First published in 1945, Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s monumental _Phénoménologie de la perception _signalled the arrival of a major new philosophical and intellectual voice in post-war Europe. Breaking with the prevailing picture of existentialism and phenomenology at the time, it has become one of the landmark works of twentieth-century thought. This new translation, the first for over fifty years, makes this classic work of philosophy available to a new generation of readers. _Phenomenology of Perception _stands in the great phenomenological tradition of Husserl, (...) Heidegger, and Sartre. Yet Merleau-Ponty’s contribution is decisive, as he brings this tradition and other philosophical predecessors, particularly Descartes and Kant, to confront a neglected dimension of our experience: the lived body and the phenomenal world. Charting a bold course between the reductionism of science on the one hand and "intellectualism" on the other, Merleau-Ponty argues that we should regard the body not as a mere biological or physical unit, but as the body which structures one’s situation and experience within the world. Merleau-Ponty enriches his classic work with engaging studies of famous cases in the history of psychology and neurology as well as phenomena that continue to draw our attention, such as phantom limb syndrome, synaesthesia, and hallucination. This new translation includes many helpful features such as the reintroduction of Merleau-Ponty’s discursive Table of Contents as subtitles into the body of the text, a comprehensive Translator’s Introduction to its main themes, essential notes explaining key terms of translation, an extensive Index, and an important updating of Merleau-Ponty’s references to now available English translations. Also included is a new foreword by Taylor Carman and an introduction to Merleau-Ponty_ _by Claude Lefort. Translated by Donald A. Landes. (shrink)

In this work the distinguished physical chemist and philosopher, Michael Polanyi, demonstrates that the scientist's personal participation in his knowledge, in both its discovery and its validation, is an indispensable part of science itself. Even in the exact sciences, "knowing" is an art, of which the skill of the knower, guided by his personal commitment and his passionate sense of increasing contact with reality, is a logically necessary part. In the biological and social sciences this becomes even more evident. The (...) tendency to make knowledge impersonal in our culture has split fact from value, science from humanity. Polanyi wishes to substitute for the objective, impersonal ideal of scientific detachment an alternative ideal which gives attention to the personal involvement of the knower in all acts of understanding. His book should help to restore science to its rightful place in an integrated culture, as part of the whole person's continuing endeavor to make sense of the totality of his experience. In honor of this work and his The Study of Man Polanyi was presented with the Lecomte de Noüy Award for 1959. (shrink)

I propose to bring fresh evidence here for my theory of knowledge and expand it in new directions. We shall arrive most swiftly at the centre of the theory, by going back to the point from which I started about twenty years ago. Upon examining the grounds on which science is pursued, I saw that its progress is determined at every stage by indefinable powers of thought. No rules can account for the way a good idea is found for starting (...) an inquiry; and there are no firm rules either for the verification or the refutation of the proposed solution of a problem. Rules widely current may be plausible enough, but scientific enquiry often proceeds and triumphs by contradicting them. Moreover, the explicit content of a theory fails to account for the guidance it affords to future discoveries. To hold a natural law to be true, is to believe that its presence may reveal itself in yet unknown and perhaps yet unthinkable consequences; it is to believe that such laws are features of a reality which as such will continue to bear consequences inexhaustibly. (shrink)

Physics says that it cannot deal with the mind-brain problem, because it does not deal in subjectivities, and mind is subjective. However, biologists still claim to seek a material basis for subjective mental processes, which would thereby render them objective. Something is clearly wrong here. I claim that what is wrong is the adoption of too narrow a view of what constitutes objectivity, especially in identifying it with what a machine can do. I approach the problem in the light of (...) two cognate circumstances: the measurement problem in quantum physics, and the objectivity of standard mathematics, even though most of it is beyond the reach of machines. I argue that the only resolution to such problems is in the recognition that closed loops of causation are objective; i.e. legitimate objects of scientific scrutiny. These are explicitly forbidden in any machine or mechanism. A material system which contains such loops is called complex. Such complex systems thus must possess nonsimulable models; i.e. models which contain impredicativities or self-references which cannot be removed, or faithfully mapped into a single coherent syntactic time-frame. I consider a few of the consequences of the above, in the context of thus redrawing the boundary between subject and object. (shrink)

In historical perspective the book presents some logical concepts underlying medical thinking--definition, diagnosis, classification, semeiology, the ontology of disease, causation, scientific method, so-called "scientific medicine" and kindred topics. Histories of concrete diseases especially tuberculosis, illustrate these concepts "in action" over several centuries, within their contemporary intellectual environment. The thought modes of the earlier physicians, absurd as they may seem today, often showed excellent logic. Historically, medical thinking remains surprisingly constant, despite spectacular scientific "progress".

This Dissertation is an analysis of Michael Polanyi's epistemology of 'personal knowledge.' ;His theory of tacit knowing is conceived of as three consecutive 'models' which explain the main strands constituting tacit knowing. The Gestalt Model is based on the analogy 'scientific insight is like gestalt perception,' the Action-Guiding Model develops the existential-phenomenological aspects of tacit knowing, the Semiotic Model introduces the notion of 'tacit triad' to show how action is directed, or 'tends to' meaning: this is Polanyi's conception of inference (...) as integration. The three models are tied together by 'heuristic striving' --a commitment to truth and engagement with reality. ;Polanyi's three successive 'models' are to be taken as presenting a relation of a relation, a method of model-building causing some difficulty both in conveying and in understanding his theory. My analysis of each level of relation and the connection of levels aims at clarification of his method. ;The theory's workings are demonstrated by examples from the sciences and mathematics. As a detailed 'test case,' Einstein's discovery of the Special Theory of Relativity is examined, as it is understood by 'the standard view of science' and as it is understood by Polanyi. The 'test case' is presented as an examination of the nature and justification of Personal Knowledge. ;An extension of Polanyi's theory of Personal Knowledge is suggested for application in somatic medicine, as a resolution of the debate on the use of mechanistic versus phenomenological approaches to clinical practice. ;Polanyi believed that his theory of tacit knowing is generalizable, and is fundamental to the idea of an educated mind. (shrink)