Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. A new understanding of psychopathy: The contribution of phenomenological psychopathology.Jérôme Englebert - unknown
    The objective of this study is to present a theoretical paper about a clinical issue. Our aim is to propose some clinical and semiological considerations for a psychopathological conception of psychopathy. We will discuss several major theoretical works dedicated to this nosographic entity. We will also examine a significant issue raised by Cooke et al., namely whether psychopathic functioning is consistently related to antisocial behavior. This theoretical essay is informed by clinical situations. The method applied a phenomenological psychopathology analysis to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Ego-Dissolution and Psychedelics: Validation of the Ego-Dissolution Inventory (EDI).Matthew M. Nour, Lisa Evans, David Nutt & Robin L. Carhart-Harris - 2016 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 10:190474.
    Aims: The experience of a compromised sense of ‘self’, termed ego-dissolution, is a key feature of the psychedelic experience and acute psychosis. This study aimed to validate the Ego-Dissolution Inventory (EDI), a new 8-item self-report scale designed to measure ego-dissolution. Additionally, we aimed to investigate the specificity of the relationship between psychedelics and ego-dissolution. Method: Sixteen items relating to altered ego-consciousness were included in an internet questionnaire; 8 relating to the experience of ego-dissolution (comprising the EDI), and 8 relating to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • What Can Psychiatric Disorders Tell Us about Neural Processing of the Self?Weihua Zhao, Lizhu Luo, Qin Li & Keith M. Kendrick - 2013 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • “To see or not to see: that is the question.” The “Protection-Against-Schizophrenia” model: evidence from congenital blindness and visuo-cognitive aberrations.Steffen Landgraf & Michael Osterheider - 2013 - Frontiers in Psychology 4.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • (2 other versions)Framework of Consciousness from Semblance of Activity at Functionally LINKed Postsynaptic Membranes.Kunjumon I. Vadakkan - 2010 - Frontiers in Psychology 1.
    Consciousness is seen as a difficult “binding” problem. Binding, a process where different sensations evoked by an item are associated in the nervous system, can be viewed as a process similar to associative learning. Several reports that consciousness is associated with some form of memory imply that different forms of memories have a common feature contributing to consciousness. Based on a proposed synaptic mechanism capable of explaining different forms of memory, we developed a framework for consciousness. It is based on (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Intentionality.Joel Krueger - 2018 - In Giovanni Stanghellini, Matthew Broome, Anthony Vincent Fernandez, Paolo Fusar-Poli, Andrea Raballo & René Rosfort (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Phenomenological Psychopathology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Failing to Self-Ascribe Thought and Motion: Towards a Three-Factor Account of Passivity Symptoms in Schizophrenia.David Miguel Gray - 2014 - Schizophrenia Research 152 (1):28-32.
    There has recently been emphasis put on providing two-factor accounts of monothematic delusions. Such accounts would explain (1) whether a delusional hypothesis (e.g. someone else is inserting thoughts into my mind) can be understood as a prima facie reasonable response to an experience and (2) why such a delusional hypothesis is believed and maintained given its implausibility and evidence against it. I argue that if we are to avoid obfuscating the cognitive mechanisms involved in monothematic delusion formation we should split (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • The First Person Perspective and Beyond: Commentary on Almaas.Simon Hoffding & Joel Krueger - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (1-2):158-178.
    In this commentary, we engage with Almaas’s contribution from the perspective of phenomenology and its idea of a ‘minimal self’. We attempt to clarify Almaas’s claims about ‘phenomenological givens’ and ‘non-dual’, ‘pure consciousness’, and then show how they might be reconciled with phenomenological approaches to consciousness and self. We conclude by briefly indicating some of the ways a comparative analysis of this sort is mutually beneficial.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Embodiment and affectivity in Moebius Syndrome and Schizophrenia: A phenomenological analysis.Joel Krueger & Mads Gram Henriksen - 2016 - In J. Aaron Simmons & James Hackett (eds.), Phenomenology for the 21st Century. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    In this comparative study, we examine experiential disruptions of embodiment and affectivity in Moebius Syndrome and schizophrenia. We suggest that using phenomenological resources to explore these experiences may help us better understand what it’s like to live with these conditions, and that such an understanding may have significant therapeutic value. Additionally, we suggest that this sort of phenomenologically-informed comparative analysis can shed light on the importance of embodiment and affectivity for the constitution of a sense of self and interpersonal relatedness (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Self across time: the diachronic unity of bodily existence.Thomas Fuchs - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (2):291-315.
    The debate on personal persistence has been characterized by a dichotomy which is due to its still Cartesian framwork: On the one side we find proponents of psychological continuity who connect, in Locke’s tradition, the persistence of the person with the constancy of the first-person perspective in retrospection. On the other side, proponents of a biological approach take diachronic identity to consist in the continuity of the organism as the carrier of personal existence from a third-person-perspective. Thus, what accounts for (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • The enactive approach and disorders of the self - the case of schizophrenia.Miriam Kyselo - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (4):591-616.
    The paper discusses two recent approaches to schizophrenia, a phenomenological and a neuroscientific approach, illustrating how new directions in philosophy and cognitive science can elaborate accounts of psychopathologies of the self. It is argued that the notion of the minimal and bodily self underlying these approaches is still limited since it downplays the relevance of social interactions and relations for the formation of a coherent sense of self. These approaches also illustrate that we still lack an account of how 1st (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • The phenomenology of Deep Brain Stimulation-induced changes in Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder patients: An enactive affordance-based model.Sanneke de Haan, Erik Rietveld, Martin Stokhof & Damiaan Denys - 2013 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7:1-14.
    People suffering from Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) do things they do not want to do, and/or they think things they do not want to think. In about 10 percent of OCD patients, none of the available treatment options is effective. A small group of these patients is currently being treated with deep brain stimulation (DBS). Deep brain stimulation involves the implantation of electrodes in the brain. These electrodes give a continuous electrical pulse to the brain area in which they are implanted. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   61 citations  
  • Consideraciones críticas sobre la propuesta de Thomas Szasz. Entre filosofía de la mente, fenomenología y psiquiatría.Pablo López-Silva - 2014 - Revista Latinoamericana de Psicopatología Fundamental 17 (2).
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Spectra of Soundless Voices and Audible Thoughts: Towards an Integrative Model of Auditory Verbal Hallucinations and Thought Insertion.Clara S. Humpston & Matthew R. Broome - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (3):611-629.
    Patients with psychotic disorders experience a range of reality distortions. These often include auditory-verbal hallucinations, and thought insertion to a lesser degree; however, their mechanisms and relationships between each other remain largely elusive. Here we attempt to establish a integrative model drawing from the phenomenology of both AVHs and TI and argue that they in fact can be seen as ‘spectra’ of experiences with varying degrees of agency and ownership, with ‘silent and internal own thoughts’ on one extreme and ‘fully (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • “An Equivocal Couple Overwhelmed by Life”: A Phenomenological Analysis of Pregnancy.Sara Heinämaa - 2014 - philoSOPHIA: A Journal of Continental Feminism 4 (1):12-49.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:“An Equivocal Couple Overwhelmed by Life”A Phenomenological Analysis of PregnancySara HeinämaaTwo conceptions of human generativity prevail in contemporary feminist philosophy. First, several contributors argue that the experience of pregnancy, when analyzed by phenomenological tools, undermines several distinctions that are central to Western philosophy, most importantly the subject-object distinction and the self-other and own-alien distinctions. This line of argument was already outlined by Iris Marion Young in her influential essay (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Mineness without Minimal Selves.M. V. P. Slors & F. Jongepier - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (7-8):193-219.
    In this paper we focus on what is referred to as the ‘mineness’ of experience, that is, the intimate familiarity we have with our own thoughts, perceptions, and emotions. Most accounts characterize mineness in terms of an experiential dimension, the first-person givenness of experience, that is subsumed under the notion of minimal self-consciousness or a ‘minimal self’. We argue that this account faces problems and develop an alternative account of mineness in terms of the coherence of experiences with what we (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • (1 other version)When actions feel alien: An explanatory model.Timothy Lane - 2014 - In Tzu-Wei Hung (ed.), Communicative Action. Singapore: Springer Science+Business. pp. 53-74.
    It is not necessarily the case that we ever have experiences of self, but human beings do regularly report instances for which self is experienced as absent. That is there are times when body parts, mental states, or actions are felt to be alien. Here I sketch an explanatory framework for explaining these alienation experiences, a framework that also attempts to explain the “mental glue” whereby self is bound to body, mind, or action. The framework is a multi-dimensional model that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • (1 other version)When actions feel alien: An explanatory model.Timothy Lane - 2014 - In Tzu-Wei Hung (ed.), Communicative Action. Singapore: Springer Science+Business. pp. 53-74.
    It is not necessarily the case that we ever have experiences of self, but human beings do regularly report instances for which self is experienced as absent. That is there are times when body parts, mental states, or actions are felt to be alien. Here I sketch an explanatory framework for explaining these alienation experiences, a framework that also attempts to explain the “mental glue” whereby self is bound to body, mind, or action. The framework is a multi-dimensional model that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Beyond words: linguistic experience in melancholia, mania, and schizophrenia. [REVIEW]Louis Sass & Elizabeth Pienkos - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (3):475-495.
    In this paper, we use a phenomenological approach to compare the unusual ways in which language can be experienced by individuals with schizophrenia or severe mood disorders, specifically mania and melancholia. Our discussion follows a tripartite/dialectical format: first we describe traditionally observed distinctions ; then we consider some apparent similarities in the experience of language in these conditions. Finally, we explore more subtle, qualitative differences. These involve: 1, interpersonal orientation, 2, forms of attention and context-relevance, 3, underlying mutations of experience, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Can functional and phenomenal consciousness be divided?J. G. Taylor - 2012 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 4 (02):457-469.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Toward an explanatory framework for mental ownership.Timothy Lane - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):251-286.
    Philosophical and scientific investigations of the proprietary aspects of self—mineness or mental ownership—often presuppose that searching for unique constituents is a productive strategy. But there seem not to be any unique constituents. Here, it is argued that the “self-specificity” paradigm, which emphasizes subjective perspective, fails. Previously, it was argued that mode of access also fails to explain mineness. Fortunately, these failures, when leavened by other findings (those that exhibit varieties and vagaries of mineness), intimate an approach better suited to searching (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  • Is consciousness only content, or is there more?J. G. Taylor - 2011 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 3 (02):375-378.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • (2 other versions)Framework of consciousness from semblance of activity at functionally LINKed postsynaptic membranes.Kunjumon Vadakkan - 2010 - Frontiers in Consciousness Research 1 (1):1-12.
    Consciousness is seen as a difficult “binding” problem. Binding, a process where different sensations evoked by an item are associated in the nervous system, can be viewed as a process similar to associative learning. Several reports that consciousness is associated with some form of memory imply that different forms of memories have a common feature contributing to consciousness. Based on a proposed synaptic mechanism capable of explaining different forms of memory, we developed a framework for consciousness. It is based on (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • On incomprehensibility in schizophrenia.Mads Gram Henriksen - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):105-129.
    This article examines the supposedly incomprehensibility of schizophrenic delusions. According to the contemporary classificatory systems (DSM-IV-TR and ICD-10), some delusions typically found in schizophrenia are considered bizarre and incomprehensible. The aim of this article is to discuss the notion of understanding that deems these delusions incomprehensible and to see if it is possible to comprehend these delusions if we apply another notion of understanding. First, I discuss the contemporary schizophrenia definitions and their inherent problems, and I argue that the notion (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • Temporality and psychopathology.Thomas Fuchs - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):75-104.
    The paper first introduces the concept of implicit and explicit temporality, referring to time as pre-reflectively lived vs. consciously experienced. Implicit time is based on the constitutive synthesis of inner time consciousness on the one hand, and on the conative–affective dynamics of life on the other hand. Explicit time results from an interruption or negation of implicit time and unfolds itself in the dimensions of present, past and future. It is further shown that temporality, embodiment and intersubjectivity are closely connected: (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   75 citations  
  • The Endogenous Feedback Network: A new approach to the comprehensive study of consciousness.Claudia Carrara Augustenborg - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2):547-579.
    The phenomenon of consciousness has received through the centuries a profusion of interpretations, engaging researchers across many disciplines. Nevertheless, consensus still floats at large. The aim of the present work is therefore twofold. Through the review of a selected number of existing proposals, it will first be considered the extents of their reciprocal compatibility, tentatively shaping an integrated, theoretical profile of consciousness. A new theory, the Endogenous Feedback Network will consequently be introduced which, besides being able to accommodate the main (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Schizophrenic Thought Insertion and Self-Experience.Darryl Mathieson - 2024 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 15 (2):523-539.
    In contemporary philosophy of mind and psychiatry, schizophrenic thought insertion is often used as a validating or invalidating counterexample in various theories about how we experience ourselves. Recent work has taken cases of thought insertion to provide an invalidating counterexample to the Humean denial of self-experience, arguing that deficiencies of agency in thought insertion suggest that we normally experience ourselves as the agent of our thoughts. In this paper, I argue that appealing to a breakdown in the sense of agency (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Being someone.Dan Zahavi - 2005 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 11.
    My discussion will focus on what is arguable the main claim of Being No One: That no such things as selves exist in the world and that nobody ever was or had a self. In discussing to what extent Metzinger can be said to argue convincingly for this claim, I will also comment on his methodological use of pathology and briefly make some remarks vis-à-vis his understanding and criticism of phenomenology.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • The Sense of Self in the Phenomenology of Agency and Perception.Jakob Hohwy - 2007 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 13.
    The phenomenology of agency and perception is probably underpinned by a common cognitive system based on generative models and predictive coding. I defend the hypothesis that this cognitive system explains core aspects of the sense of having a self in agency and perception. In particular, this cognitive model explains the phenomenological notion of a minimal self as well as a notion of the narrative self. The proposal is related to some influential studies of overall brain function, and to psychopathology. These (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   40 citations  
  • “Minimal self” locked into a model: exploring the prospect of formalizing intentionality in schizophrenia.Marianne D. Broeker & Matthew R. Broome - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    Computational psychiatry is a quickly evolving discipline that aims to understand psychopathology in terms of computational, hence algorithmic processes. While cognitive phenomena, especially beliefs or ways of “reasoning”, can more easily be formalized, meaning re-described in mathematical terms and then entered computational models, there is speculation as to whether phenomenology might be formalizable too. In other words, there are speculations in terms of what aspects of the human experience, rather than specific cognitive processes alone, can enter computational models. Here, we (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Can There Be Something it is Like to Be No One?Christian Coseru - 2024 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 31 (5):62-103.
    This paper defends the persistence of the subjective or self-intimating dimension of experience in non-ordinary and pathological states of consciousness such as non-dual awareness, full absorption, drug-induced ego dissolution, and the minimal conscious state. In considering whether non-ordinary and pathological conscious states display any subjective features, we confront a dilemma. Either they do, in which case there needs to be some way of accounting for these features in phenomenal terms, or they do not, in which case there is nothing it (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Self-disorders in schizophrenia as disorders of transparency: an exploratory account.Jasper Feyaerts, Barnaby Nelson & Louis Sass - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    Understanding alterations of selfhood (termed self-disorders or self-disturbances) that are considered typical of the schizophrenia-spectrum is a central focus of phenomenological research. The currently most influential way of phenomenologically conceiving self-disorders in schizophrenia is as disorders of the so-called most basic or “minimal self”. In this paper, we first highlight some challenges for the minimal self-view of self-disorders, focusing on (1) problems arising from the supposedly “essential” or “universal” nature of minimal self with respect to phenomenal awareness and (2) the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • In and Out of Character: Socratic Mimēsis.Mateo Duque - 2020 - Dissertation, Cuny Graduate Center
    In the "Republic," Plato has Socrates attack poetry’s use of mimēsis, often translated as ‘imitation’ or ‘representation.’ Various scholars (e.g. Blondell 2002; Frank 2018; Halliwell 2009; K. Morgan 2004) have noticed the tension between Socrates’ theory critical of mimēsis and Plato’s literary practice of speaking through various characters in his dialogues. However, none of these scholars have addressed that it is not only Plato the writer who uses mimēsis but also his own character, Socrates. At crucial moments in several dialogues, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • On the Genesis, Continuum, and the Lowest Bound of Selves.Reshma Joy - 2024 - JOLMA - The Journal for the Philosophy of Language, Mind, and the Arts 4 (2):243-270.
    In the history of philosophy, the concept of self has been perennially elusive. The philosophical quest to understand the self is rife with phenomenological and metaphysical analyses, often overlooking other kinds of selves present in the biological realm. To systematically explore this question of non-human selves, I categorize the literature on philosophical and biological notions of self into the biogenic, the zoogenic, and the anthropogenic approaches to self. This article attempts to chart the genesis, the continuum, and the lowest bound (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Measuring Phenomenal Consciousness in Delirium: The New Black.Eamonn Eeles, Andrew Teodorczuk & Nadeeka Dissanayaka - 2024 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 31 (1):31-50.
    Delirium has conventionally been considered a disorder of consciousness, but this remains a relatively unexamined precept. First, a review of the role of consciousness disruption in delirium is revised from an historical and diagnostic perspective. Second, consciousness measurement in routine assessment of delirium is considered. Conscious levels, comprising alertness and arousal, are most commonly used but are not representative of the multidimensionality of consciousness. Third, a justification for the exploration of phenomenal consciousness is presented. Three candidate dimensions of phenomenal consciousness (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Affectivity in mental disorders: an enactive-simondonian approach.Enara García - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-28.
    Several enactive-phenomenological perspectives have pointed to affectivity as a central aspect of mental disorders. Indeed, from an enactive perspective, sense-making is an inherently affective process. A question remains on the role of different forms of affective experiences (i.e., existential feelings, atmospheres, moods, and emotions) in sense-making and, consequently, in mental disorders. This work elaborates on the enactive perspective on mental disorders by attending to the primordial role of affectivity in the self-individuation process. Inspired by Husserl’s genetic methodology and Simondonian philosophy (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Towards a phenomenological approach to psychopharmacology: drug-centered model and epistemic empowerment.Marcelo Vieira Lopes & Guilherme Messas - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-18.
    The long-standing tradition of phenomenological psychopathology has been historically concerned with the nature of mental disorders, with a special focus on their basic experiential core. In the same way, much of the recent phenomenologically-inspired work in psychopathology consists in providing precise and refined tools for diagnosis, classification, and nosology of mental disorders. What is striking, however, is the lack of therapeutic proposals in this tradition. Although a number of phenomenological approaches refer positively to psychotherapeutic practices, psychopharmacological intervention has been mostly (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The rational role of the perceptual sense of reality.Paweł Gładziejewski - 2022 - Mind and Language 38 (4):1021-1040.
    Perceptual experience usually comes with “phenomenal force”, a strong sense that it reflects reality as it is. Some philosophers have argued that it is in virtue of possessing phenomenal force that perceptual experiences are able to non‐inferentially justify beliefs. In this article, I introduce an alternative, inferentialist take on the epistemic role of phenomenal force. Drawing on Bayesian modeling in cognitive science, I argue that the sense of reality that accompanies conscious vision can be viewed as epistemically appraisable in light (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • “Robbed of my life”: The Felt Loss of Familiar and Engaged Presence in Depersonalization/Derealization Disorder.Elizabeth Pienkos & Louis Sass - 2022 - Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 53 (1):51-81.
    Depersonalization/derealization disorder is classified as a dissociative disorder in the DSM5. It is noteworthy that the symptoms of depersonalization and derealization are commonly found in many other psychological disorders, including schizophrenia spectrum disorders, while phenomenological features of schizophrenia are commonly found in DPDR. The current study attempts to clarify these apparent similarities via highly detailed phenomenological interviews with four persons diagnosed with DPDR. The data revealed four interrelated facets: 1, Loss of resonance, 2, Detachment from experience, 3, Loss of self, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Solving the self-illness ambiguity: the case for construction over discovery.Sofia M. I. Jeppsson - 2022 - Philosophical Explorations 25 (3):294-313.
    Psychiatric patients sometimes ask where to draw the line between who they are – their selves – and their mental illness. This problem is referred to as the self-illness ambiguity in the literature; it has been argued that solving said ambiguity is a crucial part of psychiatric treatment. I distinguish a Realist Solution from a Constructivist one. The former requires finding a supposedly pre-existing border, in the psychiatric patient’s mental life, between that which belongs to the self and that which (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Phenomenology, Psychopathology, and Pre-Reflective Experience.Anthony Vincent Fernandez - 2023 - In J. Robert Thompson (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Implicit Cognition. New York, NY: Routledge.
    In this chapter, I introduce phenomenology and phenomenological psychopathology by clarifying the kind of implicit experiences that phenomenologists are concerned with. In section one, I introduce the phenomenological concept of pre-reflective experience, focusing especially on its relation to the concept of implicit experience. In section two, I introduce the structure of pre-reflective self-consciousness, which has been studied extensively by both classical phenomenologists and contemporary phenomenological psychopathologists. In section three, I show how phenomenological psychopathologists rely on an account of pre-reflective self-consciousness (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Embodied movement consciousness.Arturo Leyva - 2022 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (1):161-180.
    In two recent papers, I introduced the idea of embodied Rilkean movement knowledge and perception into the current philosophical debate on sports knowledge. In this paper, I offer a new analysis of how embodied movement knowledge and perception help us to identify and define movement consciousness. I develop a phenomenological account of embodied movement consciousness and show how it is closely linked to self-consciousness by generating anticipations and affordances that implicate pre-reflective self-awareness. I also expand Rowlands’ Rilkean memory notion to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Correction to: Methods of data collection in psychopathology: the role of semi-structured, phenomenological interviews.Mads Gram Henriksen, Magnus Englander & Julie Nordgaard - 2021 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (1):31-32.
    Research in psychopathology is booming in an unprecedented way, at least, in terms of increasing number of publications. Yet, a few questions arise: Does quantity also give us quality? Are the collected data generally of sound quality? How are data typically collected in psychopathology? Are the applied methods of data collection appropriate for this particular field of study? This article explores three different methods of data collection in psychopathology, namely self-rating scales, structured interviews, and semi-structured, phenomenological interviews. To identify the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Schizophrenia, Temporality, and Affection.Jae Ryeong Sul - 2022 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (4):927-947.
    Temporal experience and its radical alteration in schizophrenia have been one of the central objects of investigation in phenomenological psychopathology. Various phenomenologically oriented researchers have argued that the change in the mode of temporal experience present in schizophrenia can foreground its psychotic symptoms of delusion. This paper aims to further the development of such a phenomenological investigation by highlighting a much-neglected aspect of schizophrenic temporal experience, i.e., its non-emotional affective characteristic. In this paper, it denotes the type of an experience (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Methods of data collection in psychopathology: the role of semi-structured, phenomenological interviews.Mads Gram Henriksen, Magnus Englander & Julie Nordgaard - 2021 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (1):9-30.
    Research in psychopathology is booming in an unprecedented way, at least, in terms of increasing number of publications. Yet, a few questions arise: Does quantity also give us quality? Are the collected data generally of sound quality? How are data typically collected in psychopathology? Are the applied methods of data collection appropriate for this particular field of study? This article explores three different methods of data collection in psychopathology, namely self-rating scales, structured interviews, and semi-structured, phenomenological interviews. To identify the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Fenomenologia nos estudos de enfermagem.Hugo Ribeiro Mota, Betânia Da Mata Ribeiro Gomes, Dan Zahavi & Kristian M. M. Martiny - 2021 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 66 (1):e39223.
    O objetivo deste artigo é, primeiro, apresentar e considerar as críticas de Paley com mais detalhes e, em seguida, discutir algumas das aplicações significativas da fenomenologia que muitas vezes foram negligenciadas pelos pesquisadores qualitativos. Como foi amplamente demonstrado ao longo dos anos, a fenomenologia pode não apenas fazer a diferença no manuseio, análise e interpretação dos dados disponíveis, mas também em como os dados são obtidos em primeiro lugar, por exemplo, através de técnicas especiais de entrevista. Consideraremos algumas figuras centrais (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Feeling Oneself Requires Embodiment: Insights From the Relationship Between Own-Body Transformations, Schizotypal Personality Traits, and Spontaneous Bodily Sensations.George A. Michael, Deborah Guyot, Emilie Tarroux, Mylène Comte & Sara Salgues - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11:578237.
    Subtle bodily sensations such as itching or fluttering that occur in the absence of any external trigger may serve to locate the spatial boundaries of the body. They may constitute the normal counterpart of extreme conditions in which body-related hallucinations and perceptual aberrations are experienced. Previous investigations have suggested that situations in which the body is spontaneously experienced as being deformed are related to the ability to perform own-body transformations, i.e., mental rotations of the body requiring disembodiment. We therefore decided (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • DIE PSYCHOPATHOLOGIE DES ORDO AMORIS IN DER PERSPEKTIVE MAX SCHELERS UND BIN KIMURAS.Guido Cusinato - 2019 - Thaumàzein 7:108-142.
    In this paper I aim to re-think the question of the world of persons with schizophrenia from the perspective of the German phenomenologist Max Scheler and that of the Japanese psychiatrist Bin Kimura. So far, no comparison between these two authors has been made, even though there are several convergences and evidence of Scheler’s indirect influence on Bin Kimura through Viktor von Weizsäcker. In recent years, Dan Zahavi, Louis Sass, and Josef Parnas have interpreted the modus vivendi of schizophrenic patients (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The destructive nature of severe and ongoing trauma: Impairments in the minimal-self.Yochai Ataria & Omer Horovitz - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (2):254-276.
    This paper argues that severe and ongoing trauma (SOT) can lead to impairment at the level of the minimal self (MS), which is the core element in the structure of subjectivity. In the long-term, such impairments can result in complex post-traumatic stress disorder (CPTSD) and schizophrenia. The paper tackles this issue while trying to create meaningful bridges between phenomenology and neuroscience.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • A Phenomenological Paradigm for Empirical Research in Psychiatry and Psychology: Open Questions.Leonor Irarrázaval - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
    This article seeks to clarify the way in which phenomenology is conceptualized and applied in empirical research in psychiatry and psychology, emphasizing the suitability of qualitative research. It will address the What, Why, and How of phenomenological interviews, providing not only preliminary answers but also a critical analysis, and pointing to future directions for research. The questions it asks are: First, what makes an interview phenomenological? What are phenomenological interviews used for in empirical research in psychiatry and psychology? Second, why (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation