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Rational Capacities, or: How to Distinguish Recklessness, Weakness, and Compulsion.Michael Smith - 2003 - In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of will and practical irrationality. New York : Oxford University Press,: Oxford University Press. pp. 17-38.details
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The Myth of Instrumental Rationality.Joseph Raz - 2005 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (1):28.details
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Accidie, Evaluation, and Motivatlon.Sergio Tenenbaum - 2003 - In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of will and practical irrationality. New York : Oxford University Press,: Oxford University Press. pp. 147.details
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Where does the akratic break take place?Amelie Oksenberg Rorty - 1980 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 58 (4):333 – 346.details
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Practical unreason.Philip Pettit & Michael Smith - 1993 - Mind 102 (405):53-79.details
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On Acting Rationally Against One's Best Judgment.Nomy Arpaly - 2000 - Ethics 110 (3):488-513.details
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Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain.Antonio R. Damasio - 1994 - Putnam.details
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(1 other version)Wise choices, apt feelings: a theory of normative judgment.Allan Gibbard - 1992 - Cambridge:details
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(1 other version)Irrationality: An Essay on Akrasia, Self-deception, and Self-control.Alfred R. Mele - 1987 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1988 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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The Philosophy of Social Science: An Introduction.Martin Hollis - 1994 - New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.details
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Inhibition and the right inferior frontal cortex.Adam R. Aron, Trevor W. Robbins & Russell A. Poldrack - 2004 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 8 (4):170-177.details
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Insensitivity to future consequences following damage to human prefrontal cortex.Antoine Bechara, Antonio R. Damasio, Hanna Damasio & Steven W. Anderson - 1993 - Cognition 50 (1-3):7-15.details
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Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activity (readiness-potential). The unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act.Benjamin Libet, Curtis A. Gleason, Elwood W. Wright & Dennis K. Pearl - 1983 - Brain 106 (3):623--664.details
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Skepticism about weakness of will.Gary Watson - 1977 - Philosophical Review 86 (3):316-339.details
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Desiring the bad: An essay in moral psychology.Michael Stocker - 1979 - Journal of Philosophy 76 (12):738-753.details
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Dementia praecox oder Gruppe der Schizophrenien.Eugen Bleuler - 1911 - Verlag Franz Deuticke.details
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Conscious volition and mental representation: Toward a more fine-grained analysis.Thomas Metzinger - 2009 - In Natalie Sebanz & Wolfgang Prinz (eds.), Disorders of Volition. Bradford Books.details
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Akratics and Addicts.Alfred R. Mele - 2002 - American Philosophical Quarterly 39 (2):153 - 167.details
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The structure of ill structured problems.Herbert A. Simon - 1973 - Artificial Intelligence 4 (3-4):181--201.details
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(1 other version)Neuroeconomics: cross-currents in research on decision-making.Alan G. Sanfey, George Loewenstein, Samuel M. McClure & Jonathan D. Cohen - 2006 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (3):108-116.details
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Backsliding.R. M. Hare - 1963 - In Richard Mervyn Hare (ed.), Freedom and reason. Oxford,: Clarendon Press.details
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Dissociating the Roles of Right Ventral Lateral and Dorsal Lateral Prefrontal Cortex in Generation and Maintenance of Hypotheses in Set-shift Problems.Vinod Goel & Oshin Vartanian - 2005 - Cerebral Cortex 15 (8):1170-1177.details
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Paradoxes of Rationality.Roy Sorensen - 2004 - In Alfred R. Mele & Piers Rawling (eds.), The Oxford handbook of rationality. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Decision making and neuropsychiatry.Shibley Rahman, Barbara J. Sahakian, Rudolf N. Cardinal, Robert D. Rogers & Trevor W. Robbins - 2001 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 5 (6):271-277.details
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Moral Reasons.Jonathan Dancy - 1993 - Philosophy 69 (267):114-116.details
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Diagnosing agency.Peter G. Campbell - 2000 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 7 (2):107-119.details
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Self-deception, akrasia and irrationality.Amélie Oksenberg Rorty - 1985 - In Jon Elster (ed.), The Multiple self. New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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