Let L[E] be an iterable tame extender model. We analyze to which extent L[E] knows fragments of its own iteration strategy. Specifically, we prove that inside L[E], for every cardinal K which is not a limit of Woodin cardinals there is some cutpoint t K > a>ω1 are cardinals, then ◊$_{K.\lambda }^* $ holds true, and if in addition λ is regular, then ◊$_{K.\lambda }^* $ holds true.

We investigate both iteration hypotheses and extender models at the level of one supercompact cardinal. The HOD Conjecture is introduced and shown to be a key conjecture both for the Inner Model Program and for understanding the limits of the large cardinal hierarchy. We show that if the HOD Conjecture is true then this provides strong evidence for the existence of an ultimate version of Gödel's constructible universe L. Whether or not this "ultimate" L exists is now arguably the central (...) issue for the Inner Model Program. (shrink)

We try to answer the question which is the “right” foundation of mathematics, second order logic or set theory. Since the former is usually thought of as a formal language and the latter as a first order theory, we have to rephrase the question. We formulate what we call the second order view and a competing set theory view, and then discuss the merits of both views. On the surface these two views seem to be in manifest conflict with each (...) other. However, our conclusion is that it is very difficult to see any real difference between the two. We analyze a phenomenon we call internal categoricity which extends the familiar categoricity results of second order logic to Henkin models and show that set theory enjoys the same kind of internal categoricity. Thus the existence of non-standard models, which is usually taken as a property of first order set theory, and categoricity, which is usually taken as a property of second order axiomatizations, can coherently coexist when put into their proper context. We also take a fresh look at complete second order axiomatizations and give a hierarchy result for second order characterizable structures. Finally we consider the problem of existence in mathematics from both points of view and find that second order logic depends on what we call large domain assumptions, which come quite close to the meaning of the axioms of set theory. (shrink)

We discuss the differences between first-order set theory and second-order logic as a foundation for mathematics. We analyse these languages in terms of two levels of formalization. The analysis shows that if second-order logic is understood in its full semantics capable of characterizing categorically central mathematical concepts, it relies entirely on informal reasoning. On the other hand, if it is given a weak semantics, it loses its power in expressing concepts categorically. First-order set theory and second-order logic are not radically (...) different: the latter is a major fragment of the former. (shrink)