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  1. Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Knowledge and its Limits presents a systematic new conception of knowledge as a kind of mental stage sensitive to the knower's environment. It makes a major contribution to the debate between externalist and internalist philosophies of mind, and breaks radically with the epistemological tradition of analyzing knowledge in terms of true belief. The theory casts new light on such philosophical problems as scepticism, evidence, probability and assertion, realism and anti-realism, and the limits of what can be known. The arguments are (...)
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  • Victor's error.Michael Dummett - 2001 - Analysis 61 (1):1–2.
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  • (1 other version)The paradox of knowability.Dorothy Edgington - 1985 - Mind 94 (376):557-568.
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  • (1 other version)A logical analysis of some value concepts.Frederic Fitch - 1963 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 28 (2):135-142.
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  • The knowability paradox and the prospects for anti-realism.Jonathan Kvanvig - 1995 - Noûs 29 (4):481-500.
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  • A SOLUTION TO FITCH'S PARADOX OF KNOWABILITY.Helge Rückert - 2004 - In S. Rahman (ed.), Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 351--380.
    There is an argument (first presented by Fitch), which tries to show by formal means that the anti-realistic thesis that every truth might possibly be known, is equivalent to the unacceptable thesis that every truth is actually known (at some time in the past, present or future). First, the argument is presented and some proposals for the solution of Fitch's Paradox are briefly discussed. Then, by using Wehmeier's modal logic with subjunctive marks (S5*), it is shown how the derivation can (...)
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  • (1 other version)Relative necessity.Timothy Smiley - 1963 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 28 (2):113-134.
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  • Victor vanquished.Neil Tennant - 2002 - Analysis 62 (2):135-142.
    The naive anti-realist holds the following principle: (◊K) All truths are knowable. This unrestricted generalization (◊K), as is now well known, falls prey to Fitch’s Paradox (Fitch 1963: 38, Theorem 1). It can be used as the only suspect principle, alongside others that cannot be impugned, to prove quite generally, and constructively, that the set {p, ¬Kp} is inconsistent (Tennant 1997: 261). From this it would follow, intuitionistically, that any proposition that is never actually known to be true (by anyone, (...)
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