- (3 other versions)Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.details
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(1 other version)The Ethics of Belief.W. K. Clifford - 1999 - In William Kingdon Clifford (ed.), The ethics of belief and other essays. Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books. pp. 70-97.details
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Defeasible Reasoning.John L. Pollock - 1987 - Cognitive Science 11 (4):481-518.details
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A new argument for evidentialism.Nishi Shah - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225):481–498.details
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The lottery paradox, knowledge, and rationality.Dana K. Nelkin - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (3):373-409.details
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(3 other versions)Knowledge.Keith Lehrer - 1974 - Philosophy 50 (194):483-485.details
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Evidence and Inquiry: Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology.Jonathan Vogel & Susan Haack - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (4):621.details
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(2 other versions)What Is So Bad About Contradictions?Graham Priest - 1998 - Journal of Philosophy 95 (8):410-426.details
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A new solution to the paradoxes of rational acceptability.Igor Douven - 2002 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (3):391-410.details
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(1 other version)Assertion, knowledge, and rational credibility.Igor Douven - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (4):449-485.details
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Concepts of Epistemic Justification.William P. Alston - 1985 - The Monist 68 (1):57-89.details
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The Lottery Paradox and Our Epistemic Goal.Igor Douven - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):204-225.details
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Being knowingly incoherent.Richard Foley - 1992 - Noûs 26 (2):181-203.details
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Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology.Earl Conee & Richard Feldman - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):147-149.details
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``Conjunctivitis".Henry E. Kyburg Jr - 1970 - In Marshall Swain (ed.), Induction, acceptance, and rational belief. Dordrecht,: Reidel. pp. 55-82.details
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