Janet Malek (91–102, 2019) argues that a “clinical ethics consultant’s religious worldview has no place in developing ethical recommendations or communicating about them with patients, surrogates, and clinicians.” She offers five types of arguments in support of this thesis: arguments from consensus, clarity, availability, consistency, and autonomy. This essay shows that there are serious problems for each of Malek’s arguments. None of them is sufficient to motivate her thesis. Thus, if it is true that the religious worldview of clinical ethics (...) consultants should play no role whatsoever in their work as consultants, this claim will need to be defended on some other ground. (shrink)

Research ethics committees in Germany usually don’t have philosophers as members and if so, only contingently, not provided for by statute. This is interesting from a philosophical perspective, assuming that ethics is a discipline of philosophy. It prompts the question what role philosophers play in those committees they can be found in. Eight qualitative semi-structured interviews were conducted to explore the self-perception of philosophers regarding their contribution to research ethics committees. The results show that the participants generally don’t view themselves (...) as ethics experts. They are rather unanimous on the competencies they think they contribute to the committee but not as to whether those are philosophical competencies or applied ethical ones. In some cases they don’t see a big difference between their role and the role of the jurist member. In the discussion section of this paper I bring up three topics, prompted by the interviews, that need to be addressed: (1) I argue that the interviewees’ unwillingness to call themselves ethics experts might have to do with a too narrow understanding ofethics expertise. (2) I argue that the disagreement among the interviewees concerning therelationship between moral philosophy and applied ethicsmight be explained on a theoretical or on a practical level. (3) I argue that there is some lack of clarity concerning therelationship between ethics and lawin research ethics committees and that further work needs to be done here. All three topics, I conclude, need further investigation. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung Krankenhäuser müssen sich an der ethischen Qualität ihrer Versorgung messen lassen. Es geht dabei um einen Zustand, in dem allgemein anerkannte moralische Normen in der Patient:innenversorgung konsequent berücksichtigt werden. Damit sind zwei Ebenen angesprochen: die der ethisch-normativen Deutung und die der Gestaltung intra- und interpersonaler Prozesse. Die Klinische Ethik ist die Disziplin, die in der Verbindung beider ihre zentrale Aufgabe sieht. Um sie zu erfüllen, muss Ethikarbeit auf der Basis komplexer Kompetenzen erfolgen. Neben fundiertem Ethikwissen ist das Beherrschen von (...) geeigneten Methoden für die Steuerung solcher Prozesse eine unabdingbare Voraussetzung. Dazu aber ist die Studienlage vergleichsweise dünn. Die vorliegende Arbeit greift dieses Desiderat auf und geht dabei von der Hypothese aus, dass die Systemik einen wichtigen Beitrag zu einer im obigen Sinne effektiven Ethikarbeit leisten kann. Die Darstellung gibt einen Einblick in das systemische Denken und diskutiert die Möglichkeiten, die systemisches Handwerkszeug für die Herausforderungen der Klinischen Ethik bereithält. Die Ausführungen laden dazu ein, über den Einfluss systemischer Grundannahmen und Methoden auf die Gestaltung einer effektiven Ethikarbeit nachzudenken. Darüber hinaus ruft dieser Beitrag dazu auf, die Beratungsmethodik als solche mehr in den Fokus zu rücken. (shrink)

Discussions of the nature or possibility of moral expertise have largely proceeded in atheoretical terms, with little attention paid to whether moral expertise depends on theoretical knowledge of morality. Here I argue that moral expertise is more theory-dependent than is commonly recognized: Moral expertise consists, at least in part, in knowledge of the correct or best moral theory, and second, that knowledge of moral theory is essential to moral experts dispensing expert counsel to non-experts. Moral experts would not be moral (...) experts absent knowledge of moral theory, nor could they play the testimonial role we would expect them to play in moral inquiry and deliberation absent such knowledge. (shrink)

Scholars, policymakers and organizations in the EU, especially at the level of the European Commission, have turned their attention to the ethics of (trustworthy and human-centric) Artificial Intelligence (AI). However, there has been little reflexivity on (1) the history of the ethics of AI as an institutionalized phenomenon and (2) the comparison to similar episodes of “ethification” in other fields, to highlight common (unresolved) challenges.Contrary to some mainstream narratives, which stress how the increasing attention to ethical aspects of AI is (...) due to the fast pace and increasing risks of technological developments, Science and Technology Studies(STS)-informed perspectives highlight that the rise of institutionalized assessment methods indicates a need for governments to gain more control of scientific research and to bring EU institutions closer to the public on controversies related to emerging technologies.This article analyzes how different approaches of the recent past (i.e. bioethics, technology assessment (TA) and ethical, legal and social (ELS) research, Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI)) followed one another, often “in the name of ethics”, to address previous criticisms and/or to legitimate certain scientific and technological research programs. The focus is on how a brief history of the institutionalization of these approaches can provide insights into present challenges to the ethics of AI related to methodological issues, mobilization of expertise and public participation. (shrink)

BackgroundThe theory and practice of ethics consultations (ECs) in health care are still characterized by many controversies, including, for example, the practice of giving recommendations. These controversies are complicated by an astonishing lack of evidence in the whole field. It is not clear how often a recommendation is issued in ethics consultations and when and why this step is taken. Especially in a facilitation model in which giving recommendations is optional, more data would be helpful to evaluate daily practice, ensure (...) that this practice is in line with the overarching goals of this approach and support the development of standards.MethodsWe analyzed all consultations requested from an EC service working under a facilitation approach at a maximum-care university hospital in Germany over a period of more than 10 years. Our aim was to better understand why—and under what circumstances—some consultation requests result in a recommendation, whereas others can be sufficiently addressed solely by facilitated meetings. We especially wanted to know when and why clients felt the need for clear advice from the EC service while in other cases they did not. We compared ethics consultations in terms of the differences between cases with and without recommendations issued by the ethics consultants using χ2 difference tests and Welch’s t-test.ResultsA total of 243 ECs were carried out between September 2008 and December 2019. In approximately half of the cases, a recommendation was given. All recommendations were issued upon the request of clients. When physicians asked for an EC, the consultation was significantly more likely to result in a recommendation than when the EC was requested by any other party. ECs in cases on wards with ethics rounds resulted in comparably fewer recommendations than those in wards without ethics rounds. When interpersonal conflicts were part of the problem or relatives were present in the meeting, clients less frequently asked for a recommendation.ConclusionFrom the client’s point of view, there does not seem to be only one “right” way to provide ethics consultations, but rather several. While facilitated meetings are obviously appreciated by clients, there also seem to be situations in which a recommendation is desired (especially by physicians). Further empirical and theoretical research is needed to validate our single-center results and re-evaluate the role of recommendations in ethics consultations. (shrink)

Volume 19, Issue 11, November 2019, Page 82-84.

In a recent issue of the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, several scholars wrote on the topic of ethics expertise in clinical ethics consultation. The articles in this issue exemplified what we consider to be two troubling trends in the quest to articulate a unique expertise for clinical ethicists. The first trend, exemplified in the work of Lisa Rasmussen, is an attempt to define a role for clinical ethicists that denies they have ethics expertise. Rasmussen cites the dependence of ethical (...) expertise on irresolvable meta-ethical debates as the reason for this move. We argue against this deflationary strategy because it ends up smuggling in meta-ethical assumptions it claims to avoid. Specifically, we critique Rasmussen’s distinction between the ethical and normative features of clinical ethics cases. The second trend, exemplified in the work of Dien Ho, also attempts to avoid meta-ethics. However, unlike Rasmussen, Ho tries to articulate a notion of ethics expertise that does not rely upon meta-ethics. Specifically, we critique Ho’s attempts to explain how clinical ethicists can resolve moral disputes using what he calls the “Default Principle” and “arguments by parity.” We show that these strategies do not work unless those with the moral disagreement already share certain meta-ethical assumptions. Ultimately, we argue that the two trends of attempting to avoid meta-ethics by denying that clinical ethicists have ethics expertise, and attempting to articulate how ethics expertise can be used to resolve disputes without meta-ethics both fail because they do not, in fact, avoid doing meta-ethics. We conclude that these trends detract from what clinical ethics consultation was founded to do and ought to still be doing—provide moral guidance, which requires ethics expertise, and engagement with meta-ethics. To speak of ethicists without ethics expertise leaves their role in the clinic dangerously unclear and unjustified. (shrink)

Our aim in this article is to bring some clarity to the clinical ethics expertise debate by critiquing and replacing the taxonomy offered by the Core Competencies report. The orienting question for our taxonomy is: Can clinical ethicists offer justified, normative recommendations for active patient cases? Views that answer “no” are characterized as a “negative” view of clinical ethics expertise and are further differentiated based on (a) why they think ethicists cannot give justified normative recommendations and (b) what they think (...) ethicists can offer, if they cannot offer recommendations. Views that answer “yes” to the orienting question are characterized as a “positive” view of clinical ethics expertise. Positive views are distinguished according to four additional questions. First (P1), how are those recommendations generated? Second (P2), what is the nature of the recommendations? Third (P3), we ask, how are the recommendations justified? And finally (P4), how are the recommendations communicated? (shrink)

Definition of the problemQuality of care also includes a professional approach to ethical challenges. This involves the moral interpretation of an issue and the management of intra- and interpersonal reflection processes. Combining both is the central task of clinical ethics consultation (CEC). Despite its importance only a few studies have dealt with the appropriate methods for steering reflection processes.ArgumentsCEC requires a theory-based and methodological approach. The argumentation shows the effects that systems theory and systemic methods have on the effectiveness of (...) CEC. The main methods such as clarification of mandates and handling complexity are presented, and their impact on dealing with ethical challenges is shown through the discussion of two cases.ConclusionThe paper provides insight into systems thinking. It discusses the influence that systemic tools have on dealing with typical challenges within clinical ethics counselling. It also shows how specific counselling methods impact a normative level. (shrink)

“Outsiders” addressing ethical issues in medicine—Strangers at the Bedside —became “bioethicists.” Bioethicists providing research ethics consultation have been described as “stranger...

The nature, possibility, and implications of ethics expertise in general and of bioethics expertise in particular has been the focus of extensive debate for over thirty years. What is ethics expertise and what does it enable experts to do? Knowing what ethics expertise is can help answer another important question: What, if anything, makes a claim of expertise legitimate? In other words, how does someone earn the appellation “ethics expert?” There remains deep disagreement on whether ethics expertise is possible, and (...) if so, what constitutes such expertise and what it entails and legitimates. Discussion of bioethics expertise has become particularly important given the growing presence of bioethicists in the clinical setting as well as efforts to professionalize bioethics through codes of ethics and certification efforts. Unlike in the law or in engineering, where there may be a body of knowledge that professional organizations or others have articulated as important for education and training of experts, ethics expertise admits of no such body of knowledge or required experience. Nor is there an entity seen as having the authority to articulate the necessary scope of knowledge. Questions about whether there is such a body of knowledge for particular areas within bioethics have emerged and played a central role in professionalization efforts in recent years, especially in the area of clinical ethics. (shrink)

In recent years, there have been growing calls for nurses to have a formal advanced practice role as nurse ethicists in hospital contexts. Initially proposed in the cultural context of the USA where nurse ethicists have long been recognised, the idea is being advocated in other judications outside of the USA such as the UK, Australia and elsewhere. Such calls are not without controversy, however. Underpinning this controversy are ongoing debates about the theoretical, methodological and political dimensions of clinical ethics (...) support services generally, and more recently where nurses might ‘fit’ within such a service. In considering whether nurse ethicists ought to have a place in clinical ethics support services, a number of questions arise such as: Is such a role warranted? If so, what credentials should nurses assuming the title of ‘nurse ethicist’ be required to have? What standards of practice ought nurse ethicists be required to uphold? What is the ultimate role and function of nurse ethicists in hospital contexts? And in what contexts might a nurse ethicist be most useful? In this essay, brief attention will be given to addressing these questions. It will be concluded that, as a minimum, nurses wishing to assume an advanced nursing practice role as a nurse ethicist must have substantive grounding in the foundational knowledge of the disciplines of both moral philosophy and nursing ethics. They must also not lose sight of the ultimate goal of nursing ethics, notably, to promote and advance ethical nursing practice and the provision of ‘good’ nursing care. (shrink)

Questions concerning the role (or lack thereof) of God in morality are implicitly or explicitly important in Western philosophical ethics. I describe some of the different ways philosophers treat (or ignore) God and the foundations of morality more generally, and I highlight some of the implications of these approaches for bioethics. I demonstrate that the starting points we choose for morality set the course for fundamentally different accounts of what is permissible and impermissible, good and bad, and right and wrong.

In this paper we reflect on the looming question of what constitutes expertise in ethics. Based on an empirical program that involved qualitative and quantitative as well as participatory research...