Body and World is the definitive edition of a book that shouldnow take its place as a major contribution to contemporary existentialphenomenology. Samuel Todes goes beyond Martin Heidegger and MauriceMerleau-Ponty in his description of how independent physical natureand experience are united in our bodily action. His account allows himto preserve the authority of experience while avoiding the tendencytoward idealism that threatens both Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty.Todes emphasizes the complex structure of the human body ;front/back asymmetry, the need to balance in a (...) gravitational field, and so forth ;and the role that structure plays in producing the spatiotemporal field of experience and in making possible objective knowledge of the objects in it. He shows that perception involves nonconceptual, but nonetheless objective forms of judgment. One can think of Body and World as fleshing out Merleau-Ponty's project while presciently relating it to the current interest in embodiment, not only in philosophy but also in psychology, linguistics, cognitive science, artificial intelligence, neuroscience, and anthropology. Todes's work opens new ways of thinking about problems such as the relation of perception to thought and the possibility of knowing an independent reality ;problems that have occupied philosophers since Kant and still concern analytic and continental philosophy. (shrink)

Frontmatter -- VORWORT ZUR ERSTEN AUFLAGE -- VORWORT ZUR ZWEITEN AUFLAGE -- INHALT -- Erstes Kapitel. ZIEL UND GEGENSTAND DER UNTERSUCHUNG -- Zweites Kapitel. DER CARTESIANISCHE EINWAND UND DIE PROBLEMSTELLUNG -- Drittes Kapitel. DIE THESE -- Viertes Kapitel. DIE DASEINSWEISEN DER LEBENDIGKEIT -- Fünftes Kapitel. DIE ORGANISATIONSWEISEN DES LEBENDIGEN DASEINS. PFLANZE UND TIER -- Sechstes Kapitel. DIE SPHÄRE DES TIERES -- Siebentes Kapitel: Die Sphaere des Menschen -- NACHTRAG -- SACHREGISTER -- NAMENSREGISTER -- Backmatter.

_Challenges conventional understandings of Heidegger’s account of the body._.

Dans cet ouvrage publié en 1942, complété en 1945 par la Phénoménologie de la perception, « s’affirme pour la première fois une philosophie existentielle où le mode d’être ultime du pour-soi ne s’avère pas être, en dépit des intentions et des descriptions contraires, celui d’une conscience-témoin » (A. de Waelhens, préface). La structure du comportement se place au niveau de l’expérience non pas naturelle mais scientifique et s’efforce de prouver que cette expérience, c’est-à-dire l’ensemble des faits qui constituent le comportement, (...) n’est pas compréhensible dans les perspectives ontologiques que la science adopte spontanément. (shrink)