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  1. Principles of Biomedical Ethics.Ezekiel J. Emanuel, Tom L. Beauchamp & James F. Childress - 1995 - Hastings Center Report 25 (4):37.
    Book reviewed in this article: Principles of Biomedical Ethics. By Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress.
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  • (2 other versions)A Theory of Justice.John Rawls - unknown
    Since it appeared in 1971, John Rawls's A Theory of Justice has become a classic. The author has now revised the original edition to clear up a number of difficulties he and others have found in the original book. Rawls aims to express an essential part of the common core of the democratic tradition--justice as fairness--and to provide an alternative to utilitarianism, which had dominated the Anglo-Saxon tradition of political thought since the nineteenth century. Rawls substitutes the ideal of the (...)
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  • A Theory of Justice: Original Edition.John Rawls - 2005 - Belknap Press.
    Though the revised edition of A Theory of Justice, published in 1999, is the definitive statement of Rawls's view, so much of the extensive literature on Rawls's theory refers to the first edition. This reissue makes the first edition once again available for scholars and serious students of Rawls's work.
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  • Moral Relativism.Gilbert Harman - unknown
    According to moral relativism, there is not a single true morality. There are a variety of possible moralities or moral frames of reference, and whether something is morally right or wrong, good or bad, just or unjust, etc. is a relative matter—relative to one or another morality or moral frame of reference. Something can be morally right relative to one moral frame of reference and morally wrong relative to another. It is useful to compare moral relativism to other relativisms. One (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Modern Moral Philosophy.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1958 - Philosophy 33 (124):1 - 19.
    The author presents and defends three theses: (1) "the first is that it is not profitable for us at present to do moral philosophy; that should be laid aside at any rate until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology." (2) "the second is that the concepts of obligation, And duty... And of what is morally right and wrong, And of the moral sense of 'ought', Ought to be jettisoned if this is psychologically possible...." (3) "the third thesis is that (...)
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  • Ethics, Inventing Right and Wrong.[author unknown] - 1977 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 43 (3):581-582.
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  • Moral Relativity.Terrance McConnell - 1986 - Noûs 20 (4):559-562.
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  • Is Anesthesia Intrinsically Wrong? On Moral Absolutes and Natural Law Methodology.James M. Dubois - 2008 - Christian Bioethics 14 (2):206-216.
    This article engages two fundamentally different kinds of so-called natural law arguments in favor of specific moral absolutes: Elizabeth Anscombe's claim that certain actions are known to be intrinsically wrong through intuition, and John Finnis's claim that such actions are known to be wrong because they involve acting directly against a basic human good. Both authors maintain, for example, that murder and contraceptive sexual acts are known to be wrong, always and everywhere, through their respective epistemological lens. This article uses (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity.Richard Rorty - 1989 - The Personalist Forum 5 (2):149-152.
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  • (1 other version)The Foundations of Bioethics.H. Tristham Engelhardt - 1986 - Hypatia 4 (2):179-185.
    This review essay examines H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr.'s The Foundations of Bioethics, a contemporary nonfeminist text in mainstream biomedical ethics. It focuses upon a central concept, Engelhardt's idea of the moral community and argues that the most serious problem in the book is its failure to take account of the political and social structures of moral communities, structures which deeply affect issues in biomedical ethics.
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  • Faith and Knowledge.G. W. F. Hegel, Walter Cerf & H. S. Harris - 1981 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 12 (1):63-64.
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  • Keeping it Ethically Real.Dien Ho - 2016 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 41 (4):369-383.
    Many clinical ethicists have argued that ethics expertise is impossible. Their skeptical argument usually rests on the assumptions that to be an ethics expert is to know the correct moral conclusions, which can only be arrived at by having the correct ethical theories. In this paper, I argue that this skeptical argument is unsound. To wit, ordinary ethical deliberations do not require the appeal to ethical or meta-ethical theories. Instead, by agreeing to resolve moral differences by appealing to reasons, the (...)
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  • Expertise, Ethics Expertise, and Clinical Ethics Consultation: Achieving Terminological Clarity.Ana S. Iltis & Mark Sheehan - 2016 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 41 (4):416-433.
    The language of ethics expertise has become particularly important in bioethics in light of efforts to establish the value of the clinical ethics consultation, to specify who is qualified to function as a clinical ethics consultant, and to characterize how one should evaluate whether or not a person is so qualified. Supporters and skeptics about the possibility of ethics expertise use the language of ethics expertise in ways that reflect competing views about what ethics expertise entails. We argue for clarity (...)
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  • The Myth of Morality.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2004 - Mind 113 (452):760-763.
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  • Clinical Ethics Consultants are not “Ethics” Experts—But They do Have Expertise.Lisa M. Rasmussen - 2016 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 41 (4):384-400.
    The attempt to critique the profession of clinical ethics consultation by establishing the impossibility of ethics expertise has been a red herring. Decisions made in clinical ethics cases are almost never based purely on moral judgments. Instead, they are all-things-considered judgments that involve determining how to balance other values as well. A standard of justified decision-making in this context would enable us to identify experts who could achieve these standards more often than others, and thus provide a basis for expertise (...)
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  • The method of 'principlism': A critique of the critique.B. Andrew Lustig - 1992 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 17 (5):487-510.
    Several scholars have recently criticized the dominant emphasis upon mid-level principles in bioethics best exemplified by Beauchamp and Childress's Principles of Biomedical Ethics . In Part I of this essay, I assess the fairness and cogency of three broad criticisms raised against ‘principlism’ as an approach: (1) that principlism, as an exercise in applied ethics, is insufficiently attentive to the dialectical relations between ethical theory and moral practice; (2) that principlism fails to offer a systematic account of the principles of (...)
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  • Moral Expertise in the Clinic: Lessons Learned from Medicine and Science.Leah McClimans & Anne Slowther - 2016 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 41 (4):401-415.
    Philosophers and others have questioned whether or not expertise in morality is possible. This debate is not only theoretical, but also affects the perceived legitimacy of clinical ethicists. One argument against moral expertise is that in a pluralistic society with competing moral theories no one can claim expertise regarding what another ought morally to do. There are simply too many reasonable moral values and intuitions that affect theory choice and its application; expertise is epistemically uniform. In this article, we discuss (...)
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  • Ockham as a divine-command theorist.Thomas M. Osborne - 2005 - Religious Studies 41 (1):1-22.
    Although this thesis is denied by much recent scholarship, Ockham holds that the ultimate ground of a moral judgement's truth is a divine command, rather than natural or non-natural properties. God could assign a different moral value not only to every exterior act, but also to loving God. Ockham does allow that someone who has not had access to revelation can make correct moral judgements. Although her right reason dictates what God in fact commands, she need not know that God (...)
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  • Natural Law and Natural Rights.Richard Tuck - 1981 - Philosophical Quarterly 31 (124):282-284.
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  • Richard McCormick, SJ, and Dual Epistemology.P. A. Clark - 2008 - Christian Bioethics 14 (3):236-271.
    This article will examine McCormick's moral epistemology both at the level of how human persons know values and disvalues, which hereinafter will be referred to as synderesis, and at the level of how human persons know the rightness and wrongness of an action, which hereinafter will be referred to as normative moral judgment. On the one hand, from this investigation it appears that McCormick operates with a dual moral epistemology, at least at the level of synderesis. This means that at (...)
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  • (4 other versions)Nuclear Deterrence, Morality and Realism.John Finnis, Joseph M. Boyle, Germain Grisez & Jefferson Mcmahan - 1990 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 19 (1):93-106.
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  • Christian versus Philosophical Natural Law Reasoning: Reply to Joseph Boyle.J. M. DuBois - 2008 - Christian Bioethics 14 (3):310-313.
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  • Moral Relativity.R. A. Duff - 1986 - Philosophical Quarterly 36 (142):99-101.
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  • (4 other versions)Nuclear Deterrence, Morality, and Realism.John Finnis, Joseph M. Boyle, Germain Grisez & Gregory Kavka - 1989 - Ethics 99 (2):407-422.
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