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Immaterialist solutions to puzzles in personal ontology.Kristin Seemuth Whaley - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaigndetails
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Rational Agency without Self‐Knowledge: Could ‘We’ Replace ‘I’?Luke Roelofs - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (1):3-33.details
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A defence of anti-criterialism.Simon Langford - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (5):613-630.details
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Responding to N.T. Wright's Rejection of the Soul.Brandon L. Rickabaugh - 2018 - Heythrop Journal 59 (2):201-220.details
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I Am a Lot of Things: A Pluralistic Account of the Self.Jiri Benovsky - 2014 - Metaphysica 15 (1).details
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The Zombies Among Us.Eric T. Olson - 2016 - Noûs 52 (1):216-226.details
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Persistence and the First-Person Perspective.Dilip Ninan - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (4):425-464.details
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Perception and Representation in Leibniz.Stephen Puryear - 2006 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburghdetails
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Personas en el mundo: la perspectiva de la primera persona y el naturalismo.Agustin Vicente & Adrian Sampedro Leon - 2014 - Análisis: Revista de Investigación Filosófica 1:161-180.details
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The Nature of Time By Ulrich Meyer.G. C. Goddu - 2015 - Analysis 75 (1):167-169.details
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Merleau-Ponty and the transcendental problem of bodily agency.Rasmus Thybo Jensen - 2013 - In Rasmus Thybo Jensen & Dermot Moran (eds.), The Phenomenology of Embodied Subjectivity, Contributions to Phenomenology 71. Springer. pp. 43-61.details
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The Bodily Criterion of Personal Identity.Eric T. Olson - 2006 - In Fraser MacBride (ed.), Identity and modality. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 242.details
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I am a lot of things: A pluralistic account of the Self.Jiri Benovsky - 2014 - Metaphysica, An International Journal for Ontology and Metaphysics 15 (1):113-127.details
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Consciousness and the Prospects for Substance Dualism.John Spackman - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (11):1054-1065.details
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The Two Selves: Their Metaphysical Commitments and Functional Independence.Stan Klein - 2014 - Oxford University Press.details
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The self and its brain.Stan Klein - 2012 - Social Cognition 30 (4):474-518.details
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The Argument for Subject‐Body Dualism from Transtemporal Identity.Kirk Ludwig - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):684-701.details
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The Minimal A-theory.Meghan Sullivan - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (2):149-174.details
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A new argument for animalism.Stephan Blatti - 2012 - Analysis 72 (4):685-690.details
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Non-Reductive Physicalism and the Mind Problem.Susan Schneider - 2011 - Noûs 47 (1):135-153.details
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Emergentisms, Ancient and Modern.J. Ganeri - 2011 - Mind 120 (479):671-703.details
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Was Jekyll Hyde?Eric T. Olson - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):328-348.details
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Sorting Out Aspects of Personhood.Arto Laitinen - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (5-6):248-270.details
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The Constitution Question.Ryan Wasserman - 2004 - Noûs 38 (4):693 - 710.details
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The Self : a Humean bundle and/or a Cartesian substance ?Jiri Benovsky - 2009 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 5 (1):7 - 19.details
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Emergent substance.Patrick Toner - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (3):281 - 297.details
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Moral status and the treatment of dissociative identity disorder.Timothy J. Bayne - 2002 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 27 (1):87-105.details
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There is no problem of the self.Eric T. Olson - 1998 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 5 (5-6):645-657.details
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Non-cartesian substance dualism and the problem of mental causation.E. J. Lowe - 2006 - Erkenntnis 65 (1):5-23.details
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Consciousness and its place in nature.David Chalmers - 2003 - In Stephen P. Stich & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell. pp. 102--142.details
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Property dualists shouldn't be nominalists about properties.Daniel Giberman & David Mark Kovacs - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Non-personal immortality.Sebastian Gäb - 2023 - Religious Studies.details
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Sense Perception and Mereological Nihilism.Andrew Brenner - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 74 (1):68-83.details
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A Transformational Incarnation.Joshua Sijuwade - 2022 - Theologica 7 (2):1-37.details
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Can Consciousness be Taken Seriously When it Comes to Personal Identity?Stephen Matthew Duncan - unknowndetails
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Pairing Problems: Causal and Christological.Kevin W. Wong - 2021 - Perichoresis 19 (2):99-118.details
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An Embodied Existence in Heaven and the Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism (Revisited).Pérez Alejandro - 2021 - TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology 2 (5).details
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General Relativity, Mental Causation, and Energy Conservation.J. Brian Pitts - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):1931-1973.details
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The relation between subjects and their conscious experiences.Henry Taylor - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3493-3507.details
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Identidad personal y ontología de la persona.José Tomás Alvarado Marambio - 2016 - Universitas Philosophica 33 (66):77-112.details
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Causal after all : a model of mental causation for dualists.Bram Vaassen - 2019 - Dissertation, Umeå Universitydetails
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Conservation Laws and the Philosophy of Mind: Opening the Black Box, Finding a Mirror.J. Brian Pitts - 2019 - Philosophia 48 (2):673-707.details
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Is conscious will an illusion?Jing Zhu - 2004 - Disputatio 1 (16):58-70.details
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The identity of experiences and the identity of the subject.Donnchadh O’Conaill - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (4):987-1005.details
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Stanowisko nieredukcyjne w sporze o tożsamość osobową.Mariusz Grygianiec - 2018 - Diametros 57:23-38.details
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Neo-Thomistic hylomorphism applied to mental causation and neural correlates of consciousness.Matthew Keith Owen - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Birminghamdetails
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Personhood and Natural Kinds: Why Cognitive Status Need Not Affect Moral Status.Joseph Vukov - 2017 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 42 (3):261-277.details
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Counterfactuals and Token Identity: Reply to Lowe.José Luis Bermúdez - 2006 - SWIF Philosophy of Mind Review 5 (3).details
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Could Mental Causation Be Invisible?David Robb - 2018 - In Alexander Carruth, Sophie Gibb & John Heil (eds.), Ontology, Modality, and Mind: Themes From the Metaphysics of E. J. Lowe. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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