We present a game semantics in the style of Lorenzen for Girard's linear logic . Lorenzen suggested that the meaning of a proposition should be specified by telling how to conduct a debate between a proponent P who asserts and an opponent O who denies . Thus propositions are interpreted as games, connectives as operations on games, and validity as existence of a winning strategy for P. We propose that the connectives of linear logic can be naturally interpreted as the (...) operations on games introduced for entirely different purposes by Blass . We show that affine logic, i.e., linear logic plus the rule of weakening, is sound for this interpretation. We also obtain a completeness theorem for the additive fragment of affine logic, but we show that completeness fails for the multiplicative fragment. On the other hand, for the multiplicative fragment, we obtain a simple characterization of game-semantical validity in terms of classical tautologies. An analysis of the failure of completeness for the multiplicative fragment leads to the conclusion that the game interpretation of the connective is weaker than the interpretation implicit in Girard's proof rules; we discuss the differences between the two interpretations and their relative advantages and disadvantages. Finally, we discuss how Gödel's Dialectica interpretation , which was connected to linear logic by de Paiva , fits with game semantics. (shrink)

I present a semantics for the language of first-order additive-multiplicative linear logic, i.e. the language of classical first-order logic with two sorts of disjunction and conjunction. The semantics allows us to capture intuitions often associated with linear logic or constructivism such as sentences = games, SENTENCES = resources or sentences = problems, where “truth” means existence of an effective winning strategy.The paper introduces a decidable first-order logic ET in the above language and gives a proof of its soundness and completeness (...) with respect to this semantics. Allowing noneffective strategies in the latter is shown to lead to classical logic.The semantics presented here is very similar to Blass's game semantics. Although there is no straightforward reduction between the two corresponding notions of validity, my completeness proof can likely be adapted to the logic induced by Blass's semantics to show its decidability, which was the main problem left open in Blass's paper.The reader needs to be familiar with classical logic and arithmetic. (shrink)

Hájek and Montagna proved that the modal propositional logic ILM is the logic of -conservativity over sound theories containing I (PA with induction restricted to formulas). I give a simpler proof of the same fact.