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Natural probabilistic information

Synthese 192 (9):2901-2919 (2015)

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  1. Fifteen Arguments Against Hypothetical Frequentism.Alan Hájek - 2009 - Erkenntnis 70 (2):211-235.
    This is the sequel to my “Fifteen Arguments Against Finite Frequentism” ( Erkenntnis 1997), the second half of a long paper that attacks the two main forms of frequentism about probability. Hypothetical frequentism asserts: The probability of an attribute A in a reference class B is p iff the limit of the relative frequency of A ’s among the B ’s would be p if there were an infinite sequence of B ’s. I offer fifteen arguments against this analysis. I (...)
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  • Content: Semantic and information-theoretic.Paul M. Churchland & Patricia S. Churchland - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):67-68.
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  • A Mathematical Theory of Communication.Claude Elwood Shannon - 1948 - Bell System Technical Journal 27 (April 1924):379–423.
    The mathematical theory of communication.
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  • Signals: Evolution, Learning, and Information.Brian Skyrms - 2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    Brian Skyrms offers a fascinating demonstration of how fundamental signals are to our world. He uses various scientific tools to investigate how meaning and communication develop. Signals operate in networks of senders and receivers at all levels of life, transmitting and processing information. That is how humans and animals think and interact.
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  • The philosophy of information.Luciano Floridi - 2011 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Luciano Floridi presents a book that will set the agenda for the philosophy of information. PI is the philosophical field concerned with the critical investigation of the conceptual nature and basic principles of information, including its dynamics, utilisation, and sciences, and the elaboration and application of information-theoretic and computational methodologies to philosophical problems. This book lays down, for the first time, the conceptual foundations for this new area of research. It does so systematically, by pursuing three goals. Its metatheoretical goal (...)
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  • Toward an Informational Teleosemantics.Karen Neander - 2012 - In Dan Ryder, Justine Kingsbury & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Millikan and her critics. Malden, MA: Wiley. pp. 21--40.
    This chapter contains section titles: Introduction Response Functions Information and Singular Causation The Functions of Sensory Representations The Contents of Sensory Representations: The Problem of Error The Contents of Sensory Representation: The Distality Problem.
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  • Information processing, computation, and cognition.Gualtiero Piccinini & Andrea Scarantino - 2011 - Journal of Biological Physics 37 (1):1-38.
    Computation and information processing are among the most fundamental notions in cognitive science. They are also among the most imprecisely discussed. Many cognitive scientists take it for granted that cognition involves computation, information processing, or both – although others disagree vehemently. Yet different cognitive scientists use ‘computation’ and ‘information processing’ to mean different things, sometimes without realizing that they do. In addition, computation and information processing are surrounded by several myths; first and foremost, that they are the same thing. In (...)
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  • (1 other version)Interpretations of probability.Alan Hájek - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • The reference class problem is your problem too.Alan Hájek - 2007 - Synthese 156 (3):563--585.
    The reference class problem arises when we want to assign a probability to a proposition (or sentence, or event) X, which may be classified in various ways, yet its probability can change depending on how it is classified. The problem is usually regarded as one specifically for the frequentist interpretation of probability and is often considered fatal to it. I argue that versions of the classical, logical, propensity and subjectivist interpretations also fall prey to their own variants of the reference (...)
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  • (1 other version)Meaning.Herbert Paul Grice - 1957 - Philosophical Review 66 (3):377-388.
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  • Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes.Fred I. Dretske - 1988 - MIT Press.
    In this lucid portrayal of human behavior, Fred Dretske provides an original account of the way reasons function in the causal explanation of behavior.
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  • Misrepresentation.Fred Dretske - 1986 - In Radu J. Bogdan (ed.), Belief: Form, Content, and Function. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 17--36.
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  • (3 other versions)What has Natural Information to Do with Intentional Representation?Ruth Garrett Millikan - 2001 - In D. Walsh (ed.), Evolution, Naturalism and Mind. Cambridge University Press. pp. 105-125.
    "According to informational semantics, if it's necessary that a creature can't distinguish Xs from Ys, it follows that the creature can't have a concept that applies to Xs but not Ys." (Jerry Fodor, The Elm and the Expert, p.32).
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  • A Consistent Set of Infinite-Order Probabilities.David Atkinson & Jeanne Peijnenburg - 2013 - International Journal of Approximate Reasoning 54:1351-1360.
    Some philosophers have claimed that it is meaningless or paradoxical to consider the probability of a probability. Others have however argued that second-order probabilities do not pose any particular problem. We side with the latter group. On condition that the relevant distinctions are taken into account, second-order probabilities can be shown to be perfectly consistent. May the same be said of an infinite hierarchy of higher-order probabilities? Is it consistent to speak of a probability of a probability, and of a (...)
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  • Information and belief.Barry Loewer - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):75-76.
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  • (1 other version)Information without truth.Andrea Scarantino & Gualtiero Piccinini - 2010 - Metaphilosophy 41 (3):313-330.
    Abstract: According to the Veridicality Thesis, information requires truth. On this view, smoke carries information about there being a fire only if there is a fire, the proposition that the earth has two moons carries information about the earth having two moons only if the earth has two moons, and so on. We reject this Veridicality Thesis. We argue that the main notions of information used in cognitive science and computer science allow A to have information about the obtaining of (...)
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  • (1 other version)Semantic conceptions of information.Luciano Floridi - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • An objective counterfactual theory of information.Jonathan Cohen & Aaron Meskin - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):333 – 352.
    We offer a novel theory of information that differs from traditional accounts in two respects: (i) it explains information in terms of counterfactuals rather than conditional probabilities, and (ii) it does not make essential reference to doxastic states of subjects, and consequently allows for the sort of objective, reductive explanations of various notions in epistemology and philosophy of mind that many have wanted from an account of information.
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  • (1 other version)Precis of knowledge and the flow of information.Fred I. Dretske - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):55-90.
    A theory of information is developed in which the informational content of a signal (structure, event) can be specified. This content is expressed by a sentence describing the condition at a source on which the properties of a signal depend in some lawful way. Information, as so defined, though perfectly objective, has the kind of semantic property (intentionality) that seems to be needed for an analysis of cognition. Perceptual knowledge is an information-dependent internal state with a content corresponding to the (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Knowledge and the flow of information.F. Dretske - 1989 - Trans/Form/Ação 12:133-139.
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  • Varieties of propensity.Donald Gillies - 2000 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (4):807-835.
    The propensity interpretation of probability was introduced by Popper ([1957]), but has subsequently been developed in different ways by quite a number of philosophers of science. This paper does not attempt a complete survey, but discusses a number of different versions of the theory, thereby giving some idea of the varieties of propensity. Propensity theories are classified into (i) long-run and (ii) single-case. The paper argues for a long-run version of the propensity theory, but this is contrasted with two single-case (...)
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  • (3 other versions)What has natural information to do with intentional representation?Ruth G. Millikan - 2001 - In Denis M. Walsh (ed.), Naturalism, Evolution and the Mind. Cambridge University Press. pp. 105-125.
    There is, indeed, a form of informational semantics that has this verificationist implication. The original definition of information given in Dretske's Knowledge and the Flow of Information (1981, hereafter KFI), when employed as a base for a theory of intentional representation or "content," has this implication. I will argue that, in fact, most of what an animal needs to know about its environment is not available as natural information of this kind. It is true, I believe, that there is one (...)
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  • An Input Condition for Teleosemantics? Reply to Shea (and Godfrey-Smith).Ruth Garrett Millikan - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):436-455.
    In his essay "Consumers Need Information: Supplementing Teleosemantics with an Input Condition" (this issue) Nicholas Shea argues, with support from the work of Peter Godfrey-Smith (1996), that teleosemantics, as David Papinau and I have articulated it, cannot explain why "content attribution can be used to explain successful behavior." This failure is said to result from defining the intentional contents of representations by reference merely to historically normal conditions for success of their "outputs," that is, of their uses by interpreting or (...)
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  • (1 other version)Indication and adaptation.Peter Godfrey-Smith - 1992 - Synthese 92 (2):283-312.
    This paper examines the relationship between a family of concepts involving reliable correlation, and a family of concepts involving adaptation and biological function, as these concepts are used in the naturalistic semantic theory of Dretske's "Explaining Behavior." I argue that Dretske's attempt to marry correlation and function to produce representation fails, though aspects of his failure point the way forward to a better theory.
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  • Information and representation.Jerry A. Fodor - 1990 - In Philip P. Hanson (ed.), Information, Language and Cognition. University of British Columbia Press.
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  • Probaility and information.Patrick Suppes - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):81-82.
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  • A new perspective on representational problems.Chris Eliasmith - 2005 - Journal of Cognitive Science 6:97-123.
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  • (1 other version)Reply to Reviewers.Fred Dretske - 1990 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 50 (4):819 - 839.
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  • Why information?Freg I. Dretske - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):82-90.
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