The Masters of Truth in Archaic Greece traces the odyssey of "truth," Aletheia, from mythoreligious to philosophical thought in archaic Greece. Marcel Detienne's starting point is a simple observation: In archaic Greece, three figures - the diviner, the bard, and the king - all share the privilege of dispensing truth by virtue of the religious power of divine memory which provides them with knowledge, both oracular and inspired, of the present, past, and future. Beginning with this definition of the prerational (...) meaning of truth, Detienne proceeds to elaborate the complex conceptual and historical contexts from which emerges the philosophical notion of truth still influencing Western philosophy today. (shrink)

The parasol, whatever the conditions of use, ultimately functions as a social symbol as it satisfies no utilitarian need. The operative mechanism of that symbol varies from culture to culture but the parasol is polysemous even at its least complicated, when held by the person to be protected without allusion to foreign social systems and in the context of single-sex usage. For example, as an implement of fashionable feminine attire of over a century ago, the parasol signified the maintenance of (...) a standard of beauty that precluded extended activities out of doors and the delicate constitution of the lady thus protected, both with further implications of ‘good breeding’ and economic inutility; and the wasteful employment of items that must be changed with the costume and discarded before unserviceable to suit the dictates of fashion. Both facets—termed ‘conspicuous leisure’ and ‘conspicuous consumption’ by Veblen—conjointly served to advertise the wealth of the individual man on the basis of whose property such extravagance and non-productive practice could be sustained. (shrink)

Writing of Terence'sAndria(‘The Girl from Andros’) in 1952, Duckworth said: ‘In theAndriathe second love affair is unusual; Charinus’ love for a respectable girl whose virtue is still intact has been considered an anticipation of a more modern attitude towards love and sex. More frequently in Plautus and Terence the heroine, if of respectable parentage, has been violated before the opening of the drama (Aulularia, Adelphoe), or she is a foreigner, a courtesan, or a slave girl' (Duckworth (1952), p. 158). Perhaps (...) in 1993 it does not seem quite so ‘modern’ that Charinus is not only in love with a respectable virgin but wishes to marry her. (shrink)

It has recently been alleged that there was, among Greek men of the classical period, a deep-seated fear of the female genitals, and that pubic hair was a focus of that fear. On account of this phobia, it has been suggested, in order to achieve a satisfactory sexual relationship, Greek men required their women fully to depilate their genitals. The thesis has logical problems: if the cause is the sight of the mother's genitals during childhood, the syndrome can affect only (...) one generation. Besides this, it is clear that any depilation would tend to make the vulva more visible, while a heavier growth of hair would tend to hide it. To put the alleged phobic syndrome further to the test, three questions must be answered: Did Greek women practise total pubic depilation? Did they practise pubic depilation at all? If they did depilate, why did they? As for most questions of daily life, there are two major sources of information: Comedy and vase painting. The evidence presented will show that Athenian women did practise partial genital depilation, and that female genital display—including display of pubic hair—is an important element in Attic erotic painting. These two facts are not compatible with a theory of genital phobia. (shrink)

foreword by Pierre Vidal-Naquet The acclaimed French classicist Marcel Detienne's first book traces the odyssey of "truth," aletheia, from mytho-religious concept to philosophical thought in archaic Greece. Detienne begins by examining how truth in Greek literature first emerges as an enigma. He then looks at the movement from a religious to a secular thinking about truth in the speech of the sophists and orators. His study culminates with an original interpretation of Parmenides' poem on Being.

When I read, rather belatedly, Professor Davison's article on Theognis 257–66 in C.R. ix , 1–5, I found myself remembering somewhat uncomfortably that I have an article awaiting publication in Mnemosyne in which I present a new interpretation of Theognis 1209–16 as a griphos. Against Carriere, Davison remarks that it would be easier to accept 261–6 as a griphos ‘if there were any serious evidence for the prevalence of in the Theognidean corpus’ ; this is an eminently sane attitude and (...) leaves the question open for later consideration. But lower on the same page E. Harrison's dictum that ‘sweeping emendations’ are ‘the last infirmity of exegesis’ has given birth to a pronouncement that ‘recourse to riddles’ is one of two ‘penultimate infirmities of academic minds’. This is really too much. I have not yet acquired a fixation on this subject, but I am sufficiently impenitent to maintain that the griphos appears at least twice in the corpus, at 1209–16 and 261–6. I have no opinion on 257–60, which seems at any rate to be in its proper place. (shrink)