In this new volume in the Oxford Psychology Series, the author presents a highly readable account of the cognitive unconscious, focusing in particular on the problem of implicit learning. Implicit learning is defined as the acquisition of knowledge that takes place independently of the conscious attempts to learn and largely in the absence of explicit knowledge about what was acquired. One of the core assumptions of this argument is that implicit learning is a fundamental, "root" process, one that lies at (...) the very heart of the adaptive behavioral repertoire of every complex organism. The author's goals are to outline the essential features of implicit learning that have emerged from the many studies that have been carried out in a variety of experimental laboratories over the past several decades; to present the various alternative perspectives on this issue that have been proposed by other researchers and to try to accommodate these views with his own; to structure the literature so that it can be seen in the context of standard heuristics of evolutionary biology; to present the material within a functionalist approach and to try to show why the experimental data should be seen as entailing particular epistemological perspectives; and to present implicit processing as encompassing a general and ubiquitous set of operations that have wide currency and several possible applications. Chapter 1 begins with the core problem under consideration in this book, a characterization of "implicit learning" as it has come to be used in the literature. Reber puts this seemingly specialized topic into a general framework and suggests a theoretical model based on standard heuristics of evolutionary biology. In his account, Reber weaves a capsule history of interest in and work on the cognitive unconscious. Chapter 2 turns to a detailed overview of the experimental work on the acquisition of implicit knowledge, which currently is of great interest. Chapter 3 develops the evolutionary model within which one can see learning and cognition as richly intertwining issues and not as two distinct fields with one dominating the other. Finally, Chapter 4 explores a variety of entailments and speculations concerning implicit cognitive processes and their general role in the larger scope of human performance. (shrink)

Reflective practice in general, and the views of Carr and Kemmis on ‘action research’ in particular, have become the settled orthodoxy of much educational thinking, but can they take the load that they are being asked to bear? An analysis of ‘reflection’ is offered, which reveals what can be achieved by the operation and what cannot. This is then used to assess the coherence of Kemmis's views on the concept—the basis of Carr and Kemmis's widely-cited theoretical proposals, which they use (...) to justify their approach to action research. I then turn to an examination of the adequacy of these proposals themselves. (shrink)

Reflective practice in general, and the views of Carr and Kemmis on ‘action research’ in particular, have become the settled orthodoxy of much educational thinking, but can they take the load that they are being asked to bear? An analysis of ‘reflection’ is offered, which reveals what can be achieved by the operation and what cannot. This is then used to assess the coherence of Kemmis's views on the concept—the basis of Carr and Kemmis's widely-cited theoretical proposals, which they use (...) to justify their approach to action research. I then turn to an examination of the adequacy of these proposals themselves. (shrink)

Donald Schön’s theory of reflective practice has received unprecedented attention as an approach to professional development in nursing and other health and social care professions. This paper examines technical rationality in Schön’s theory of reflective practice and argues that its critique is a broad and often overlooked epistemological underpinning in this work. This paper suggests that the popularity of Schön’s theory is tied in part to his critique of technical rationality, and to his acknowledgement of the significance of practitioner experience (...) and indeterminate zones of practice in the development of expertise. Schön tapped into a growing disillusionment with technical rationality that coincided with a crisis of knowledge across a range of disciplines. The question is raised as to whether Schön’s critique sets up a dichotomy between technical rationality and experience, or overcomes it. The conclusions suggest that Schön is not discarding research‐based professional knowledge, but rather challenging conflated views of its practical significance. In this way, it is proposed that his critique of technical rationality can be interpreted as an attempt to overcome dualistic thinking as it pertains to professional knowledge. (shrink)

Shortly after the publication of The Reflective Practitioner (1983) and the sequel Educating the Reflective Practitioner (1987) ‘reflection-in-action’ became a major concept in teacher education. The concept has, however, been criticised on ontological/epistemological as well as practice oriented accounts (Van Manen, 1995; Newman, 1999; Erlandson, 1995). In this paper I argue that reflection-in-action is a theoretical construction that snatches the interacting, working, and producing bodies from their practices, and consequently, matters of politics, of discipline, of institutional interaction and of the (...) workings of social categories are reduced to matters of thinking. Turning to Foucault (1991) I claim that the doctrine of reflection is interwoven in the logic of discipline. (shrink)

Shortly after the publication of The Reflective Practitioner (1983) and the sequel Educating the Reflective Practitioner (1987) ‘reflection-in-action’ became a major concept in teacher education. The concept has, however, been criticised on ontological/epistemological as well as practice oriented accounts (Van Manen, 1995; Newman, 1999; Erlandson, 1995). In this paper I argue that reflection-in-action is a theoretical construction that snatches the interacting, working, and producing bodies from their practices, and consequently, matters of politics, of discipline, of institutional interaction and of the (...) workings of social categories are reduced to matters of thinking. Turning to Foucault (1991) I claim that the doctrine of reflection is interwoven in the logic of discipline. (shrink)