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  1. Phenomenal states.Brian Loar - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:81-108.
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  • What is consciousness?David M. Armstrong - 1970 - In The nature of mind. New York,: Cornell University Press.
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  • Consciousness, Color, and Content.Michael Tye - 2000 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
    A further development of Tye's theory of phenomenal consciousness along with replies to common objections.
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  • Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
    Lycan not only uses the numerous arguments against materialism, and functionalist theories of mind in particular, to gain a more detailed positive view of the ..
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  • Sosa, Safety, Sensitivity, and Skeptical Hypotheses.Keith DeRose - 2004 - In John Greco (ed.), Ernest Sosa: And His Critics. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 22–41.
    This chapter contains section titled: Sensitivity Accounts — Direct and Indirect The Attack by Counterexample on Sensitivity Accounts — And Why SCA Seems on the Right Track Nonetheless Sosa's Safety Account Sosa's Account as a Sensitivity Account — and His Counterexamples Safety and the Problem of True/True Subjunctives Other Formulations of Safety Safety and Strength of Epistemic Position Contextualist Solutions to Skepticism Intuitive Complexity: Do We Know that We're Not Brains in Vats?
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  • Individualism and Self-Knowledge.Tyler Burge - 2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: readings in contemporary epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • .Richard Alston - 2015
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  • Individualism and Self-Knowledge.Tyler Burge - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.
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  • The First Person Perspective and Other Essays.Sydney Shoemaker - 1996 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 59 (2):378-378.
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  • Dretske on the Mind's Awareness of Itself.William G. Lycan - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):125-133.
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  • Privileged Access.John Heil - 1988 - Mind 97 (386):238-251.
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  • Consciousness, colour, and content. Michael Tye.Bill Brewer - 2001 - Mind 110 (439):869-874.
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  • Philosophical Explanations. [REVIEW]Robert Nozick - 1982 - Critica 14 (41):87-93.
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  • VI Reliabilism, Knowledge, and Mental Content.J. Brown - 2000 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100:115-136.
    I consider whether one particular anti-individualist claim, the doctrine of object-dependent thoughts (DODT), is compatible with the Principle of Privileged Access, or PPA, which states that, in general, a subject can have non-empirical knowledge of her thought contents. The standard defence of the compatibility of anti-individualism and PPA emphasises the reliability of the process which produces a subject's second order beliefs about her thought contents. I examine whether this defence can be applied to DODT, given that DODT generates the possibility (...)
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  • What the Disjunctivist is Right About.Alan Millar - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):176-198.
    There is a traditional conception of sensory experience on which the experiences one has looking at, say, a cat could be had by someone merely hallucinating a cat. Disjunctivists take issue with this conception on the grounds that it does not enable us to understand how perceptual knowledge is possible. In particular, they think, it does not explain how it can be that experiences gained in perception enable us to be in ‘cognitive contact’ with objects and facts. I develop this (...)
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  • Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations[REVIEW]Alvin I. Goldman - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (1):81-88.
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  • VI-Reliabilism, Knowledge, and Mental Content.Jessica Brown - 2000 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (2):115-135.
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  • Externalism and Self-Knowledge.Peter Ludlow & Norah Martin (eds.) - 1998 - Center for the Study of Language and Inf.
    One of the most provocative projects in recent analytic philosophy has been the development of the doctrine of externalism, or, as it is often called, anti-individualism. While there is no agreement as to whether externalism is true or not, a number of recent investigations have begun to explore the question of what follows if it is true. One of the most interesting of these investigations thus far has been the question of whether externalism has consequences for the doctrine that we (...)
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  • The First Person Perspective and Other Essays.Sydney Shoemaker - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    Sydney Shoemaker is one of the most influential philosophers currently writing on philosophy of mind and metaphysics. The essays in this collection deal with the way in which we know our own minds, and with the nature of those mental states of which we have our most direct conscious awareness. Professor Shoemaker opposes the 'inner sense' conception of introspective self-knowledge. He defends the view that perceptual and sensory states have non-representational features - 'qualia' - that determine what it is like (...)
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  • How to Defeat Opposition to Moore.Ernest Sosa - 1999 - Noûs 33 (s13):141-153.
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  • Eplstemic Justification. Essays In the Theory of Knowledge, by William Alston. [REVIEW]Matthias Steup - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1):228-232.
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  • What the disjunctivist is right about.Alan Millar - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):176-199.
    There is a traditional conception of sensory experience on which the experiences one has looking at, say, a cat could be had by someone merely hallucinating a cat. Disjunctivists take issue with this conception on the grounds that it does not enable us to understand how perceptual knowledge is possible. In particular, they think, it does not explain how it can be that experiences gained in perception enable us to be in ‘cognitive contact’ with objects and facts. I develop this (...)
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  • A priority and externalism.John Hawthorne - 2007 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Internalism and externalism in semantics and epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 201--218.
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  • The state of knowing.Alan Millar - 2007 - Philosophical Issues 17 (1):179–196.
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  • Internalism, externalism and the no-defeater condition.Michael Bergmann - 1997 - Synthese 110 (3):399-417.
    Despite various attempts to rectify matters, the internalism-externalism (I-E) debate in epistemology remains mired in serious confusion. I present a new account of this debate, one which fits well with entrenched views on the I-E distinction and illuminates the fundamental disagreements at the heart of the debate. Roughly speaking, the I-E debate is over whether or not certain of the necessary conditions of positive epistemic status are internal. But what is the sense of internal here? And of which conditions of (...)
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  • What the Externalist Can Know A Priori.Paul Boghossian - 1998 - Philosophical Issues 9:197-211.
    Compatibilism combines an externalist view of mental content with a doctrine of privileged self‐knowledge. The essay presents a reductio of compatibilism by arguing that if compatibilism were true, we would be in a position to know certain facts about the world a priori, facts that no one can reasonably believe are knowable a priori. Whether this should be taken to cast doubt on externalism or privileged self‐knowledge is not discussed. Consideration is given to the ’empty case’—the case in which a (...)
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  • Introspection.Alex Byrne - 2005 - Philosophical Topics 33 (1):79-104.
    I know various contingent truths about my environment by perception. For example, by looking, I know that there is a computer before me; by hearing, I know that someone is talking in the corridor; by tasting, I know that the coffee has no sugar. I know these things because I have some built-in mechanisms specialized for detecting the state of my environment. One of these mechanisms, for instance, is presently transducing electromagnetic radiation (in a narrow band of wavelengths) coming from (...)
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  • The mechanics of self-knowledge.Brie Gertler - 2000 - Philosophical Topics 28 (2):125-46.
    It is often said that we can know our own thoughts more directly or with more certainty than anyone else can know them. And this disparity is usually taken to be principled, in that we would not be the rational, reflective beings that we are without it. My aim is to trace the consequences of a principled disparity between self-knowledge and other-knowledge for what may be termed the “mechanics ” of self-knowledge . I use a new thought experiment to show (...)
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  • Disjunctivism.John Hawthorne & Karson Kovakovich - 2006 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 80 (1):145-83.
    [John Hawthorne] We examine some well-known disjunctivist projects in the philosophy of perception, mainly in a critical vein. Our discussion is divided into four parts. Following some introductory remarks, we examine in part two the link between object-dependent contents and disjunctivism. In part three, we explore the disjunctivist's use of discriminability facts as a basis for understanding experience. In part four, we examine an interesting argument for disjunctivism that has been offered by Michael Martin. /// [Scott Sturgeon] The paper aims (...)
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