In this paper I trace Husserl’s transformation of his notion of phantasy from its strong leanings towards empiricism into a transcendental phenomenology of imagination. Rejecting the view that this account is only more incompatible with contemporary neuroscientific research, I instead claim that the transcendental suspension of naturalistic (or scientific) pretensions precisely enables cooperation between the two distinct realms of phenomenology and science. In particular, a transcendental account of phantasy can disclose the specific accomplishments of imagination without prematurely deciding upon a (...) particular scientific paradigm for its experimental investigation; a decision that is best left to the sciences themselves. (shrink)

_ Source: _Volume 46, Issue 1, pp 98 - 116 The paper addresses Ricoeur’s critique of Sartre in light of Ricoeur’s unpublished _Lectures on Imagination_. I argue that Ricoeur’s critique is twofold: hermeneutical and phenomenological. The hermeneutical critique relies on two central claims, namely, that Sartre fails to distinguish productive and reproductive imagination and that this distinction is language-based. I argue that neither claim is justified. The phenomenological critique casts doubts on Sartre’s sharp distinction between the real and the imaginary. (...) It relies on Ricoeur’s phenomenology of painting, which offers an alternative way to distinguish productive and reproductive imagination. In place of a conclusion, I inquire into the reasons why Ricoeur, who considers imagination a theme of central philosophical importance, never wrote a separate book on imagination. I maintain that the reasons are methodological: the phenomenological and hermeneutical approaches to imagination are irreconcilable since the first one relies on the primacy of pre-predicative experience, while the second one is based on the primacy of language. (shrink)

I argue that imagination has an inherently paradoxical structure: it enables one to flee one’s socio-cultural reality and to constitute one’s socio-cultural world. I maintain that most philosophical accounts of the imagination leave this paradox unexplored. I further contend that Paul Ricoeur is the only thinker to have addressed this paradox explicitly. According to Ricoeur, to resolve this paradox, one needs to recognize language as the origin of productive imagination. This paper explores Ricoeur’s solution by offering a detailed study of (...) reproductive and productive imagination in the framework of poetic imagination. My analysis subjects Ricoeur’s distinction between reproductive and productive imagination to a critique that relies upon the principles of classical phenomenology. According to my central thesis, the imaginative powers of language are themselves rooted in perception. This thesis broadens the scope and significance of Ricoeur’s solution by enabling one to resolve the paradox of imagination not only at the level of language-based imagination, but also at the level of dreams and daydreaming as well as at the level of non-language based art. No less significantly, this thesis enables one to open a fresh dialogue between phenomenology and hermeneutics. (shrink)

For fifty years Hubert Dreyfus has done pioneering work which brings phenomenology and existentialism to bear on the philosophical and scientific study of the mind. This is a selection of his most influential essays, developing his critique of the representational model of the mind in analytical philosophy of mind and mainstream cognitive science.

Klausimas apie transcendenciją šiuolaikinės fenomenologijos diskusijose susiejamas su klausimu apie jusliškumą. Jutimai tradiciškai suvokiami kaip išorybės ir vidujybės tarpininkai. Nagrinėdamas objekto duotį patirtyje Edmundas Husserlis įsteigia materijos ir formos perskyrą. Grynieji įspūdžiai pateikiami kaip tokia pirminė patyrimo medžiaga, kuri tampa prasminga tiktai per intencionalų formavimą. Michelis Henry supriešina materialią ir intencionalią fenomenologiją. Jis siekia parodyti, jog be grynųjų įspū-džių analizės nebūtų galima ir intencionali fenomenologija. Henry mano, kad Husserlis aiškiai neatsako į klausimą apie juslinės materijos ir intencionalios formos santykį. Be (...) to, jis teigia, jog Husserlis šį santykį interpretuoja pripažindamas intencionalios formos pirmenybę. Taigi Henry siekia reabilituoti materialinę fenomenologiją, nes būtent joje t. y. juslinėje materijoje, kaip tik ir glūdi, jo manymu, bet kokios pirminės duoties paslaptis. Šis posūkis į materialiąją fenomenologiją reabilituoja „gyvenimo imanencijos“ filosofiją. Tačiau Wilhelmo Schapo, Martino Heideggerio ir Maurice’o Merleau-Ponty pateikti fenomenologiniai aprašymai parodo, kad jusliškumas yra ne imanencijos ir transcendencijos tarpininkas, bet tokia transcendentali empirijos plotmė, kurią įmanoma aprašyti tik atmetant grynųjų įspūdžių sampratą. Pagrindiniai žodžiai: hiletiniai duomenys, intencionali forma, jusliškumas, fenomenologija. (shrink)