In a recent article in this journal (Foundations of Chemistry, 7 (2005), 125–148) Lombardi and Labarca call into question a thesis of ontological reduction to which several writers on reduction subscribe despite rejecting a thesis of epistemological reduction. Lombardi and Labarca advocate instead a pluralistic ontology inspired by Putnam’s internal realism. I suggest that it is not necessary to go so far, and that a more critical view of the ontological reduction espoused by the authors they criticise circumvents the need (...) to resort to their radical alternative. (shrink)

The main aim of the paper is to reinforce the notion that emergence is a basic characteristic of the molecular sciences in general and chemistry in particular. Although this point is well accepted, even in the primary reference on emergence, the keyword emergence is rarely utilized by chemists and molecular biologists and chemistry textbooks for undergraduates. The possible reasons for this situation are discussed. The paper first re-introduces the concept of emergence based on very simple geometrical forms; and considers some (...) simple chemical examples among low and high molecular weight compounds. On the basis of these chemical examples, a few interesting philosophical issues inherent to the field of emergence are discussed – again making the point that such examples, given their clarity and simplicity, permit one to better understand the complex philosophical issues. Thus, the question of predictability is discussed, namely whether and to what extent can emergent properties be predicted on the basis of the component’s properties; or the question of the explicability (a top down process). The relation between reductionism and emergentism is also discussed as well as the notion of downward causality and double causality (macrodeterminism); namely the question whether and to what extent the emergent properties of the higher hierarchic level affect the properties of the lower level components. Finally, the question is analyzed, whether life can be considered as an emergent property. More generally, the final point is made, that the re-introduction of the notion of emergence in chemistry, and in particular in the teaching, may bring about a deeper understanding of the meaning of chemical complexity and may bring chemistry closer to the humanistic areas of philosophy and epistemology. (shrink)

In the problem of the relationship between chemistry and physics, many authors take for granted the ontological reduction of the chemical world to the world of physics. The autonomy of chemistry is usually defended on the basis of the failure of epistemological reduction: not all chemical concepts and laws can be derived from the theoretical framework of physics. The main aim of this paper is to argue that this line of argumentation is not strong enough for eliminate the idea of (...) a hierarchical dependence of chemistry with respect to physics. The rejection of the secondary position of chemistry and the defense of the legitimacy of the philosophy of chemistry require a radically different philosophical perspective that denies not only epistemological reduction but also ontological reduction. Only on the basis of a philosophically grounded ontological pluralism it is possible to accept the ontological autonomy of the chemical world and, with this, to reverse the traditional idea of the ‘superiority’ of physics in the context of natural sciences. (shrink)

David Albert's Time and Chance (2000) provides a fresh and interesting perspective on the problem of the direction of time. Unfortunately, the book opens with a highly non-standard exposition of time reversal invariance that distorts the subsequent discussion. The present article not only has the remedial goal of setting the record straight about the meaning of time reversal invariance, but it also aims to show how the niceties of this symmetry concept matter to the problem of the direction of time (...) and to related foundation issues in physics. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to analyze time-asymmetric quantum mechanics with respect to the problems of irreversibility and of time's arrow. We begin with arguing that both problems are conceptually different. Then, we show that, contrary to a common opinion, the theory's ability to describe irreversible quantum processes is not a consequence of the semigroup evolution laws expressing the non-time-reversal invariance of the theory. Finally, we argue that time-asymmetric quantum mechanics, either in Prigogine's version or in Bohm's version, does (...) not solve the problem of the arrow of time because it does not supply a substantial and theoretically founded criterion for distinguishing between the two directions of time. (shrink)

Apresentação / Pablo Lorenzano Introdução / Os editores Princípios em cosmologia / Antonio Augusto Passos Videira Aleatoriedad vs. arbitrariedad en la mecánica estadística clásica / Eduardo H. Flichman La teoría galileana de la materia: resolutio e infinitos indivisibles / Fernando Tula Molina Ciencia y música en la obra de Vincenzo Galilei (ca. 1520-1591) / Guillermo Boido & Eduardo Kastika T-invariancia, irreversibilidad, flecha del tiempo: similares pero diferentes / Olimpia Lombardi Mapa das interpretações da teoria quântica / Osvaldo Pessoa Jr. Aspectos (...) epistemológicos y geométricos de la teoría del campo unificado de Schrödinger / Victor Rodríguez & Pedro W. Lamberti. (shrink)

El propósito del presente artículo es evaluar en qué sentido y bajo qué condiciones la ergodicidad es relevante para explicar el éxito de la mecánica estadística. Se objeta la positión de quienes sostienen que la ergodicidad es irrelevante para tal explicatión, y se señala que las propiedades ergódicas desempeñan diferentes papeles en la mecánica estadística del equilibrio y en la descriptión de la evolución hacia el equilibrio: es posible prescindir de la ergodicidad en el primer caso pero no en el (...) segundo. Sobre esta base, se reformularán las definiciones de ergodicidad y mezcla, relativizándolas a la macrovariable particular cuya evolución irreversible se desea describir. Finalmente, se enfatiza la importancia de tomar en cuenta la elaboratión de modelos para evaluar la utilizatión de los métodos de Gibbs. /// The aim of this paper is to consider in what sense and under what conditions ergodicity is relevant for explaining the success of Statistical Mechanics. We argue against those who claim that ergodicity is irrelevant to this explanation, by noting that ergodic properties play different roles in equilibrium Statistical Mechanics and in the description of the approach to equilibrium: it is possible to do without it in the first case but not in the second one. On this basis, we reformulate the definitions of ergodicity and mixing, relativizing them to the particular macrovariable whose irreversible evolution is to be described. Finally, we stress the relevance of taking into account model-construction for evaluating the use of Gibbs' methods. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to analyze time-asymmetric quantum mechanics with respect of its validity as a non time-reversal invariant, time-asymmetric theory as well as of its ability to determine an arrow of time.

By their own account, physicalists are committed to the claim that physics is causally complete, or closed. The claim is presented as an empirical one. However, detailed and explicit empirical arguments for the claim are rare. I argue that molecular models are a key source of evidence but that, on closer inspection, they do not support the completeness claim.

It is demonstrated that the reduction of a physical theory S to another one, T, in the sense that S can be derived from T holds in general only for the mathematical framework. The interpretation of S and the associated central terms cannot all be derived from those of T because of the qualitative differences between the cognitive levels of S and T. Their cognitively autonomous status leads to an epistemic as well as an ontological pluralism. This pluralism is consistent (...) with the unity of nature in the sense of a substantive monism. (shrink)