the emergence of simple communication systems. To substantiate these arguments, I will look at models similar to those of Skyrms (2000) and Komarova and Niyogi (2004) and study their dynamical properties. My results will lend partial support to the (...)
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  • (1 other version)Evolution of the Social Contract.Brian Skyrms - 1999 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):229-236.
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  • Emergence of a Signaling Network with Probe and Adjust.Brian Skyrms & Simon M. Huttegger - 2013 - In Kim Sterelny, Richard Joyce, Brett Calcott & Ben Fraser (eds.), Cooperation and its Evolution. MIT Press. pp. 265.
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  • The role of forgetting in the evolution and learning of language.Jeffrey Barrett & Kevin J. S. Zollman - unknown
    Lewis signaling games illustrate how language might evolve from random behavior. The probability of evolving an optimal signaling language is, in part, a function of what learning strategy the agents use. Here we investigate three learning strategies, each of which allows agents to forget old experience. In each case, we find that forgetting increases the probability of evolving an optimal language. It does this by making it less likely that past partial success will continue to reinforce suboptimal practice. The learning (...)
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