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  1. Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory.Peter Carruthers - 2000 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    How can phenomenal consciousness exist as an integral part of a physical universe? How can the technicolour phenomenology of our inner lives be created out of the complex neural activities of our brains? Many have despaired of finding answers to these questions; and many have claimed that human consciousness is inherently mysterious. Peter Carruthers argues, on the contrary, that the subjective feel of our experience is fully explicable in naturalistic terms. Drawing on a variety of interdisciplinary resources, he develops and (...)
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  • Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory.Uriah Kriegel - 2009 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
    Some mental events are conscious, some are unconscious. What is the difference between the two? Uriah Kriegel offers an answer. His aim is a comprehensive theory of the features that all and only conscious mental events have. The key idea is that consciousness arises when self-awareness and world-awareness are integrated in the right way. Conscious mental events differ from unconscious ones in that, whatever else they may represent, they always also represent themselves, and do so in a very specific way. (...)
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  • The sense of agency: A philosophical and empirical review of the “Who” system.Frédérique de Vignemont & Pierre Fourneret - 2004 - Consciousness and Cognition 13 (1):1-19.
    How do I know that I am the person who is moving? According to Wittgenstein (1958), the sense of agency involves a primitive notion of the self used as subject, which does not rely on any prior perceptual identification and which is immune to error through misidentification. However, the neuroscience of action and the neuropsychology of schizophrenia show the existence of specific cognitive processes underlying the sense of agency—the ‘‘Who'' system (Georgieff & Jeannerod, 1998) which is disrupted in delusions of (...)
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  • The First Person Perspective and Other Essays.Sydney Shoemaker - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
    Sydney Shoemaker is one of the most influential philosophers currently writing on philosophy of mind and metaphysics. The essays in this collection deal with the way in which we know our own minds, and with the nature of those mental states of which we have our most direct conscious awareness. Professor Shoemaker opposes the 'inner sense' conception of introspective self-knowledge. He defends the view that perceptual and sensory states have non-representational features - 'qualia' - that determine what it is like (...)
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  • Consciousness and Mind.David M. Rosenthal - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press UK.
    Consciousness and Mind presents David Rosenthal's influential work on the nature of consciousness. Central to that work is Rosenthal's higher-order-thought theory of consciousness, according to which a sensation, thought, or other mental state is conscious if one has a higher-order thought that one is in that state. The first four essays develop various aspects of that theory. The next three essays present Rosenthal's homomorphism theory of mental qualities and qualitative consciousness, and show how that theory fits with and helps sustain (...)
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  • The Situated Self.J. T. Ismael - 2006 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.
    J. T. Ismael's monograph is an ambitious contribution to metaphysics and the philosophy of language and mind. She tackles a philosophical question whose origin goes back to Descartes: What am I? The self is not a mere thing among things--but if so, what is it, and what is its relationship to the world?
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  • The Unity of Consciousness.Tim Bayne - 2010 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
    Tim Bayne draws on philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience in defence of the claim that consciousness is unified. He develops an account of what it means to say that consciousness is unified, and then applies this account to a variety of cases - drawn from both normal and pathological forms of experience - in which the unity of consciousness is said to break down. He goes on to explore the implications of the unity of consciousness for theories of consciousness, for the (...)
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  • Our Own Minds: Sociocultural Grounds for Self-Consciousness.Radu J. Bogdan - 2010 - Bradford.
    An argument that in response to sociocultural pressures, human minds develop self-consciousness by activating a complex machinery of self-regulation.
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  • Self and schizophrenia: a phenomenological perspective.Josef Parnas - 2003 - In Tilo Kircher & Anthony S. David (eds.), The Self in Neuroscience and Psychiatry. Cambridge University Press. pp. 217--241.
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  • Embodiment, ownership and disownership.Frédérique de Vignemont - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (1):1-12.
    There are two main pathways to investigate the sense of body ownership, (i) through the study of the conditions of embodiment for an object to be experienced as one's own and (ii) through the analysis of the deficits in patients who experience a body part as alien. Here, I propose that E is embodied if some properties of E are processed in the same way as the properties of one's body. However, one must distinguish among different types of embodiment, and (...)
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  • Brain, mind, and the structure of reality.Paul L. Nunez - 2010 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Many faces of consciousness -- Ethics, religion, and the identity of self -- States of mind -- Why hearts don't love and brains don't pump -- EEG : a window on the mind -- Dynamic patterns as shadows of thought -- Networks, waves, and resonant binding -- The limits of science : What do we really know? -- Modern physics, cosmology, and consciousness -- The weird behavior of quantum systems -- Ontological interpretations of quantum mechanics -- Does the brain create (...)
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  • Brain imaging of the self–Conceptual, anatomical and methodological issues.Georg Northoff, Pengmin Qin & Todd E. Feinberg - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (1):52–63.
    In this paper we consider two major issues: conceptual–experimental approaches to the self, and the neuroanatomical substrate of the self. We distinguish content- and processed-based concepts of the self that entail different experimental strategies, and anatomically, we investigate the concept of midline structures in further detail and present a novel view on the anatomy of an integrated subcortical–cortical midline system. Presenting meta-analytic evidence, we show that the anterior paralimbic, e.g. midline, regions do indeed seem to be specific for self-specific stimuli. (...)
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  • Pre-reflective self-as-subject from experiential and empirical perspectives.Dorothée Legrand - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (3):583-599.
    In the first part of this paper I characterize a minimal form of self-consciousness, namely pre-reflective self-consciousness. It is a constant structural feature of conscious experience, and corresponds to the consciousness of the self-as-subject that is not taken as an intentional object. In the second part, I argue that contemporary cognitive neuroscience has by and large missed this fundamental form of self-consciousness in its investigation of various forms of self-experience. In the third part, I exemplify how the notion of pre-reflective (...)
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  • Selves: an essay in revisionary metaphysics.Galen Strawson - 2009 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    What is the self? Does it exist? If it does exist, what is it like? It's not clear that we even know what we're asking about when we ask these large, metaphysical questions. The idea of the self comes very naturally to us, and it seems rather important, but it's also extremely puzzling. As for the word "self"--it's been taken in so many different ways that it seems that you can mean more or less what you like by it and (...)
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  • Aspects of scientific explanation.Carl G. Hempel - 1965 - In Carl Gustav Hempel (ed.), Aspects of Scientific Explanation and Other Essays in the Philosophy of Science. New York: The Free Press. pp. 504.
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  • Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs.Lisa Bortolotti - 2009 - Oxford University Press. Edited by K. W. M. Fulford, John Sadler, Stanghellini Z., Morris Giovanni, Bortolotti Katherine, Broome Lisa & Matthew.
    Delusions are a common symptom of schizophrenia and dementia. Though most English dictionaries define a delusion as a false opinion or belief, there is currently a lively debate about whether delusions are really beliefs and indeed, whether they are even irrational. The book is an interdisciplinary exploration of the nature of delusions. It brings together the psychological literature on the aetiology and the behavioural manifestations of delusions, and the philosophical literature on belief ascription and rationality. The thesis of the book (...)
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  • The phenomenal self.Barry Dainton - 2008 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Barry Dainton presents a fascinating new account of the self, the key to which is experiential or phenomenal continuity. Provided our mental life continues we can easily imagine ourselves surviving the most dramatic physical alterations, or even moving from one body to another. It was this fact that led John Locke to conclude that a credible account of our persistence conditions - an account which reflects how we actually conceive of ourselves - should be framed in terms of mental rather (...)
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  • (1 other version)Empirical perspectives from the self-model theory of subjectivity: a brief summary with examples.Thomas Metzinger - 2008 - In Rahul Banerjee & Bikas K. Chakrabarti (eds.), Models of brain and mind: physical, computational, and psychological approaches. Boston: Elsevier.
    In Rahul Banerjee and Bikas K. Chakrabarti (eds.), Progress in Brain Research, 168: 215-246. Amsterdam: Elsevier. Electronic offprint available upon request.
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  • Anosognosia in parietal lobe syndrome.Vilayanur S. Ramachandran - 1995 - Consciousness and Cognition 4 (1):22-51.
    Patients with right parietal lesions often deny their paralysis , but do they have "tacit" knowledge of their paralysis? I devised three novel tests to explore this. First, the patients were given a choice between a bimanual task vs a unimanual one . They chose the former on 17 of 18 trials and, surprisingly, showed no frustration or learning despite repeated failed attempts. I conclude that they have no tacit knowledge of paralysis . Second, I used a "virtual reality box" (...)
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  • Schizophrenia, consciousness, and the self.Louis A. Sass & Josef Parnas - 2003 - Schizophrenia Bulletin 29 (3):427-444.
    In recent years, there has been much focus on the apparent heterogeneity of schizophrenic symptoms. By contrast, this article proposes a unifying account emphasizing basic abnormalities of consciousness that underlie and also antecede a disparate assortment of signs and symptoms. Schizophrenia, we argue, is fundamentally a self-disorder or ipseity disturbance that is characterized by complementary distortions of the act of awareness: hyperreflexivity and diminished self-affection. Hyperreflexivity refers to forms of exaggerated self-consciousness in which aspects of oneself are experienced as akin (...)
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  • A framework for consciousness.Francis Crick & Christof Koch - 2003 - Nature Neuroscience 6:119-26.
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  • The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception: Classic Edition.James J. Gibson - 1979 - Houghton Mifflin.
    This is a book about how we see: the environment around us (its surfaces, their layout, and their colors and textures); where we are in the environment; whether or not we are moving and, if we are, where we are going; what things are good for; how to do things (to thread a needle or drive an automobile); or why things look as they do.The basic assumption is that vision depends on the eye which is connected to the brain. The (...)
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  • The Illusion of Conscious Will.Daniel M. Wegner - 2002 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
    In this book Daniel Wegner offers a novel understanding of the relation of consciousness, the will, and our intentional and voluntary actions. Wegner claims that our experience and common sense view according to which we can influence our behavior roughly the way we experience that we do it is an illusion.
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  • Subjectivity and Selfhood: Investigating the First-Person Perspective.Dan Zahavi - 2005 - Cambridge MA: Bradford Book/MIT Press.
    The relationship of self, and self-awareness, and experience: exploring classical phenomenological analyses and their relevance to contemporary discussions in ...
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  • Being No One: The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity.Thomas Metzinger (ed.) - 2003 - MIT Press.
    " In Being No One, Metzinger, a German philosopher, draws strongly on neuroscientific research to present a representationalist and functional analysis of...
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  • Self-reference and self-awareness.Sydney S. Shoemaker - 1968 - Journal of Philosophy 65 (October):555-67.
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  • The First Person Perspective and Other Essays.Sydney Shoemaker - 1996 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 59 (2):378-378.
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  • (4 other versions)Confabulation.William Hirstein - 2009 - In Patrick Wilken, Timothy J. Bayne & Axel Cleeremans (eds.), The Oxford Companion to Consciousness. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 174-177.
    When people confabulate, they make an ill-grounded claim that they honestly believe is true, for example recalling an event from their childhood that never actually happened. This interdisciplinary book brings together some of the leading thinkers on confabulation in neuroscience, psychiatry, psychology, and philosophy.
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  • Depersonalization: A selective impairment of self-awareness.Mauricio Sierra & Anthony S. David - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (1):99-108.
    Depersonalization is characterised by a profound disruption of self-awareness mainly characterised by feelings of disembodiment and subjective emotional numbing.It has been proposed that depersonalization is caused by a fronto-limbic suppressive mechanism – presumably mediated via attention – which manifests subjectively as emotional numbing, and disables the process by which perception and cognition normally become emotionally coloured, giving rise to a subjective feeling of ‘unreality’.Our functional neuroimaging and psychophysiological studies support the above model and indicate that, compared with normal and clinical (...)
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  • How we know our own minds: The relationship between mindreading and metacognition.Peter Carruthers - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):121-138.
    Four different accounts of the relationship between third-person mindreading and first-person metacognition are compared and evaluated. While three of them endorse the existence of introspection for propositional attitudes, the fourth (defended here) claims that our knowledge of our own attitudes results from turning our mindreading capacities upon ourselves. Section 1 of this target article introduces the four accounts. Section 2 develops the “mindreading is prior” model in more detail, showing how it predicts introspection for perceptual and quasi-perceptual (e.g., imagistic) mental (...)
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  • Specifying the self for cognitive neuroscience.Kalina Christoff, Diego Cosmelli, Dorothée Legrand & Evan Thompson - 2011 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 15 (3):104-112.
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  • The self in action: Lessons from delusions of control.Chris Frith - 2005 - Consciousness and Cognition 14 (4):752-770.
    Patients with delusions of control are abnormally aware of the sensory consequences of their actions and have difficulty with on-line corrections of movement. As a result they do not feel in control of their movements. At the same time they are strongly aware of the action being intentional. This leads them to believe that their actions are being controlled by an external agent. In contrast, the normal mark of the self in action is that we have very little experience of (...)
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  • Self-Consciousness and Immunity.Timothy Lane & Caleb Liang - 2011 - Journal of Philosophy 108 (2):78-99.
    Sydney Shoemaker, developing an idea of Wittgenstein’s, argues that we are immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronoun. Although we might be liable to error when “I” (or its cognates) is used as an object, we are immune to error when “I” is used as a subject (as when one says, “I have a toothache”). Shoemaker claims that the relationship between “I” as-subject and the mental states of which it is introspectively aware is tautological: when, say, we (...)
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  • The situated self.Jenann Ismael - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    J. T. Ismael's monograph is an ambitious contribution to metaphysics and the philosophy of language and mind. She tackles a philosophical question whose origin goes back to Descartes: What am I? The self is not a mere thing among things--but if so, what is it, and what is its relationship to the world? Ismael is an original and creative thinker who tries to understand our problematic concepts about the self and how they are related to our use of language in (...)
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  • (1 other version)Explaining the brain: mechanisms and the mosaic unity of neuroscience.Carl F. Craver - 2007 - New York : Oxford University Press,: Oxford University Press, Clarendon Press.
    Carl Craver investigates what we are doing when we sue neuroscience to explain what's going on in the brain.
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  • (1 other version)Curing cognitive hiccups: A defense of the extended mind.Andy Clark - 2007 - Journal of Philosophy 104 (4):163-192.
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  • (1 other version)Real People: Personal Identity Without Thought Experiments.Kathleen V. Wilkes - 1988 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    This book explores the scope and limits of the concept of personDS a vexed question in contemporary philosophy. The author begins by questioning the methodology of thought-experimentation, arguing that it engenders inconclusive and unconvincing results, and that truth is stranger than fiction. She then examines an assortment of real-life conditions, including infancy, insanity andx dementia, dissociated states, and split brains. The popular faith in continuity of consciousness, and the unity of the person is subjected to sustained criticism. The author concludes (...)
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  • Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2004 - MIT Press.
    "Perception is not something that happens to us, or in us," writes Alva Noe. "It is something we do." In Action in Perception, Noe argues that perception and perceptual consciousness depend on capacities for action and thought — that ...
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  • Bodily awareness and the self.Bill Brewer - 1995 - In José Luis Bermúdez, Anthony Marcel & Naomi Eilan (eds.), The Body and the Self. MIT Press. pp. 291-€“303.
    In The Varieties of Reference (1982), Gareth Evans claims that considerations having to do with certain basic ways we have of gaining knowledge of our own physical states and properties provide "the most powerful antidote to a Cartesian conception of the self" (220). In this chapter, I start with a discussion and evaluation of Evans' own argument, which is, I think, in the end unconvincing. Then I raise the possibility of a more direct application of similar considerations in defence of (...)
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  • Consciousness Reconsidered.Owen J. Flanagan - 1992 - MIT Press.
    Owen Flanagan argues that we are on the way to understanding consciousness and its place in the natural order.
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  • (4 other versions)Confabulation.William Hirstein - 2009 - In Hal Pashler (ed.), Encyclopedia of the Mind. Sage Publications. pp. 183-186.
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  • (4 other versions)Confabulation.William Hirstein - 2009 - In Hal Pashler (ed.), Encyclopedia of the Mind. Sage Publications. pp. 183-186.
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  • (2 other versions)Real people. Personal identity without thought experiments.Kathleen V. Wilkes - 1989 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 179 (4):632-633.
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  • (2 other versions)Real People: Personal Identity Without Thought Experiments.Kathleen V. Wilkes - 1990 - Mind 99 (394):305-308.
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  • Voluntary control of two lateralized conscious states: Validation of electrical and behavioral studies.P. S. Gott, E. C. Hughes & K. Whipple - 1984 - Neuropsychologia 22:65-72.
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  • (2 other versions)Explaining Consciousness.David M. Rosenthal - 2002 - In David John Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. New York: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 109-131.
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  • Mental Ownership and Higher Order Thought.Timothy Lane & Caleb Liang - 2010 - Analysis 70 (3):496-501.
    Mental ownership concerns who experiences a mental state. According to David Rosenthal (2005: 342), the proper way to characterize mental ownership is: ‘being conscious of a state as present is being conscious of it as belonging to somebody. And being conscious of a state as belonging to somebody other than oneself would plainly not make it a conscious state’. In other words, if a mental state is consciously present to a subject in virtue of a higher-order thought (HOT), then the (...)
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  • What is self-specific? Theoretical investigation and critical review of neuroimaging results.Dorothée Legrand & Perrine Ruby - 2009 - Psychological Review 116 (1):252-282.
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  • Putting the brakes on enactive perception.Jesse J. Prinz - 2006 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 12.
    Alva Noë’s _Action in Perception _offers a provocative and vigorous defense of the thesis that vision is enactive: visual experience depends on dispositional motor responses. On this view, vision and action are inextricably bound. In this review, I argue against enactive perception. I raise objections to seven lines of evidence that appear in Noë’s book, and I indicate some reasons for thinking that vision can operate independently of motor responses. I conclude that the relationship between vision and action is causal, (...)
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  • Active perception and perceiving action: The shared circuits model.Susan Hurley - 2006 - In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual experience. New York: Oxford University Press.
    Recently research on imitation and its role in social cognition has been flourishing across various disciplines. After briefly reviewing these developments under the headings of behavior, subpersonal mechanisms, and functions of imitation, I advance the _shared circuits_.
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