Switch to: Citations

Add references

You must login to add references.
  1. On Metaphysics.Roderick M. Chisholm - 1984 - Univ of Minnesota Press.
    Chisholm, in these 18 essays, combines an internal approach to knowledge with an international approach to metaphysics, presupposing that the self is best known, and that knowledge of the self can serve as a key for further understanding. Among his topics are the whole and parts, freedom and the self, and substance and attribution. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
  • .R. G. Swinburne - 1989 - Cambridge University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   250 citations  
  • Subjects of Experience.E. J. Lowe - 1996 - Cambridge University Press.
    In this innovative study of the relationship between persons and their bodies, E. J. Lowe demonstrates the inadequacy of physicalism, even in its mildest, non-reductionist guises, as a basis for a scientifically and philosophically acceptable account of human beings as subjects of experience, thought and action. He defends a substantival theory of the self as an enduring and irreducible entity - a theory which is unashamedly committed to a distinctly non-Cartesian dualism of self and body. Taking up the physicalist challenge (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   64 citations  
  • Criteria of personal identity and the limits of conceptual analysis.Theodore Sider - 2001 - Philosophical Perspectives 15:189-209.
    When is there no fact of the matter about a metaphysical question? When multiple candidate meanings are equally eligible, in David Lewis's sense, and fit equally well with ordinary usage. Thus given certain ontological schemes, there is no fact of the matter whether the criterion of personal identity over time is physical or psychological. But given other ontological schemes there is a fact of the matter; and there is a fact of the matter about which ontological scheme is correct.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   72 citations  
  • What does functionalism tell us about personal identity?Eric T. Olson - 2002 - Noûs 36 (4):682-698.
    Sydney Shoemaker argues that the functionalist theory of mind entails a psychological-continuity view of personal identity, as well as providing a defense of that view against a crucial objection. I show that his view has surprising consequences, e.g. that no organism could have mental properties and that a thing's mental properties fail to supervene even weakly on its microstructure and surroundings. I then argue that the view founders on "fission" cases and rules out our being material things. Functionalism tells us (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • The refutation of idealism.G. E. Moore - 1903 - Mind 12 (48):433-453.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   239 citations  
  • There are no criteria of identity over time.Trenton Merricks - 1998 - Noûs 32 (1):106-124.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   78 citations  
  • How to Live Forever without Saving Your Soul: Physicalism and Immortality.Trenton Merricks - 2001 - In Kevin J. Corcoran (ed.), Soul, Body, and Survival: Essays on the Metaphysics of Human Persons. Cornell University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Endurance, psychological continuity, and the importance of personal identity.Trenton Merricks - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4):983-997.
    This paper argues that if persons last over time by “enduring”, then no analysis or reduction of personal identity over time in tenus of any sort of psychological continuity can be correct. In other words, any analysis of personal identity over time in tenus of psychological continuity entails that persons are four-dimensional and have temporal parts. The paper then shows that if we abandon psychological analyses of personal identity---as we must if persons endure---Parfit’s argument for the claim that identity does (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   14 citations  
  • Subjects of Experience.Cynthia MacDonald - 1996 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):224-228.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   42 citations  
  • Is Personal Identity Analysable?Simon Langford - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (3):309-316.
    Trenton Merricks has argued that given endurantism personal identity is unanalysable in terms of psychological continuity, while Anthony Brueckner has argued against this claim. This article shows that neither philosopher has made a compelling case and also shows what it would take to settle the issue either way. It is then argued that whether personal identity is analysable or not may not be of crucial importance to those wanting to defend a psychological continuity approach to personal identity.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • A Challenge to Anti-Criterialism.Matt Duncan - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (2):283-296.
    Most theists believe that they will survive death. Indeed, they believe that any given person will survive death and persist into an afterlife while remaining the very same person. In light of this belief, one might ask: how—or, in virtue of what—do people survive death? Perhaps the most natural way to answer this question is by appealing to some general account of personal identity through time. That way one can say that people persist through the time of their death in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Criteria of Identity and the 'Identity Mystics'.Dean Zimmerman - 1998 - Erkenntnis 48 (2-3):281 - 301.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   16 citations  
  • Endurantism and the psychological approach to personal identity.Anthony Brueckner - 2009 - Theoria 75 (1):28-33.
    This paper considers the question whether a psychological approach to personal identity can be formulated within an endurantist, as opposed to four-dimensionalist, framework. Trenton Merricks has argued that this cannot be done. I argue to the contrary: a perfectly coherent endurantist version of the psychological approach can indeed be formulated.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • In Search of the Simple View.Eric T. Olson - forthcoming - In G. Gasser & M. Stefan (eds.), Personal Identity: Complex or Simple? Cambridge University Press.
    Accounts of personal identity over time are supposed to fall into two broad categories: 'complex views' saying that our persistence consists in something else, and 'simple views' saying that it doesn' t. But it is impossible to characterize this distinction in any satisfactory way. The debate has been systematically misdescribed. After arguing for this claim, the paper says something about how the debate might be better characterized.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Against Parthood.Theodore Sider - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 8:237–293.
    Mereological nihilism says that there do not exist (in the fundamental sense) any objects with proper parts. A reason to accept it is that we can thereby eliminate 'part' from fundamental ideology. Many purported reasons to reject it - based on common sense, perception, and the possibility of gunk, for example - are weak. A more powerful reason is that composite objects seem needed for spacetime physics; but sets suffice instead.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   179 citations  
  • Composition, colocation, and metaontology.Karen Bennett - 2009 - In David Chalmers, David Manley & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press. pp. 38.
    The paper is an extended discussion of what I call the ‘dismissive attitude’ towards metaphysical questions. It has three parts. In the first part, I distinguish three quite different versions of dismissivism. I also argue that there is little reason to think that any of these positions is correct about the discipline of metaphysics as a whole; it is entirely possible that some metaphysical disputes should be dismissed and others should not be. Doing metametaphysics properly requires doing metaphysics first. I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   135 citations  
  • How to live forever without saving your soul: Physicalism and immortality.Trenton Merricks - 2001 - In Kevin J. Corcoran (ed.), Soul, Body, and Survival. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. pp. 183-201.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • Personal Identity.Sydney Shoemaker & Richard Swinburne - 1984 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 18 (3):184-185.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   132 citations  
  • On Metaphysics.Roderick M. CHISHOLM - 1989 - Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 96 (1):129-129.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  • Subjects of Experience.E. J. Lowe - 1996 - Philosophy 72 (279):147-150.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   62 citations  
  • Personal Identity.Sydney Shoemaker Y. Richard Swinburne - 1984 - Critica 16 (47):65-69.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations