Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. Fairness, Responsibility, and Welfare.Marc Fleurbaey - 2008 - Oxford University Press.
    What is a fair distribution of resources and other goods when individuals are partly responsible for their achievements? This book develops a theory of fairness incorporating a concern for personal responsibility, opportunities and freedom. With a critical perspective, it makes accessible the recent developments in economics and philosophy that define social justice in terms of equal opportunities. It also proposes new perspectives and original ideas. The book separates mathematical sections from the rest of the text, so that the main concepts (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   43 citations  
  • Luck and Oppression.Mark Navin - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (5):533-547.
    Oppression can be unjust from a luck egalitarian point of view even when it is the consequence of choices for which it is reasonable to hold persons responsible. This is for two reasons. First, people who have not been oppressed are unlikely to anticipate the ways in which their choices may lead them into oppressive conditions. Facts about systematic phenomena (like oppression) are often beyond the epistemic reach of persons who are not currently subject to such conditions, even when they (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • What is Egalitarianism?Samuel Scheffler - 2003 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 31 (1):5-39.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   183 citations  
  • Desert and Equality.Richard J. Arneson - 2006 - In Nils Holtug & Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen (eds.), Egalitarianism: New Essays on the Nature and Value of Equality. Clarendon Press. pp. 262--293.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  • Equality of Opportunity for Welfare Defended and Recanted.Richard J. Arneson - 1999 - Journal of Political Philosophy 7 (4):488-497.
    Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen’s interesting criticisms of the ideal of equality of opportunity for welfare provide a welcome occasion for rethinking the requirements of egalitarian distributive justice.1 In the essay he criticizes I had proposed that insofar as we think distributive justice requires equality of any sort, we should conceive of distributive equality as equal opportunity provision. Roughly put, my suggestion was that equality of opportunity for welfare obtains among a group of people when all would have the same expected welfare over (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • Equality of Opportunity for Welfare Defended and Recanted.R. J. Arneson - 1999 - Journal of Political Philosophy 7 (4):488–497.
    Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen’s interesting criticisms of the ideal of equality of opportunity for welfare provide a welcome occasion for rethinking the requirements of egalitarian distributive justice.1 In the essay he criticizes I had proposed that insofar as we think distributive justice requires equality of any sort, we should conceive of distributive equality as equal opportunity provision. Roughly put, my suggestion was that equality of opportunity for welfare obtains among a group of people when all would have the same expected welfare over (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   39 citations  
  • Health, Luck and Justice.Shlomi Segall - 2009 - Princeton University Press.
    Health, Luck, and Justice is the first attempt to systematically apply luck egalitarianism to the just distribution of health and health care.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   100 citations  
  • Equal Opportunity or Equal Social Outcome?Marc Fleurbaey - 1994 - Economics and Philosophy 10 (2):25-55.
    John Rawls's work (1971) has greatly contributed to rehabilitating equality as a basic social value, after decades of utilitarian hegemony,particularly in normative economics, but Rawls also emphasized that full equality of welfare is not an adequate goal either. This thesis was echoed in Dworkin's famous twin papers on equality (Dworkin 1981a,b), and it is now widely accepted that egalitarianism must be selective. The bulk of the debate on ‘Equality of What?’ thus deals with what variables ought to be submitted for (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   59 citations  
  • What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare.Ronald Dworkin - 1981 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 10 (3):185-246.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   270 citations  
  • Justice for Hedgehogs.Ronald Dworkin - 2011 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
    Baedeker -- Independence. Truth in morals -- External skepticism -- Morals and causes -- Internal skepticism -- Interpretation. Moral responsibility -- Interpretation in general -- Conceptual interpretation -- Ethics. Dignity -- Free will and responsibility -- Morality. From dignity to morality -- Aid -- Harm -- Obligations -- Politics. Political rights and concepts -- Equality -- Liberty -- Democracy -- Law -- Epilogue. Dignity indivisible.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   206 citations  
  • Responsibility in Health Care: A Liberal Egalitarian Approach.A. W. Cappelen & O. F. Norheim - 2005 - Journal of Medical Ethics 31 (8):476-480.
    Lifestyle diseases constitute an increasing proportion of health problems and this trend is likely to continue. A better understanding of the responsibility argument is important for the assessment of policies aimed at meeting this challenge. Holding individuals accountable for their choices in the context of health care is, however, controversial. There are powerful arguments both for and against such policies. In this article the main arguments for and the traditional arguments against the use of individual responsibility as a criterion for (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   53 citations  
  • Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare.Richard J. Arneson - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 56 (1):77 - 93.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   325 citations  
  • What is the Point of Equality.Elizabeth Anderson - 1999 - Ethics 109 (2):287-337.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   709 citations  
  • Egalitarian Opportunities.Marc Fleurbaey - 2001 - Law and Philosophy 20 (5):499-530.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • Choices Chance and Change: Luck Egalitarianism Over Time.Patrick Tomlin - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (2):393-407.
    The family of theories dubbed ‘luck egalitarianism’ represent an attempt to infuse egalitarian thinking with a concern for personal responsibility, arguing that inequalities are just when they result from, or the extent to which they result from, choice, but are unjust when they result from, or the extent to which they result from, luck. In this essay I argue that luck egalitarians should sometimes seek to limit inequalities, even when they have a fully choice-based pedigree (i.e., result only from the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare.Richard Arneson - 1997 - In Louis P. Pojman & Robert Westmoreland (eds.), Equality: Selected Readings. Oup Usa.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   152 citations  
  • Luck Egalitarianism: Equality, Responsibility, and Justice.Carl Knight - 2009 - Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
    How should we decide which inequalities between people are justified, and which are unjustified? One answer is that such inequalities are only justified where there is a corresponding variation in responsible action or choice on the part of the persons concerned. This view, which has become known as 'luck egalitarianism', has come to occupy a central place in recent debates about distributive justice. This book is the first full length treatment of this significant development in contemporary political philosophy. Each of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   41 citations  
  • Why Egalitarians Should Not Care About Equality.Shlomi Segall - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (4):507 - 519.
    Can outcome equality (say, in welfare) ever be unjust? Despite the extensive inquiry into the nature of luck egalitarianism in recent years, this question is curiously under-explored. Leading luck egalitarians pay little attention to the issue of unjust equalities, and when they do, they appear not to speak in one voice. To facilitate the inquiry into the potential injustice of equalities, the paper introduces two rival interpretations of egalitarianism: the responsibility view, which may condemn equalities as unjust (when they reflect (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Desert, Rights, Free Will, Responsibility, and Luck1.Larry Temkin - 2011 - In Carl Knight & Zofia Stemplowska (eds.), Responsibility and Distributive Justice. Oxford University Press. pp. 51.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • 1. Justice, Equality, Fairness, Desert, Rights, Free Will, Responsibility, and Luck.Larry Temkin - 2011 - In Carl Knight & Zofia Stemplowska (eds.), Responsibility and Distributive Justice. Oxford University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Responsibility and False Beliefs.Peter Vallentyne - 2011 - In Carl Knight & Zofia Stemplowska (eds.), Responsibility and Distributive Justice. Oxford University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Equal Opportunity1.Marc Fleurbaey - 2011 - In Carl Knight & Zofia Stemplowska (eds.), Responsibility and Distributive Justice. Oxford University Press. pp. 77.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Four Approaches to Equal Opportunity.Marc Fleurbaey - 2011 - In Carl Knight & Zofia Stemplowska (eds.), Responsibility and Distributive Justice. Oxford University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Luck Egalitarianism–A Primer.Richard J. Arneson - 2011 - In Carl Knight & Zofia Stemplowska (eds.), Responsibility and Distributive Justice. Oxford University Press. pp. 24--50.
    This essay surveys varieties of the luck egalitarian project in an exploratory spirit, seeking to identify lines of thought that are worth developing further and that might ultimately prove morally acceptable. I do not attend directly to the critics and assess their concerns; I have done that in other essays. 7 I do seek to identify some large fault lines, divisions in ways of approaching the task of constructing a theory of justice or of conceiving its substance. These are controversial (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  • Egalitarianism.Richard Arneson - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   35 citations  
  • How Should Egalitarians Cope with Market Risks?Elizabeth Anderson - 2008 - Theoretical Inquiries in Law 9 (1):239-270.
    Individuals in capitalist societies are increasingly exposed to market risks. Luck egalitarian theories, which advocate neutralizing the influence of luck on distribution, fail to cope with this problem, because they focus on the wrong kinds of distributive constraints. Rules of distributive justice can specify (1) acceptable procedures for allocating goods, (2) the range of acceptable variations in distributive outcomes, or (3) which individuals should have which goods, according to individual characteristics such as desert or need. Desert-catering luck egalitarians offer rules (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • Hurley on Egalitarianism and the Luck-Neutralizing Aim.Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen - 2005 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 4 (2):249-265.
    s admirable new book, Justice, Luck, and Knowledge , brings together recent developments in the fields of responsibility and egalitarian justice. This article focuses on Hurley’s critique of luck-neutralizing egalitarianism. The article concludes that the bad-luck-neutralizing aim serves better as a justificatory basis for egalitarianism than the more general luck-neutralizing aim. Since the former does not simply assume that we should aim for equality, Hurley has not demonstrated (nor indeed does she claim to have shown) that this concern cannot form (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Brute Luck, Option Luck, and Equality of Initial Opportunities.Peter Vallentyne - 2002 - Ethics 112 (3):529-557.
    In the old days, material egalitarians tended to favor equality of outcome advantage, on some suitable conception of advantage. Under the influence of Dworkin’s seminal articles on equality, contemporary material egalitarians have tended to favor equality of brute luck advantage---on the grounds that this permits people to be held appropriately accountable for the benefits and burdens of their choices. I shall argue, however, that a plausible conception of egalitarian justice requires neither that brute luck advantage always be equalized nor that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   52 citations  
  • Luck Egalitarianism and Political Solidarity.Daniel Markovits - 2008 - Theoretical Inquiries in Law 9 (1):271-308.
    Luck egalitarianism — the theory that makes individual responsibility central to distributive justice, so that bad luck underwrites a more compelling case for redistribution than do the bad choices of the disadvantaged — has recently come under a sustained attack from critics who are deeply committed to the broader struggle for equality. These egalitarian critics object, first, that luck egalitarianism’s policy recommendations are often unappealing. Second, they add that luck egalitarianism neglects the deep political connection between equality and non-subordination, in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Brute Luck and Responsibility.Peter Vallentyne - 2008 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 7 (1):57-80.
    The concept of agent-responsibility for an outcome (that is, of the outcome reflecting the autonomous choice of the agent) is central to both ethics and political philosophy. The concept, however, remains radically under-explored. In particular, the issue of partial responsibility for an outcome needs further development. I propose an account of partial responsibility based on partial causal contribution. Agents who choose autonomously in full knowledge of the consequences are agent-responsible, I claim, for the shift in the objective probability of the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   21 citations  
  • The Harshness Objection: Is Luck Egalitarianism Too Harsh on the Victims of Option Luck?Kristin Voigt - 2007 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (4):389-407.
    According to luck egalitarianism, inequalities are justified if and only if they arise from choices for which it is reasonable to hold agents responsible. This position has been criticised for its purported harshness in responding to the plight of individuals who, through their own choices, end up destitute. This paper aims to assess the Harshness Objection. I put forward a version of the objection that has been qualified to take into account some of the more subtle elements of the luck (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   38 citations  
  • Equal Opportunity or Equal Social Outcome?Marc Fleurbaey - 1995 - Economics and Philosophy 11 (1):25.
    John Rawls's work has greatly contributed to rehabilitating equality as a basic social value, after decades of utilitarian hegemony,particularly in normative economics, but Rawls also emphasized that full equality of welfare is not an adequate goal either. This thesis was echoed in Dworkin's famous twin papers on equality, and it is now widely accepted that egalitarianism must be selective. The bulk of the debate on ‘Equality of What?’ thus deals with what variables ought to be submitted for selection and how (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   74 citations  
  • On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice.G. A. Cohen - 1989 - Ethics 99 (4):906-944.
    In his Tanner Lecture of 1979 called ‘Equality of What?’ Amartya Sen asked what metric egalitarians should use to establish the extent to which their ideal is realized in a given society. What aspect of a person’s condition should count in a fundamental way for egalitarians, and not merely as cause of or evidence of or proxy for what they regard as fundamental?
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   561 citations  
  • Inequality, Avoidability, and Healthcare.Carl Knight - 2011 - Iyyun 60:72-88.
    This review article of Shlomi Segall's Health, Luck, and Justice (Princeton University Press, 2010) addresses three issues: first, Segall’s claim that luck egalitarianism, properly construed, does not object to brute luck equality; second, Segall’s claim that brute luck is properly construed as the outcome of actions that it would have been unreasonable to expect the agent to avoid; and third, Segall’s account of healthcare and criticism of rival views. On the first two issues, a more conventional form of luck egalitarianism (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Describing Equality.Carl Knight - 2009 - Law and Philosophy 28 (4):327 - 365.
    This articles proposes that theories and principles of distributive justice be considered substantively egalitarian iff they satisfy each of three conditions: (1) they consider the bare fact that a person is in certain circumstances to be a conclusive reason for placing another relevantly identically entitled person in the same circumstances, except where this conflicts with other similarly conclusive reasons arising from the circumstances of other persons; (2) they can be stated as 'equality of x for all persons', making no explicit (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Epistemic Constraints on Practical Normativity.Simon Robertson - 2011 - Synthese 181 (S1):81-106.
    What is the relation between what we ought to do, on the one hand, and our epistemic access to the ought-giving facts, on the other? In assessing this,it is common to distinguish ‘objective’ from ‘subjective’ oughts. Very roughly, on the objectivist conception what an agent ought to do is determined by ought-giving facts in such a way that does not depend on the agent’s beliefs about, or epistemic access to, those facts; whereas on the subjectivist conception, what an agent ought (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Why Sufficiency is Not Enough.Paula Casal - 2007 - Ethics 117 (2):296-326.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   133 citations  
  • What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources.Ronald Dworkin - 1981 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 10 (4):283 - 345.
    The JSTOR Archive is a trusted digital repository providing for long-term preservation and access to leading academic journals and scholarly literature from around the world. The Archive is supported by libraries, scholarly societies, publishers, and foundations. It is an initiative of JSTOR, a not-for-profit organization with a mission to help the scholarly community take advantage of advances in technology. For more information regarding JSTOR, please contact [email protected]
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   294 citations  
  • Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism.Richard J. Arneson - 2000 - Ethics 110 (2):339-349.
    In her recent, provocative essay “What Is the Point of Equality?”, Elizabeth Anderson argues against a common ideal of egalitarian justice that she calls “ luck egalitarianism” and in favor of an approach she calls “democratic equality.”1 According to the luck egalitarian, the aim of justice as equality is to eliminate so far as is possible the impact on people’s lives of bad luck that falls on them through no fault or choice of their own. In the ideal luck egalitarian (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   130 citations  
  • Responsibility and False Beliefs.Peter Vallentyne - 2011 - In Carl Knight & Zofia Stemplowska (eds.), Justice and Responsibility. Oxford University Press.
    An individual is agent-responsible for an outcome just in case it flows from her autonomous agency in the right kind of way. The topic of agent-responsibility is important because most people believe that agents should be held morally accountable (e.g., liable to punishment or having an obligation to compensate victims) for outcomes for which they are agent-responsible and because many other people (e.g., brute luck egalitarians) hold that agents should not be held accountable for outcomes for which they are not (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Egalitarianism, Option Luck, and Responsibility.Kasper Lippert‐Rasmussen - 2001 - Ethics 111 (3):548-579.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   49 citations  
  • Egalitarian Opportunities.Marc Fleurbaey - 2001 - Law and Philosophy 20 (5):499-530.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations