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What is consciousness?David M. Armstrong - 1970 - In The nature of mind. New York,: Cornell University Press.details
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Consciousness, Color, and Content.Michael Tye - 2000 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.details
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Consciousness and Experience.William G. Lycan - 1996 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.details
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Individualism and Self-Knowledge.Tyler Burge - 2000 - In Sven Bernecker & Fred I. Dretske (eds.), Knowledge: readings in contemporary epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Individualism and Self-Knowledge.Tyler Burge - 2003 - In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The First Person Perspective and Other Essays.Sydney Shoemaker - 1996 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 59 (2):378-378.details
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Dretske on the Mind's Awareness of Itself.William G. Lycan - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):125-133.details
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Privileged Access.John Heil - 1988 - Mind 97 (386):238-251.details
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Consciousness, colour, and content. Michael Tye.Bill Brewer - 2001 - Mind 110 (439):869-874.details
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Philosophical Explanations. [REVIEW]Robert Nozick - 1982 - Critica 14 (41):87-93.details
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VI Reliabilism, Knowledge, and Mental Content.J. Brown - 2000 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100:115-136.details
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What the Disjunctivist is Right About.Alan Millar - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):176-198.details
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Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations. [REVIEW]Alvin I. Goldman - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (1):81-88.details
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VI-Reliabilism, Knowledge, and Mental Content.Jessica Brown - 2000 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 100 (2):115-135.details
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Externalism and Self-Knowledge.Peter Ludlow & Norah Martin (eds.) - 1998 - Center for the Study of Language and Inf.details
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The First Person Perspective and Other Essays.Sydney Shoemaker - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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How to Defeat Opposition to Moore.Ernest Sosa - 1999 - Noûs 33 (s13):141-153.details
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Eplstemic Justification. Essays In the Theory of Knowledge, by William Alston. [REVIEW]Matthias Steup - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1):228-232.details
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What the disjunctivist is right about.Alan Millar - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):176-199.details
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A priority and externalism.John Hawthorne - 2007 - In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Internalism and externalism in semantics and epistemology. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 201--218.details
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The state of knowing.Alan Millar - 2007 - Philosophical Issues 17 (1):179–196.details
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Internalism, externalism and the no-defeater condition.Michael Bergmann - 1997 - Synthese 110 (3):399-417.details
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What the Externalist Can Know A Priori.Paul Boghossian - 1998 - Philosophical Issues 9:197-211.details
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Introspection.Alex Byrne - 2005 - Philosophical Topics 33 (1):79-104.details
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The mechanics of self-knowledge.Brie Gertler - 2000 - Philosophical Topics 28 (2):125-46.details
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Disjunctivism.John Hawthorne & Karson Kovakovich - 2006 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 80 (1):145-83.details
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