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  1. Priority or Equality for Possible People?Alex Voorhoeve & Marc Fleurbaey - 2016 - Ethics 126 (4):929-954.
    Suppose that you must make choices that may influence the well-being and the identities of the people who will exist, though not the number of people who will exist. How ought you to choose? This paper answers this question. It argues that the currency of distributive ethics in such cases is a combination of an individual’s final well-being and her expected well-being conditional on her existence. It also argues that this currency should be distributed in an egalitarian, rather than a (...)
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  • Luck, Opportunity and Disability.Cynthia A. Stark - 2013 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 16 (3):383-402.
    This paper argues that luck egalitarianism, especially in the guise of equality of opportunity for welfare, is in tension with the ideal of fair equality of opportunity in three ways. First, equal opportunity for welfare is compatible with a caste system in employment that is inconsistent with open competition for positions. Second, luck egalitarianism does not support hiring on the basis of qualifications. Third, amending luck egalitarianism to repair this problem requires abandoning fair access to qualifications. Insofar as luck egalitarianism (...)
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  • Unjust Equalities.Andreas Albertsen & Sören Flinch Midtgaard - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2):335-346.
    In the luck egalitarian literature, one influential formulation of luck egalitarianism does not specify whether equalities that do not reflect people’s equivalent exercises of responsibility are bad with regard to inequality. This equivocation gives rise to two competing versions of luck egalitarianism: asymmetrical and symmetrical luck egalitarianism. According to the former, while inequalities due to luck are unjust, equalities due to luck are not necessarily so. The latter view, by contrast, affirms the undesirability of equalities as well as inequalities insofar (...)
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  • Luck Egalitarianism.Carl Knight - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (10):924-934.
    Luck egalitarianism is a family of egalitarian theories of distributive justice that aim to counteract the distributive effects of luck. This article explains luck egalitarianism's main ideas, and the debates that have accompanied its rise to prominence. There are two main parts to the discussion. The first part sets out three key moves in the influential early statements of Dworkin, Arneson, and Cohen: the brute luck/option luck distinction, the specification of brute luck in everyday or theoretical terms and the specification (...)
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  • Option luck, gambling, and fairness.Daniel Butt - 2012 - Ethical Perspectives 19 (3):417-443.
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  • Equal and ashamed? Egalitarianism, anti-discrimination, and redistribution.Bastian Steuwer - forthcoming - Politics, Philosophy and Economics.
    One prominent criticism of luck egalitarianism is that it requires either shameful revelations or otherwise problematic declarations by the state toward those who have had bad brute luck. Relational egalitarianism, by contrast, is portrayed as an alternative that requires no such revelations or declarations. I argue that this is false. Relational equality requires the state to draft anti-discrimination laws for both state and private action. The ideal of relational egalitarianism requires these laws to be asymmetric, that is to allow affirmative (...)
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  • Intuition about Justice: Desertist or Luck Egalitarian?Huub Brouwer & Thomas Mulligan - 2024 - The Journal of Ethics 28 (2):239-262.
    There is a large and growing body of empirical work on people’s intuitions about distributive justice. In this paper, we investigate how well luck egalitarianism and desertism—the two normative approaches that appear to cohere well with people’s intuitions—are supported by more fine-grained findings in the empirical literature. The time is ripe for a study of this sort, as the positive literature on justice has blossomed over the last three decades. The results of our investigation are surprising. In three different contexts (...)
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  • Fairness, Care, and Abortion.David O'Brien - 2023 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 40 (4):658-675.
    Only women can bear the burdens of gestating fetuses. That fact, I suggest, bears on the morality of abortion. To illustrate and explain this point, I frame my discussion around Judith Jarvis Thomson's classic defense of abortion and Gina Schouten's recent feminist challenge to Thomson's defense. Thomson argued that, even assuming that fetuses are morally equivalent to persons, abortions are typically morally permissible. According to Schouten's feminist challenge to Thomson, however, if fetuses are morally equivalent to persons, then abortions are (...)
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  • Envy, self-esteem, and distributive justice.Vegard Stensen - forthcoming - European Journal of Political Theory.
    Most agree that envy, or at least the malicious kind, should not have any role in the moral justification of distributive arrangements. This paper defends a contrary position. It argues that at...
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  • Measuring freedom, and its value.Nicolas Cote - 2021 - Dissertation, London School of Economics
    This thesis concerns the measurement of freedom, and its value. Specifically, I am concerned with three overarching questions. First, can we measure the extent of an individual’s freedom? It had better be that we can, otherwise much ordinary and intuitive talk that we would like to vindicate – say, about free persons being freer than slaves – will turn out to be false or meaningless. Second, in what ways is freedom valuable, and how is this value measured? It matters, for (...)
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  • Luck egalitarianism without moral tyranny.Jesse Spafford - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):469-493.
    Luck egalitarians contend that, while each person starts out with a claim to an equal quantity of advantage, she can forfeit this claim by making certain choices. The appeal of luck egalitarianism is that it seems to satisfy what this paper calls the moral tyranny constraint. According to this constraint, any acceptable theory of justice must preclude the possibility of an agent unilaterally, discretionarily, and foreseeably leaving others with less advantage under conditions of full compliance with the theory. This paper (...)
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  • ‘Personal Health Surveillance’: The Use of mHealth in Healthcare Responsibilisation.Ben Davies - 2021 - Public Health Ethics 14 (3):268-280.
    There is an ongoing increase in the use of mobile health technologies that patients can use to monitor health-related outcomes and behaviours. While the dominant narrative around mHealth focuses on patient empowerment, there is potential for mHealth to fit into a growing push for patients to take personal responsibility for their health. I call the first of these uses ‘medical monitoring’, and the second ‘personal health surveillance’. After outlining two problems which the use of mHealth might seem to enable us (...)
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  • Luck and the Limits of Equality.Matthew T. Jeffers - 2020 - Philosophical Papers 49 (3):397-429.
    A recent movement within political philosophy called luck egalitarianism has attempted to synthesize the right’s regard for responsibility with the left’s concern for equality. The original motivation for subscribing to luck egalitarianism stems from the belief that one’s success in life ought to reflect one’s own choices and not brute luck. Luck egalitarian theorists differ in the decision procedures that they propose, but they share in common the general approach that we ought to equalize individuals with respect to brute luck (...)
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  • What Is the Point of the Harshness Objection?Andreas Albertsen & Lasse Nielsen - 2020 - Utilitas 32 (4):427-443.
    According to luck egalitarianism, it is unjust if some are worse off than others through no fault or choice of their own. The most common criticism of luck egalitarianism is the ‘harshness objection’, which states that luck egalitarianism allows for too harsh consequences, as it fails to provide justification for why those responsible for their bad fate can be entitled to society's assistance. It has largely gone unnoticed that the harshness objection is open to a number of very different interpretations. (...)
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  • Equality of Resources and Non-domination: Can the Two be Compatible?Sotiria Skarveli - 2020 - Res Publica 27 (1):3-24.
    Social egalitarians hold that one fundamental requirement of the ideal of social equality is that people should stand in relations of non-domination to one another. In the light of this, they reject luck egalitarian principles of justice as incompatible with a society of equals, because the former violate the non-domination requirement. I call this the domination objection. In this paper I examine its force against Dworkinian resource egalitarianism. There are two reasons why equality of resources might be thought to be (...)
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  • Buyer Beware: A Critique of Leading Virtue Ethics Defenses of Markets.Roberto Fumagalli - 2020 - Journal of Social Philosophy 51 (3):457-482.
    Over the last few decades, there have been intense debates concerning the effects of markets on the morality of individuals’ behaviour. On the one hand, several authors argue that markets’ ongoing expansion tends to undermine individuals’ intentions for mutual benefit and virtuous character traits and actions. On the other hand, leading economists and philosophers characterize markets as a domain of intentional cooperation for mutual benefit that promotes many of the character traits and actions that traditional virtue ethics accounts classify as (...)
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  • Chance, Merit, and Economic Inequality: Rethinking Distributive Justice and the Principle of Desert.Joseph de la Torre Dwyer - 2019 - Springer Verlag.
    This book develops a novel approach to distributive justice by building a theory based on a concept of desert. As a work of applied political theory, it presents a simple but powerful theoretical argument and a detailed proposal to eliminate unmerited inequality, poverty, and economic immobility, speaking to the underlying moral principles of both progressives who already support egalitarian measures and also conservatives who have previously rejected egalitarianism on the grounds of individual freedom, personal responsibility, hard work, or economic efficiency. (...)
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  • Global Luck Egalitarianism and Border Control.Kim Angell & Robert Huseby - 2019 - Ratio Juris 32 (2):177-192.
    This paper discusses what implications global luck egalitarianism (GLE) has for border control. Some authors suggest that an open‐borders policy follows from GLE. The idea is that various unchosen inequalities inevitably follow from differences in birthplace, such that GLE will always have principled reason to condemn closed borders. Others are skeptical of the assumption that GLE will have liberal implications for border control, because open borders may have other, adverse effects that outweigh the reductions in unjust inequality. Against such skeptics, (...)
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  • Why not be a desertist?: Three arguments for desert and against luck egalitarianism.Huub Brouwer & Thomas Mulligan - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2271-2288.
    Many philosophers believe that luck egalitarianism captures “desert-like” intuitions about justice. Some even think that luck egalitariansm distributes goods in accordance with desert. In this paper, we argue that this is wrong. Desertism conflicts with luck egalitarianism in three important contexts, and, in these contexts, desertism renders the proper moral judgment. First, compared to desertism, luck egalitarianism is sometimes too stingy: it fails to justly compensate people for their socially valuable contributions—when those contributions arose from “option luck”. Second, luck egalitarianism (...)
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  • When do Risky Choices Justify Inequality?Keith Hyams - 2017 - Diametros 53:60-74.
    Luck egalitarianism is the view that inequalities are justified when and only when a particular condition is met. Recent years have seen considerable debate about the exact nature of the risky choices thought by luck egalitarians to justify inequality. All positions in the debate emphasise the importance of choice, but they differ in the precise details of how choice features in the inequality-justifying condition. The present paper argues for a novel view about the conditions under which risky choices should justify (...)
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  • (1 other version)Luck Egalitarianism and the Rights of Immigrants.Nils Holtug - 2017 - Ratio Juris 30 (2):127-143.
    This article considers the implications of luck egalitarianism for a range of issues relating to international, South-North migration. More specifically, the implications of luck egalitarianism for the question of whether receiving societies are justified in extending to immigrants a less comprehensive set of rights than that enjoyed by other members of society are considered. First, are voluntary migrants responsible for their migration in such a way that receiving societies are justified in extending to them a less comprehensive set of rights (...)
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  • (1 other version)Luck-Egalitarianism: Faults and Collective Choice.Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen - 2011 - Economics and Philosophy 27 (2):151-173.
    A standard formulation of luck-egalitarianism says that ‘it is [in itself] bad – unjust and unfair – for some to be worse off than others [through no fault or choice of their own]’, where ‘fault or choice’ means substantive responsibility-generating fault or choice. This formulation is ambiguous: one ambiguity concerns the possible existence of a gap between what is true of each worse-off individual and what is true of the group of worse-off individuals, fault or choice-wise, the other concerns the (...)
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  • Egalitarianismul.Eugen Huzum - 2013 - In Teorii si ideologii politice. Iasi: Institutul European. pp. 49-88.
    În acest capitol îmi revine sarcina de a prezenta unul dintre cele mai influente și mai dinamice curente din filosofia politică actuală. Este vorba, desigur, despre curentul care dă titlul acestui capitol: egalitarianismul.
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  • Teorii si ideologii politice.Eugen Huzum (ed.) - 2013 - Iasi: Institutul European.
    Nu cu foarte mult timp în urmă, grupul de teorie socială şi politică din cadrul proiectului POSDRU 89/1.5/S/56815 „Societatea bazată pe cunoaştere-cercetări, dezbateri, perspective”, a publicat, tot la editura Institutul European, lucrarea Concepte şi teorii social-politice. Volumul de faţă reprezintă un nou pas al grupului nostru de lucru în realizarea proiectului inaugurat prin publicarea acelei lucrări. Este vorba, reamintesc, despre proiectul elaborării unor volume care să-i ajute pe cei interesaţi în iniţierea (lor sau a altora) în teoria (şi în special (...)
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  • The Harshness Objection: Is Luck Egalitarianism Too Harsh on the Victims of Option Luck?Kristin Voigt - 2007 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (4):389-407.
    According to luck egalitarianism, inequalities are justified if and only if they arise from choices for which it is reasonable to hold agents responsible. This position has been criticised for its purported harshness in responding to the plight of individuals who, through their own choices, end up destitute. This paper aims to assess the Harshness Objection. I put forward a version of the objection that has been qualified to take into account some of the more subtle elements of the luck (...)
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  • How Interesting is the “Boring Problem” for Luck Egalitarianism?Gerald Lang - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (3):698-722.
    Imagine a two-person distributive case in which Ernest's choices yield X and Bertie's choices yield X + Y, producing an income gap between them of Y. Neither Ernest nor Bertie is responsible for this gap of Y, since neither of them has any control over what the other agent chooses. This is what Susan Hurley calls the “Boring Problem” for luck egalitarianism. Contrary to Hurley's relatively dismissive treatment of it, it is contended that the Boring Problem poses a deep problem (...)
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  • Genetic Discrimination and Health Insurance.Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen - 2015 - Res Publica 21 (2):185-199.
    According to US law, insurance companies can lawfully differentiate individual health insurance premiums on the basis of non-genetic medical information, but not on the basis of genetic information. The article reviews the case for such genetic exceptionalism. First, I critically assess some standard justifications. Next, I scrutinize an argument appealing to the view that genetically based premium differentiation expresses that persons do not all merit equal concern and respect. In the final section, I argue that even if genetic exceptionalism is (...)
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  • Weak and strong luck egalitarianism.Göran Duus-Otterström - 2012 - Contemporary Political Theory 11 (2):153-171.
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  • Rescuing justice and equality from libertarianism.Serena Olsaretti - 2013 - Economics and Philosophy 29 (1):43-63.
    One of the central motifs of G. A. Cohen's work was his opposition to capitalism in the name of justice. This motif was fully in view in Cohen's work on Robert Nozick's libertarianism: Cohen carefully reconstructed and relentlessly criticized Nozick's apologetics of the free market, which, he thought, was internally coherent but unconvincing. This article suggests that Cohen's opposition to libertarianism did not, however, go far enough, and identifies two respects in which Cohen's position could and should have been more (...)
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  • Weak and strong luck egalitarianism.G.|[Ouml]|Ran Duus-Otterstr|[Ouml]|M. - 2012 - Contemporary Political Theory 11 (2):153.
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  • Luck, Risk and the Market.Hugh Lazenby - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (4):667-680.
    This paper explores how luck egalitarianism fares in capturing our intuitions about the fairness of market-generated outcomes. Critics of luck egalitarianism have argued that it places no restrictions on what outcomes are acceptable, at least when all agents are equally situated before entering the market, and that this gives us a reason to reject it as an account of fairness. I will argue that luck egalitarianism does make specific judgements about which market-generated outcomes are compatible with maintaining a fair distribution. (...)
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  • Egalitarian Justice and Expected Value.Carl Knight - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (5):1061-1073.
    According to all-luck egalitarianism, the differential distributive effects of both brute luck, which defines the outcome of risks which are not deliberately taken, and option luck, which defines the outcome of deliberate gambles, are unjust. Exactly how to correct the effects of option luck is, however, a complex issue. This article argues that (a) option luck should be neutralized not just by correcting luck among gamblers, but among the community as a whole, because it would be unfair for gamblers as (...)
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  • Equality of Opportunity and Other-Affecting Choice: Why Luck Egalitarianism Does Not Require Brute Luck Equality.Gideon Elford - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (1):139-149.
    The luck egalitarian view famously maintains that inequalities in individuals’ circumstances are unfair or unjust, whereas inequalities traceable to individuals’ own responsible choices are fair or just. On this basis, the distinction between so-called brute luck and option luck has been seen as central to luck egalitarianism. Luck egalitarianism is interpreted, by advocates and opponents alike, as a view that condemns inequalities in brute luck but permits inequalities in option luck. It is also thought to be expressed in terms of (...)
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  • Justice as Fairness: Luck Egalitarian, Not Rawlsian.Michael Otsuka - 2010 - The Journal of Ethics 14 (3-4):217-230.
    I assess G. A. Cohen's claim, which is central to his luck egalitarian account of distributive justice, that forcing others to pay for people's expensive indulgence is inegalitarian because it amounts to their exploitation. I argue that the forced subsidy of such indulgence may well be unfair, but any such unfairness fails to ground an egalitarian complaint. I conclude that Cohen's account of distributive justice has a non-egalitarian as well as an egalitarian aspect. Each impulse arises from an underlying commitment (...)
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  • Responsibility and the consequences of choice.Serena Olsaretti - 2009 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt2):165-188.
    Contemporary egalitarian theories of justice constrain the demands of equality by responsibility, and do not view as unjust inequalities that are traceable to individuals' choices. This paper argues that, in order to make non-arbitrary determinate judgements of responsibility, any theory of justice needs a principle of stakes , that is, an account of what consequences choices should have. The paper also argues that the principles of stakes seemingly presupposed by egalitarians are implausible, and that adopting alternative principles of stakes amounts (...)
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  • Justice and bad luck.Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Debate: Capabilities versus opportunities for well-being.Peter Vallentyne - 2005 - Journal of Political Philosophy 13 (3):359–371.
    Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum have argued that justice is concerned, at least in part, with the distribution of capabilities (opportunities to function). Richard Arneson, G.A. Cohen, and John Roemer have argued that justice is concerned with something like the distribution of opportunities for well-being. I argue that, although some versions of the capability view are incompatible with some versions of the opportunity for well-being view, the most plausible version of the capability view is identical to a slight generalization of (...)
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  • Rationing, Responsibility, and Vaccination during COVID-19: A Conceptual Map.Jin K. Park & Ben Davies - 2023 - American Journal of Bioethics 24 (7):66-79.
    Throughout the COVID-19 pandemic, shortages of scarce healthcare resources consistently presented significant moral and practical challenges. While the importance of vaccines as a key pharmaceutical intervention to stem pandemic scarcity was widely publicized, a sizable proportion of the population chose not to vaccinate. In response, some have defended the use of vaccination status as a criterion for the allocation of scarce medical resources. In this paper, we critically interpret this burgeoning literature, and describe a framework for thinking about vaccine-sensitive resource (...)
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  • Catering for Responsibility: Brute Luck, Option Luck, and the Neutrality Objection to Luck Egalitarianism.Greg Bognar - 2019 - Economics and Philosophy 35 (2):259-281.
    Abstract:The distinction between brute luck and option luck is fundamental for luck egalitarianism. Many luck egalitarians write as if it could be used to specify which outcomes people should be held responsible for. In this paper, I argue that the distinction can’t be used this way. In fact, luck egalitarians tend to rely instead on rough intuitive judgements about individual responsibility. This makes their view vulnerable to what’s known as theneutrality objection. I show that attempts to avoid this objection are (...)
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  • (1 other version)When, If Ever, Do We Aggregate? And Why?Jan Narveson - 2009 - Social Philosophy and Policy 26 (1):48-75.
    Aggregation in moral philosophy calls for the summing or averaging of values or utilities as a guide to individual behavior. But morality, it is argued, needs to be individualistic, in view of the evident separateness of persons, especially given the great disparities among individuals who nevertheless interact with each other in social life. The most plausible general moral program is the classical liberal (or “libertarian”) one calling for mutual noninterference rather than treating others as equal to oneself in point of (...)
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  • May a Government Mandate More Comprehensive Health Insurance than Citizens Want for Themselves?Alex Voorhoeve - 2018 - In David Sobel, Peter Vallentyne & Steven Wall (eds.), Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy Volume 4. Oxford University Press. pp. 167-191.
    I critically examine a common liberal egalitarian view about the justification for, and proper content of, mandatory health insurance. This view holds that a mandate is justified because it is the best way to ensure that those in poor health gain health insurance on equitable terms. It also holds that a government should mandate what a representative prudent individual would purchase for themselves if they were placed in fair conditions of choice. I argue that this common justification for a mandate (...)
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  • Tough Luck and Tough Choices: Applying Luck Egalitarianism to Oral Health.Andreas Albertsen - 2015 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 40 (3):342-362.
    Luck egalitarianism is often taken to task for its alleged harsh implications. For example, it may seem to imply a policy of nonassistance toward uninsured reckless drivers who suffer injuries. Luck egalitarians respond to such objections partly by pointing to a number of factors pertaining to the cases being debated, which suggests that their stance is less inattentive to the plight of the victims than it might seem at first. However, the strategy leaves some cases in which the attribution of (...)
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  • Equality versus priority: How relevant is the distinction?Marc Fleurbaey - 2015 - Economics and Philosophy 31 (2):203-217.
    :This paper questions the distinction between egalitarianism and prioritarianism, arguing that it is important to separate the reasons for particular social preferences from the contents of these preferences, that it is possible to like equality and separability simultaneously, and that some egalitarians and prioritarians may therefore share the same social preferences. The case of risky prospects, for which Broome has proposed an interesting example meant to show that egalitarians and prioritarians cannot share the same preferences, is scrutinized. The levelling down (...)
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  • The Difference Principle, Rising Inequality, and Supply-Side Economics: How Rawls Got Hijacked by the Right.Mark R. Reiff - 2012 - Revue de Philosophie Économique 13 (2):119-173.
    Rawls intended the difference principle to be a liberal egalitarian principle of justice. By that I mean he intended it to provide a moral justification for a moderate amount of redistribution of income from the most advantaged members of society to the least. But since the difference principle was introduced, economic inequality has increased dramatically, reaching levels now not seen since just before the Great Depression, levels that Rawls surely would have thought perverse. Many blame this increase on the rise (...)
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  • Preferences versus opportunities: on the conceptual foundations of normative welfare economics.Roberto Fumagalli - 2024 - Economics and Philosophy 40 (1):77-101.
    Normative welfare economics commonly assumes that individuals’ preferences can be reliably inferred from their choices and relies on preference satisfaction as the normative standard for welfare. In recent years, several authors have criticized welfare economists’ reliance on preference satisfaction as the normative standard for welfare and have advocated grounding normative welfare economics on opportunities rather than preferences. In this paper, I argue that although preference-based approaches to normative welfare economics face significant conceptual and practical challenges, opportunity-based approaches fail to provide (...)
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  • When Is Inequality Fair?Gideon Elford - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (5):1205-1218.
    Recent literature on responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism has suggested that an opposition to unchosen inequality on the grounds of unfairness is compatible with a range of accounts as to which inequalities are fair. I argue that forms of responsibility-sensitive egalitarianism face a challenge in the construction of such accounts; namely to explain the fairness of such inequalities specifically, as opposed to their being merely justified in a broader sense. I illustrate the nature of this challenge through an interesting parallel with an issue (...)
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  • Left-Libertarianism: Rawlsian Not Luck Egalitarian.Jonathan Quong - 2010 - Journal of Political Philosophy 19 (1):64-89.
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  • Eliminating or Calibrating the Role of Chance? Acute Resource Scarcity as a Challenge for Luck Egalitarianism.Jed Adam Gross - 2024 - American Journal of Bioethics 24 (7):120-122.
    Park and Davies have laid out an illuminating map of major arguments bearing on whether vaccination status should affect access to scarce healthcare resources during a pandemic. Notably, they sugge...
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  • A Dilemma for Luck Egalitarians.Ofer Malcai & Re’em Segev - forthcoming - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-21.
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