A precise notion of ‘mathematical structure’ other than that given by model theory may prove fruitful in the philosophy of mathematics. It is shown how the language and methods of category theory provide such a notion, having developed out of a structural approach in modern mathematical practice. As an example, it is then shown how the categorical notion of a topos provides a characterization of ‘logical structure’, and an alternative to the Pregean approach to logic which is continuous with the (...) modern structural approach in mathematics. (shrink)

Moving beyond both realist and anti-realist accounts of mathematics, Shapiro articulates a "structuralist" approach, arguing that the subject matter of a mathematical theory is not a fixed domain of numbers that exist independent of each other, but rather is the natural structure, the pattern common to any system of objects that has an initial object and successor relation satisfying the induction principle.

In this paper (a sequel to [4]) I put forward a "local" interpretation of mathematical concepts based on notions derived from category theory. The fundamental idea is to abandon the unique absolute universe of sets central to the orthodox set-theoretic account of the foundations of mathematics, replacing it by a plurality of local mathematical frameworks - elementary toposes - defined in category-theoretic terms.

Around the turn of the century, Poincare and Hilbert each published an account of geometry that took the discipline to be an implicit definition of its concepts. The terms ‘point’, ‘line’, and ‘plane’ can be applied to any system of objects that satisfies the axioms. Each mathematician found spirited opposition from a different logicist—Russell against Poincare' and Frege against Hilbert— who maintained the dying view that geometry essentially concerns space or spatial intuition. The debates illustrate the emerging idea of mathematics (...) as the science of structure. The article closes with some remarks on structuralist and nonstructuralist themes in Frege's own development of arithmetic. (shrink)

The view that toposes originated as generalized set theory is a figment of set theoretically educated common sense. This false history obstructs understanding of category theory and especially of categorical foundations for mathematics. Problems in geometry, topology, and related algebra led to categories and toposes. Elementary toposes arose when Lawvere's interest in the foundations of physics and Tierney's in the foundations of topology led both to study Grothendieck's foundations for algebraic geometry. I end with remarks on a categorical view of (...) the history of set theory, including a false history plausible from that point of view that would make it helpful to introduce toposes as a generalization from set theory. (shrink)

The business of mathematics is definition and proof, and its foundations comprise the principles which govern them. Modern mathematics is founded upon set theory. In particular, both the axiomatic method and mathematical logic belong, by their very natures, to the theory of sets. Accordingly, foundational set theory is not, and cannot logically be, an axiomatic theory. Failure to grasp this point leads obly to confusion. The idea of a set is that of an extensional plurality, limited and definite in size, (...) composed of well defined objects.It is the extension of Greek notion of 'number' (arithmos) into Cantor's 'transfinite'. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that category theory ought to be seen as providing the language for mathematical discourse. Against foundational approaches, I argue that there is no need to reduce either the content or structure of mathematical concepts and theories to the constituents of either the universe of sets or the category of categories. I assign category theory the role of organizing what we say about the content and structure of both mathematical concepts and theories. Insofar, then, as the (...) structuralist sees mathematics as talking about structures and their morphology, I contend that category theory furnishes a framework for mathematical structuralism. (shrink)

Three principal varieties of mathematical structuralism are compared: set-theoretic structuralism (‘STS’) using model theory, Shapiro's ante rem structuralism invoking sui generis universals (‘SGS’), and the author's modal-structuralism (‘MS’) invoking logical possibility. Several problems affecting STS are discussed concerning, e.g., multiplicity of universes. SGS overcomes these; but it faces further problems of its own, concerning, e.g., the very intelligibility of purely structural objects and relations. MS, in contrast, overcomes or avoids both sets of problems. Finally, it is argued that the modality (...) of MS or a close cousin appears at crucial junctures in both STS and SGS, so that the above outcome is not obviously tendentious. (shrink)

Category theory and topos theory have been seen as providing a structuralist framework for mathematics autonomous vis-a-vis set theory. It is argued here that these theories require a background logic of relations and substantive assumptions addressing mathematical existence of categories themselves. We propose a synthesis of Bell's many-topoi view and modal-structuralism. Surprisingly, a combination of mereology and plural quantification suffices to describe hypothetical large domains, recovering the Grothendieck method of universes. Both topos theory and set theory can be carried out (...) relative to such domains; puzzles about ‘large categories’ and ‘proper classes’ are handled in a uniform way, by relativization, sustaining insights of Zermelo. (shrink)