The author takes the reader on a tour that covers such topics as computers, evolution, Descartes, Schrodinger, and the nature of perception, language, and invididuality. He argues that biology provides the key to understanding the brain. Underlying his argument is the evolutionary view that the mind arose at a definite time in history. This book ponders connections between psychology and physics, medicine, philosophy, and more. Frequently contentious, Edelman attacks cognitive and behavioral approaches, which leave biology out of the picture, as (...) well as the currently fashionable view of the brain as a computer. (shrink)

What is life? For four centuries, it has been believed that the only possible scientific approach to this question proceeds from the Cartesian metaphor -- organism as machine. Therefore, organisms are to be studied and characterized the same way "machines" are; the same way any inorganic system is. Robert Rosen argues that such a view is neither necessary nor sufficient to answer the question. He asserts that life is not a specialization of mechanism, but rather a sweeping generalization of it. (...) Above all, Rosen argues that renouncing mechanism does not mean abandoning science. A radical alternative is proposed, drawn equally from experience in biology, physics, and mathematics; an alternative which draws attention to a new class of complex systems, which are radically different from mechanism. (shrink)

Metaphor influences the construction of biological models and theories and the analysis of its use can reveal important tools of thought. Some aspects of biological organisation are investigated through the analysis of metaphors associated with treating biosystems as a kind of text. In particular, the use of glue and verbs is considered. Some of the reasons why glue is important in the construction of hierarchies are pursued in the light of specific examples, and some of the conceptual links between glue (...) in biology and other domains is discussed. Verbs are shown to be important in the construction of networks. Some of the relations between glue, verb and text are considered and the text metaphor is placed within a much broader context of ideas associated with form, relation and system. The paper concludes with comments on the nature of biological information and the need for extending or better understanding the verbal vocabulary. (shrink)

"This is the most systematic discussion of semiotics yet published." --Choice -/- "A bravura performance." --Thomas Sebeok -/- "Nöth's handbook is an outstanding encyclopedia that provides first-rate information on many facets of sign-related studies, research results, and applications." --Social Sciences in General.

Development and Evolution surveys and illuminates the key themes of rapidly changing fields and areas of controversy that the redefining the theory and philosophy of biology. It continues Stanley Salthe's investigation of evolutionary theory, begun in his influential book Evolving Hierarchical Systems, while negating the implicit philosophical mechanisms of much of that work. Here Salthe attempts to reinitiate a theory of biology from the perspective of development rather than from that of evolution, recognizing the applicability of general systems thinking to (...) biological and social phenomena and pointing towards a non-Darwinian and even a postmodern biology. (shrink)

The final version of the paper is published pp. 117-166 in: Myrdene Anderson and Floyd Merrell (eds.): On Semiotic Modeling . Mouton de Gruyter, Berlin and New York, 1991.

This is the third volume in Floyd Merrell's trilogy on semiotics focusing on Peirce's categories of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness. In this book the author argues that there are passageways linking the social sciences with the physical sciences, and signs with life processes. This is not a study of the semiotics of life, but rather of semiosis as a living process. Merrell attempts to articulate the links between thought that is rooted in that which can be quantified and thought that (...) resists quantification, namely that of the consciousness. As he writes in his preface, he is intent on `fusing the customary distinctions between life and non-life, mind and matter, self and other, appearance (fiction) and "reality,"... to reveal the everything that is is a sign.' In order to accomplish this goal, Peirce's terciary concept of the sign is crucial. Merrell begins by asking `What are signs that they may take on life-like processes, and what is life that it may know the sign processes that brought it - themselves - into existence?' In order to answer this question he examines semiotic theory, philosophical discourse, the life sciences, the mathematical sciences, and literary theory. He offers an original reading of Peirce's thought along with that of Prigogine and of many others. Following Sebeok, Merrell reminds us that `any and all investigation of nature and of the nature of signs and life must ultimately be semiotic in nature.'. (shrink)

Three premises set the stage for a Peirce based notion of resemblance, which, as Firstness, cannot be more than vaguely distinguished from Secondnessand Thirdness. Inclusion of Firstness with, and within, Secondness and Thirdness, calls for a nonbivalent, nonlinear, context dependent mode of thinkingcharacteristic of semiosis — that is, the process by which everything is always becoming something other than what it was becoming — and at the same time itincludes linear, bivalent classical logic as a subset. Certain aspects of the (...) Dao, Buddhist philosophy, and Donald Davidson’s ‘radical interpretation’ affordadditional, and perhaps unexpected, support for the initial set of three premises. (shrink)

Journal Name: Semiotica Issue: Ahead of print.

The viewpoint of Evolutionary Epistemology (EE) and of Genetic Epistemology (GE) on classical epistemological questions is strikingly different: EE starts with Evolutionary Biology, the subject of which is population's dynamics. GE, however, starts with Developmental Psychology and thus focusses the development of individuals. By EE knowledge is seen as portraying or copying process, and truth is interpreted as a product of adaptation, whereas for GE knowledge is due to a construction process in which the production of true insights is only (...) one possibility among others: Like falsity, error and deception, true knowledge goes back to a free relationship to reality. The difference between scientific and common knowledge is hard to be checked by EE, since both result ultimately from human hereditary structures. The study of how scientific knowledge emerges from everyday cognition is rather the task of GE. (shrink)