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The Nature of Appearance in Kant’s Transcendentalism: A Seman- tico-Cognitive Analysis.Sergey L. Katrechko - 2018 - Kantian Journal 37 (3):41-55.details
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Explanatory exclusion and mental explanation.Dwayne Moore - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (3):390-404.details
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Max Black's objection to mind-body identity.Ned Block - 2006 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 2:3-78.details
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A Phenomenal Theory of Grasping and Understanding.David Bourget - forthcoming - In Andrei Ionuţ Mărăşoiu & Mircea Dumitru (eds.), Understanding and Conscious Experience: Philosophical and Scientific Perspectives. Routledge.details
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Sense data: The sensible approach.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2001 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 62 (1):17-63.details
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Are Phenomenal Concepts Perspectival?Andreas Elpidorou - 2012 - Southwest Philosophy Review 28 (1):43-53.details
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Introduction.Martina Fürst & Guido Melchior - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (1):1-1.details
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Consciousness, type physicalism, and inference to the best explanation.Brian P. McLaughlin - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):266-304.details
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Closing the Conceptual Gap in Epistemic Injustice.Martina Fürst - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 74 (1): 1-22..details
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How to dig up minds: The intentional analysis program in cognitive archaeology.Corijn van Mazijk - 2024 - European Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):130-144.details
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Spacetime Emergence in Quantum Gravity: Functionalism and the Hard Problem.Baptiste Le Bihan - 2021 - Synthese 199 (2):371–393.details
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Filozofija uma: pregled suvremenih rasprava o umu i tijelu (Eng. Philosophy of mind: a survey of contemporary debates on the mind-body problem).Marko Jurjako & Luca Malatesti - 2022 - Rijeka: University of Rijeka, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences.details
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Taking referentialism seriously: A response to the modal argument.Brendan O'sullivan - 2010 - Theoria 76 (1):54-67.details
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Physicalism.Daniel Stoljar - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Hard, Harder, Hardest.Katalin Balog - 2019 - In Arthur Sullivan (ed.), Sensations, Thoughts, and Language: Essays in Honor of Brian Loar. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 265-289.details
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Relational vs Adverbial Conceptions of Phenomenal Intentionality.David Bourget - 2019 - In Arthur Sullivan (ed.), Sensations, Thoughts, and Language: Essays in Honor of Brian Loar. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 137-166.details
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Either/Or: Subjectivity, Objectivity and Value.Katalin Balog - 2020 - In John Schwenkler & Enoch Lambert (eds.), Becoming Someone New: Essays on Transformative Experience, Choice, and Change. Oxford University Press.details
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The Philosophy of Phenomenal Consciousness.Zoe Drayson - 2015 - In Drayson Zoe (ed.), The Constitution of Phenomenal Consciousness. pp. 273-292.details
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Grounding, Analysis, and Russellian Monism.Philip Goff - 2019 - In Sam Coleman (ed.), The Knowledge Argument. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 198-222.details
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Cosmopsychism, Micropsychism, and the Grounding Relation.Philip Goff - 2019 - In William Seager (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism. Routledge.details
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Introspecting in the 20th century.Maja Spener - 2018 - In Amy Kind (ed.), Philosophy of Mind in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries: The History of the Philosophy of Mind, Volume 6. New York: Routledge. pp. 148-174.details
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The Subjectively Enduring Self.L. A. Paul - 2017 - In Ian Phillips (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Temporal Experience: Routledge Handbooks in Philosophy. New York: Routledge. pp. 262-271.details
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Grounding physicalism and the knowledge argument.Alex Moran - 2023 - Philosophical Perspectives 37 (1):269-289.details
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The Knowledge Argument and Epiphenomenalism.Yujin Nagasawa - 2010 - Erkenntnis 72 (1):37 - 56.details
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Why Panpsychism Doesn’t Help Us Explain Consciousness.Philip Goff - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (3):289-311.details
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Why Panpsychism doesn't Help Us Explain Consciousness.Philip Goff - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (3):289-311.details
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The Scrambler: An Argument Against Representationalism.Stephen Biggs - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):215-236.details
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Conceiving of Pain.Brendan O'Sullivan & Peter Hanks - 2008 - Dialogue 47 (2):351-376.details
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Chains of Being: Infinite Regress, Circularity, and Metaphysical Explanation.Ross P. Cameron - 2022 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Philosophical Investigation Series: Selected Texts on Metaphysics, Language and Mind / Série Investigação Filosófica: Textos Selecionados de Metafísica, Linguagem e Mente.Rodrigo Cid & Pedro Merlussi (eds.) - 2020 - Pelotas: Editora da UFPel / NEPFIL Online.details
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The Normative Property Dualism Argument.Jesse Hambly - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.details
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Consciousness and the Philosophy of Signs: How Peircean Semiotics Combines Phenomenal Qualia and Practical Effects.Marc Champagne - 2018 - Cham: Springer.details
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Experimentos Mentales y Filosofías de Sillón.Rodrigo González (ed.) - 2017 - Santiago, Chile: Bravo y Allende.details
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A Posteriori Physicalism and the Discrimination of Properties.Philip Woodward - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (1):121-143.details
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Review of Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness, by John Perry. [REVIEW]Jessica Wilson - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (4):598-601.details
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Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness.Jessica Wilson - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (4):598-602.details
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The Hard Problem Isn’t Getting any Easier: Thoughts on Chalmers’ “Meta-Problem”.Ben White - 2020 - Philosophia 49:495-506.details
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Other minds are neither seen nor inferred.Mason Westfall - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11977-11997.details
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The cognitive significance of phenomenal knowledge.Bénédicte Veillet - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2955-2974.details
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What makes you think you are conscious? An agnosticist manifesto.Cees van Leeuwen - 2015 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 9.details
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Some reflections on Husserlian intentionality, intentionalism, and non-propositional contents.Corijn van Mazijk - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (4):499-517.details
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Absent qualia and the mind-body problem.Michael Tye - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (2):139-168.details
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A theory of phenomenal concepts.Michael Tye - 2003 - In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 91-105.details
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A Theory of Phenomenal Concepts.Michael Tye - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 53:91-105.details
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'Appearing Equal' at Phaedo 74 B 4-C 6: an Epistemic Interpretation.Thomas M. Tuozzo - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 54.details
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Categoricalism, dispositionalism, and the epistemology of properties.Matthew Tugby - 2014 - Synthese 191 (6):1-16.details
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Dispositional realism without dispositional essences.Matthew Tugby - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-27.details
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Revelation and physicalism.Kelly Trogdon - 2017 - Synthese 194 (7):2345-2366.details
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Representationalism and the conceivability of inverted spectra.Brad Thompson - 2008 - Synthese 160 (2):203-213.details
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