LandryElaine, * ed. Categories for the Working Philosopher. Oxford University Press, 2017. ISBN 978-0-19-874899-1 ; 978-0-19-106582-8. Pp. xiv + 471.

This dissertation makes two primary contributions. The first three chapters develop an interpretation of Carnap's Meta-Philosophical Program which places stress upon his methodological analysis of the sciences over and above the Principle of Tolerance. Most importantly, I suggest, is that Carnap sees philosophy as contiguous with science—as a part of the scientific enterprise—so utilizing the very same methods and subject to the same limitations. I argue that the methodological reforms he suggests for philosophy amount to philosophy as the explication of (...) the concepts of science through the construction and use of suitably robust meta-logical languages. My primary interpretive claim is that Carnap's understanding of logic and mathematics as a set of formal auxiliaries is premised upon this prior analysis of the character of logico-mathematical knowledge, his understanding of its role in the language of science, and the methods used by practicing mathematicians. Thus the Principle of Tolerance, and so Carnap's logical pluralism, is licensed and justified by these methodological insights. This interpretation of Carnap's program contrasts with the popular Deflationary reading as proposed in Goldfarb & Ricketts. The leading idea they attribute to Carnap is a Logocentrism: That philosophical assertions are always made relative to some particular language, and that our choice of syntactical rules for a language are constitutive of its inferential structure and methods of possible justification. Consequently Tolerance is considered the foundation of Carnap's entire program. My third chapter argues that this reading makes Carnap's program philosophically inert, and I present significant evidence that such a reading is misguided. The final chapter attempts to extend the methodological ideals of Carnap's program to the analysis of the ongoing debate between category- and set-theoretic foundations for mathematics. Recent criticism of category theory as a foundation charges that it is neither autonomous from set theory, nor offers a suitable ontological grounding for mathematics. I argue that an analysis of concepts can be foundationally informative without requiring the construction of those concepts from first principles, and that ontological worries can be seen as methodologically unfruitful. (shrink)

This volume covers a wide range of topics in the most recent debates in the philosophy of mathematics, and is dedicated to how semantic, epistemological, ontological and logical issues interact in the attempt to give a satisfactory picture of mathematical knowledge. The essays collected here explore the semantic and epistemic problems raised by different kinds of mathematical objects, by their characterization in terms of axiomatic theories, and by the objectivity of both pure and applied mathematics. They investigate controversial aspects of (...) contemporary theories such as neo-logicist abstractionism, structuralism, or multiversism about sets, by discussing different conceptions of mathematical realism and rival relativistic views on the mathematical universe. They consider fundamental philosophical notions such as set, cardinal number, truth, ground, finiteness and infinity, examining how their informal conceptions can best be captured in formal theories. The philosophy of mathematics is an extremely lively field of inquiry, with extensive reaches in disciplines such as logic and philosophy of logic, semantics, ontology, epistemology, cognitive sciences, as well as history and philosophy of mathematics and science. By bringing together well-known scholars and younger researchers, the essays in this collection – prompted by the meetings of the Italian Network for the Philosophy of Mathematics (FilMat) – show how much valuable research is currently being pursued in this area, and how many roads ahead are still open for promising solutions to long-standing philosophical concerns. Promoted by the Italian Network for the Philosophy of Mathematics – FilMat. (shrink)

This work is a conceptual analysis of certain recent developments in the mathematical foundations of Classical and Quantum Mechanics which have allowed to formulate both theories in a common language. From the algebraic point of view, the set of observables of a physical system, be it classical or quantum, is described by a Jordan-Lie algebra. From the geometric point of view, the space of states of any system is described by a uniform Poisson space with transition probability. Both these structures (...) are here perceived as formal translations of the fundamental twofold role of properties in Mechanics: they are at the same time quantities and transformations. The question becomes then to understand the precise articulation between these two roles. The analysis will show that Quantum Mechanics can be thought as distinguishing itself from Classical Mechanics by a compatibility condition between properties-as-quantities and properties-as-transformations. -/- Moreover, this dissertation shows the existence of a tension between a certain "abstract way" of conceiving mathematical structures, used in the practice of mathematical physics, and the necessary capacity to specify particular states or observables. It then becomes important to understand how, within the formalism, one can construct a labelling scheme. The “Chase for Individuation” is the analysis of different mathematical techniques which attempt to overcome this tension. In particular, we discuss how group theory furnishes a partial solution. (shrink)

Scientific pluralism is an issue at the forefront of philosophy of science. This landmark work addresses the question, Can pluralism be advanced as a general, philosophical interpretation of science?

Fefermans argument is indeed convincing in a certain context, it can be dissolved entirely by modifying the context appropriately.

Two topics figure prominently in recent discussions of mathematical structuralism: challenges to the purported metaphysical insight provided by sui generis structuralism and the significance of category theory for understanding and articulating mathematical structuralism. This article presents an overview of central themes related to these topics.

The aim of this paper is to clarify the role of category theory in the foundations of mathematics. There is a good deal of confusion surrounding this issue. A standard philosophical strategy in the face of a situation of this kind is to draw various distinctions and in this way show that the confusion rests on divergent conceptions of what the foundations of mathematics ought to be. This is the strategy adopted in the present paper. It is divided into 5 (...) sections. We first show that already in the set theoretical framework, there are different dimensions to the expression foundations of. We then explore these dimensions more thoroughly. After a very short discussion of the links between these dimensions, we move to some of the arguments presented for and against category theory in the foundational landscape. We end up on a more speculative note by examining the relationships between category theory and set theory. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to put into context the historical, foundational and philosophical significance of category theory. We use our historical investigation to inform the various category-theoretic foundational debates and to point to some common elements found among those who advocate adopting a foundational stance. We then use these elements to argue for the philosophical position that category theory provides a framework for an algebraic in re interpretation of mathematical structuralism. In each context, what we aim to show (...) is that, whatever the significance of category theory, it need not rely upon any set-theoretic underpinning. (shrink)

Category theory and topos theory have been seen as providing a structuralist framework for mathematics autonomous vis-a-vis set theory. It is argued here that these theories require a background logic of relations and substantive assumptions addressing mathematical existence of categories themselves. We propose a synthesis of Bell's many-topoi view and modal-structuralism. Surprisingly, a combination of mereology and plural quantification suffices to describe hypothetical large domains, recovering the Grothendieck method of universes. Both topos theory and set theory can be carried out (...) relative to such domains; puzzles about ‘large categories’ and ‘proper classes’ are handled in a uniform way, by relativization, sustaining insights of Zermelo. (shrink)

IntroductionScientific pluralism is generally understood in the backdrop of scientific monism. So is mathematical pluralism. Though there are many culture-dependent mathematical practices, mathematical concepts and theories are generally taken to be culture invariant. We would like to explore in this paper whether mathematical pluralism is admissible or not.Materials and methodsMathematical pluralism may be approached at least from five different perspectives. 1. Foundational: The view would claim that different issues within mathematics need support of different foundations, apparently incompatible with one another. (...) 2. Ontological: The world itself is dappled—the mathematical counterpart of which can be traced to the admission of non-Euclidean spaces and also in simultaneous acceptance of set-theoretic and category theoretic entities in the ontology of mathematics. 3. The third route is epistemological. It follows from the view that the nature of reality is so complex that different aspects of it require alternative modes of representation and explanation sometimes severally, sometimes simultaneously, e.g., classical, constructivist, computer-aided and different finitist mathematics can be used depending on the knowledge situation. 4. The fourth route is semantic. Fuzzy mathematics, we know, gives up bivalence in theory of truth, and ascribes truth to mathematical propositions in degrees. 5. The last one is Programmatic: for some, mathematical pluralism is a stance, a programme. It provides a framework which strikes at the root of cultural hegemony and nourishes a climate of intellectual humility and tolerance. It is not my intention to hold the brief of any of these versions. I just want to present to the readers a more or less complete picture of the scenario, though not an exhaustive one. ConclusionUnlike monism, mathematical pluralism does not rule out any possibility—even the possibility of having a unitary over-arching framework of interpretation remains as an open option. This paper highlights the fact that motivations for upholding pluralism in mathematics have been many and one can be a pluralist just by subscribing to any of the views listed above. (shrink)

We can learn from questions as well as from their answers. This paper urges some things to learn from questions about categorical foundations for mathematics raised by Geoffrey Hellman and from ones he invokes from Solomon Feferman.

The claim that there can be relations without relata, submitted by the radical ontic structural realist, mounts a serious challenge to her: on the one hand, the world is constituted, according to this sort of realism, just by structures and relations, and on the other hand, relations depend, mathematics says, on individual objects as relata. To resolve the problem, Steven French has argued that while the dependency of relations on relata is conceivable concerning the structure associated with the source of (...) representation, radical ontic structural realism assumes the existence of relations devoid of relata regarding the target of representation. In this article, I will argue this solution considered together with his semantics for the sentences that contain terms referring apparently to individual objects seems incoherent. (shrink)

The volume includes twenty-five research papers presented as gifts to John L. Bell to celebrate his 60th birthday by colleagues, former students, friends and admirers. Like Bell’s own work, the contributions cross boundaries into several inter-related fields. The contributions are new work by highly respected figures, several of whom are among the key figures in their fields. Some examples: in foundations of maths and logic ; analytical philosophy, philosophy of science, philosophy of mathematics and decision theory and foundations of economics. (...) Most articles are contributions to current philosophical debates, but contributions also include some new mathematical results, important historical surveys, and a translation by Wilfrid Hodges of a key work of arabic logic. (shrink)

This paper presents a new approach to the class-theoretic paradoxes. In the first part of the paper, I will distinguish classes from sets, describe the function of class talk, and present several reasons for postulating type-free classes. This involves applications to the problem of unrestricted quantification, reduction of properties, natural language semantics, and the epistemology of mathematics. In the second part of the paper, I will present some axioms for type-free classes. My approach is loosely based on the Gödel–Russell idea (...) of limited ranges of significance. It is shown how to derive the second-order Dedekind–Peano axioms within that theory. I conclude by discussing whether the theory can be used as a solution to the problem of unrestricted quantification. In an appendix, I prove the consistency of the class theory relative to Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory. (shrink)

Linnebo and Pettigrew present some objections to category theory as an autonomous foundation. They do a commendable job making clear several distinct senses of ‘autonomous’ as it occurs in the phrase ‘autonomous foundation’. Unfortunately, their paper seems to treat the ‘categorist’ perspective rather unfairly. Several infelicities of this sort were addressed by McLarty. In this note I address yet another apparent infelicity.

Some mathematicians and philosophers contend that set theory plays a foundational role in mathematics. However, the development of category theory during the second half of the twentieth century has encouraged the view that this theory can provide a structuralist alternative to set-theoretical foundations. Against this tendency, criticisms have been made that category theory depends on set-theoretical notions and, because of this, category theory fails to show that set-theoretical foundations are dispensable. The goal of this paper is to show that these (...) criticisms are misguided by arguing that category theory is entirely autonomous from set theory. (shrink)

This paper, accessible for a general philosophical audience having only some fleeting acquaintance with set-theory and category-theory, concerns the philosophy of mathematics, specifically the bearing of category-theory on the foundations of mathematics. We argue for six claims. (I) A founding theory for category-theory based on the primitive concept of a set or a class is worthwile to pursue. (II) The extant set-theoretical founding theories for category-theory are conceptually flawed. (III) The conceptual distinction between a set and a class can be (...) seen to be formally codified in Ackermann's axiomatisation of set-theory. (IV) A slight but significant deductive extension of Ackermann's theory of sets and classes founds Cantorian set-theory as well as category-theory, and therefore can pass as a founding theory of the whole of mathematics. (V) The extended theory does not suffer from the conceptual flaws of the extant set-theoretical founding theories. (VI) The extended theory is not only conceptually but also logically superior to the competing set-theories because its consistency can be proved on the basis of weaker assumptions than the consistency of the competition. (shrink)

Ernest Nagel Lecture, Columbia University, Sept. 27, 2007.

This volume explores the many different meanings of the notion of the axiomatic method, offering an insightful historical and philosophical discussion about how these notions changed over the millennia. The author, a well-known philosopher and historian of mathematics, first examines Euclid, who is considered the father of the axiomatic method, before moving onto Hilbert and Lawvere. He then presents a deep textual analysis of each writer and describes how their ideas are different and even how their ideas progressed over time. (...) Next, the book explores category theory and details how it has revolutionized the notion of the axiomatic method. It considers the question of identity/equality in mathematics as well as examines the received theories of mathematical structuralism. In the end, Rodin presents a hypothetical New Axiomatic Method, which establishes closer relationships between mathematics and physics. Lawvere's axiomatization of topos theory and Voevodsky's axiomatization of higher homotopy theory exemplify a new way of axiomatic theory building, which goes beyond the classical Hilbert-style Axiomatic Method. The new notion of Axiomatic Method that emerges in categorical logic opens new possibilities for using this method in physics and other natural sciences. This volume offers readers a coherent look at the past, present and anticipated future of the Axiomatic Method. (shrink)

1. Logic, determinism and free will. The determinism-free will debate is perhaps as old as philosophy itself and has been engaged in from a great variety of points of view including those of scientific, theological and logical character; my concern here is to limit attention to two arguments from logic. To begin with, there is an argument in support of determinism that dates back to Aristotle, if not farther. It rests on acceptance of the Law of Excluded Middle, according to (...) which every proposition is either true or false, no matter whether the proposition is about the past, present or future. In particular, the argument goes, whatever one does or does not do in the future is determined in the present by the truth or falsity of the corresponding proposition. Surely no such argument could really establish determinism, but one is hard pressed to explain where it goes wrong. One now classic dismantling of it has been given by Gilbert Ryle, in the chapter ‘What was to be’ of his fine book, Dilemmas (Ryle 1954). We leave it to the interested reader to pursue that and the subsequent literature. (shrink)

Ambiguity is a property of syntactic expressions which is ubiquitous in all informal languages–natural, scientific and mathematical; the efficient use of language depends to an exceptional extent on this feature. Disambiguation is the process of separating out the possible meanings of ambiguous expressions. Ambiguity is typical if the process of disambiguation can be carried out in some systematic way. Russell made use of typical ambiguity in the theory of types in order to combine the assurance of its (apparent) consistency (“having (...) the cake”) with the freedom of the informal untyped theory of classes and relations (“eating it too”). The paper begins with a brief tour of Russell’s uses of typical ambiguity, including his treatment of the statement Cls ∈ Cls. This is generalized to a treatment in simple type theory of statements of the form A ∈ B where A and B are class expressions for which A is prima facie of the same or higher type than B. In order to treat mathematically more interesting statements of self membership we then formulate a version of typical ambiguity for such statements in an extension of Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory. Specific attention is given to how the“naive” theory of categories can thereby be accounted for. (shrink)

Four requirements are suggested for an axiomatic system S to provide the foundations of category theory: (R1) S should allow us to construct the category of all structures of a given kind (without restriction), such as the category of all groups and the category of all categories; (R2) It should also allow us to construct the category of all functors between any two given categories including the ones constructed under (R1); (R3) In addition, S should allow us to establish the (...) existence of the usual basic mathematical structures and carry out the usual set-theoretical operations; and (R4) S should be shown to be consistent relative to currently accepted systems of set theory. This paper explains how all but parts of (R3) can be met using a system S extending NFU enriched by a stratified pairing operation; to meet more of (R3) a stronger system S∗ is introduced, but there are still some real obstacles to meeting this requirement in full. For (R4) it is sketched how both S and S∗ are shown to be consistent. (shrink)

Bourbaki showed us the potential inherent within the concept of mathematical structure for re-organizing, systematically arranging and unifying the mathematical framework. But mathematics’ development in recent decades has flagged up the limitations of this approach. In this article we analyse Bourbaki’s contributions to what we term the “internal” foundations of mathematics, and at the same time we indicate where, in our view, they fall short. We go on to outline some of the evidence on which we base the viewpoint termed (...) structural functionalism. According to the latter, the general notion of morphism characterizes the dynamic nature of present-day mathematics. (shrink)

This paper reviews the claims of several main-stream candidates to be the foundations of mathematics, including set theory. The review concludes that at this level of mathematical knowledge it would be very unreasonable to settle with any one of these foundations and that the only reasonable choice is a pluralist one.

The problem of finding proper set-theoretic foundations forcategory theory has challenged mathematician since the very beginning. In this paper we give an analysis of some of the standard approaches that havebeen proposed in the past 70 years. By means of the central notions of class and universe we suggest a possible conceptual recasting of these proposals. We focus on the intended semantics for the notion of large category in each proposed foundation. Following Feferman we give a comparison and evaluation of (...) their expressive power. (shrink)