We present a game semantics in the style of Lorenzen for Girard's linear logic . Lorenzen suggested that the meaning of a proposition should be specified by telling how to conduct a debate between a proponent P who asserts and an opponent O who denies . Thus propositions are interpreted as games, connectives as operations on games, and validity as existence of a winning strategy for P. We propose that the connectives of linear logic can be naturally interpreted as the (...) operations on games introduced for entirely different purposes by Blass . We show that affine logic, i.e., linear logic plus the rule of weakening, is sound for this interpretation. We also obtain a completeness theorem for the additive fragment of affine logic, but we show that completeness fails for the multiplicative fragment. On the other hand, for the multiplicative fragment, we obtain a simple characterization of game-semantical validity in terms of classical tautologies. An analysis of the failure of completeness for the multiplicative fragment leads to the conclusion that the game interpretation of the connective is weaker than the interpretation implicit in Girard's proof rules; we discuss the differences between the two interpretations and their relative advantages and disadvantages. Finally, we discuss how Gödel's Dialectica interpretation , which was connected to linear logic by de Paiva , fits with game semantics. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungP. Bernays hat darauf hingewiesen, dass man, um die Widerspruchs freiheit der klassischen Zahlentheorie zu beweisen, den Hilbertschen flniter Standpunkt dadurch erweitern muss, dass man neben den auf Symbole sich beziehenden kombinatorischen Begriffen gewisse abstrakte Begriffe zulässt, Die abstrakten Begriffe, die bisher für diesen Zweck verwendet wurden, sinc die der konstruktiven Ordinalzahltheorie und die der intuitionistischer. Logik. Es wird gezeigt, dass man statt deesen den Begriff einer berechenbaren Funktion endlichen einfachen Typs über den natürlichen Zahler benutzen kann, wobei keine anderen (...) Konstruktionsverfahren für solche Funktionen nötig sind, als einfache Rekursion nach einer Zahlvariablen und Einsetzung von Funktionen ineinander .P. Bernays has pointed out that, in order to prove the consistency of classical number theory, it is necessary to extend Hilbert's finitary stand‐point by admitting certain abstract concepts in addition to the combinatorial concepts referring to symbols. The abstract concepts that so far have been used for this purpose are those of the constructive theory of ordinals and those of intuitionistic logic. It is shown that the concept of a computable function of finite simple type over the integers can be used instead, where no other procedures of constructing such functions are necessary except simple recursion by an integral variable and substitution of functions in each other. (shrink)

The paper gives a soundness and completeness proof for the implicative fragment of intuitionistic calculus with respect to the semantics of computability logic, which understands intuitionistic implication as interactive algorithmic reduction. This concept — more precisely, the associated concept of reducibility — is a generalization of Turing reducibility from the traditional, input/output sorts of problems to computational tasks of arbitrary degrees of interactivity.

In 1933 Godel introduced a calculus of provability (also known as modal logic S4) and left open the question of its exact intended semantics. In this paper we give a solution to this problem. We find the logic LP of propositions and proofs and show that Godel's provability calculus is nothing but the forgetful projection of LP. This also achieves Godel's objective of defining intuitionistic propositional logic Int via classical proofs and provides a Brouwer-Heyting-Kolmogorov style provability semantics for Int which (...) resisted formalization since the early 1930s. LP may be regarded as a unified underlying structure for intuitionistic, modal logics, typed combinatory logic and λ-calculus. (shrink)