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  1. Affective affordances and psychopathology.Joel Krueger & Giovanna Colombetti - 2018 - Discipline Filosofiche 2 (18):221-247.
    Self-disorders in depression and schizophrenia have been the focus of much recent work in phenomenological psychopathology. But little has been said about the role the material environment plays in shaping the affective character of these disorders. In this paper, we argue that enjoying reliable (i.e., trustworthy) access to the things and spaces around us — the constituents of our material environment — is crucial for our ability to stabilize and regulate our affective life on a day-today basis. These things and (...)
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  • (1 other version)The problem of consciousness for philosophy of mind and of psychiatry.Felipe De Brigard - 2017 - Ideas Y Valores 66 (S3):15-45.
    RESUMEN Muchos psiquiatras se encuentran constantemente con pacientes cuyos síntomas incluyen trastornos o alteraciones de la conciencia. Infortunadamente, el significado del término conciencia es poco claro. Este artículo hace un repaso sistemático de varios significados atribuidos a dicho término, así como de diversos problemas filosóficos asociados. Asimismo, reconstruye varias teorías filosóficas y científicas de la conciencia, identificando sus ventajas y desventajas. Al final, ofrece algunas sugerencias para el uso del término conciencia en la psiquiatría. ABSTRACT Psychiatrists often encounter patients whose (...)
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  • Ipseity at the Intersection of Phenomenology, Psychiatry and Philosophy of Mind: Are we Talking about the Same Thing?Kristina Musholt - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (3):689-701.
    In recent years, phenomenologically informed philosophers, psychologists and psychiatrists have attempted to import philosophical notions associated with the self into the empirical study of pathological experience. In particular, so-called ipseity disturbances have been put forward as generative of symptoms of schizophrenia, and several attempts have been made to operationalize and measure kinds and degrees of ipseity disturbances in schizophrenia. However, we find that this work faces challenges caused by the fact that the notion of ipseity is used ambiguously, both in (...)
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  • Beyond the Ontological Difference: Heidegger, Binswanger, and the Future of Existential Analysis.Anthony Vincent Fernandez - 2018 - In Kevin Aho (ed.), Existential Medicine: Essays on Health and Illness. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. pp. 27–42.
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  • Schizophrenia and the Scaffolded Self.Joel Krueger - 2020 - Topoi 39 (3):597-609.
    A family of recent externalist approaches in philosophy of mind argues that our psychological capacities are synchronically and diachronically “scaffolded” by external resources. I consider how these “scaffolded” approaches might inform debates in phenomenological psychopathology. I first introduce the idea of “affective scaffolding” and make some taxonomic distinctions. Next, I use schizophrenia as a case study to argue—along with others in phenomenological psychopathology—that schizophrenia is fundamentally a self-disturbance. However, I offer a subtle reconfiguration of these approaches. I argue that schizophrenia (...)
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  • The paradoxical self: Awareness, solipsism and first-rank symptoms in schizophrenia.Clara S. Humpston - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (2):210-231.
    Schizophrenia as a pathology of self-awareness has attracted much attention from philosophical theorists and empirical scientists alike. I view schizophrenia as a basic self-disturbance leading to a lifeworld of solipsism adopted by the sufferer and explain how this adoption takes place, which then manifests in ways such as first-rank psychotic symptoms. I then discuss the relationships between these symptoms, not as isolated mental events, but as end-products of a loss of agency and ownership, and argue that symptoms like thought insertion (...)
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  • The Effect of Trait Self-Awareness, Self-Reflection, and Perceptions of Choice Meaningfulness on Indicators of Social Identity within a Decision-Making Context.Noam Dishon, Julian A. Oldmeadow, Christine Critchley & Jordy Kaufman - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
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  • Racionalidades e irracionalidades en la experiencia psicótica y los trastornos de la Intencionalidad.Juan José Botero & Jorge Dávila - 2017 - Ideas Y Valores 66 (S3):221-245.
    Se ha presentado mucha controversia, desde hace años, acerca de la capacidad de la psiquiatría para mantener estándares médico-científicos comparables a los de otras especialidades de la medicina. La tendencia más reciente, basada en una fuerte crítica a la última edición del dsm, hace un énfasis particular en tratar de caracterizar los trastornos mentales con base en las neurociencias y abandonar toda otra forma de abordarlos. Este artículo revisa dicha tendencia y propone un enfoque multidimensional, haciendo énfasis en la investigación, (...)
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  • (1 other version)El problema de la conciencia para la filosofía de la mente y de la psiquiatría.Felipe De Brigard - 2017 - Ideas Y Valores 66 (S3):15-45.
    Muchos psiquiatras se encuentran constantemente con pacientes cuyos síntomas incluyen trastornos o alteraciones de la conciencia. Infortunadamente, el significado del término conciencia es poco claro. Este artículo hace un repaso sistemático de varios significados atribuidos a dicho término, así como de diversos problemas filosóficos asociados. Asimismo, reconstruye varias teorías filosóficas y científicas de la conciencia, identificando sus ventajas y desventajas. Al final, ofrece algunas sugerencias para el uso del término conciencia en la psiquiatría.
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  • Watsuji's phenomenology of aidagara: An interpretation and application to psychopathology.Joel Krueger - forthcoming - In Krueger Joel (ed.), Tetsugaku Companion to Phenomenology and Japanese Philosophy. Springer. pp. 165-181.
    I discuss Watsuji’s characterization of aidagara or “betweenness”. First, I develop a phenomenological reading of aidagara. I argue that the notion can help illuminate aspects of our embodied subjectivity and its interrelation with the world and others. Along the way, I also indicate how the notion can be fruitfully supplemented by different sources of empirical research. Second, I put aidagara to work in the context of psychopathology. I show how disruptions of aidagara in schizophrenia not only affirm the foundational role (...)
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  • IntrospectionIntrospection and schizophrenia: A comparative investigation of anomalous self experiences.Louis Sass, Elizabeth Pienkos & Barnaby Nelson - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (3):853-867.
    This paper offers a comparative investigation of anomalous self-experiences common in schizophrenia instrument) and those of normal individuals in an intensely introspective orientation. The latter represent a relatively pure manifestation of certain forms of exaggerated self-consciousness, one facet of the disturbance of core- or minimal-self postulated as central in schizophrenia. Significant similarities with schizophrenia-like experience were found but important differences also emerged. Affinities included feelings of passivity, fading of self or world, and alienation from thoughts, feelings, or lived-body. Differences involved (...)
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  • Life story chapters and narrative self-continuity in patients with schizophrenia.Tine Holm, Dorthe Kirkegaard Thomsen & Vibeke Bliksted - 2016 - Consciousness and Cognition 45:60-74.
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  • Intentionality.Joel Krueger - 2018 - In Giovanni Stanghellini, Matthew Broome, Anthony Vincent Fernandez, Paolo Fusar-Poli, Andrea Raballo & René Rosfort (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Phenomenological Psychopathology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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  • Failing to Self-Ascribe Thought and Motion: Towards a Three-Factor Account of Passivity Symptoms in Schizophrenia.David Miguel Gray - 2014 - Schizophrenia Research 152 (1):28-32.
    There has recently been emphasis put on providing two-factor accounts of monothematic delusions. Such accounts would explain (1) whether a delusional hypothesis (e.g. someone else is inserting thoughts into my mind) can be understood as a prima facie reasonable response to an experience and (2) why such a delusional hypothesis is believed and maintained given its implausibility and evidence against it. I argue that if we are to avoid obfuscating the cognitive mechanisms involved in monothematic delusion formation we should split (...)
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  • Embodiment and affectivity in Moebius Syndrome and Schizophrenia: A phenomenological analysis.Joel Krueger & Mads Gram Henriksen - 2016 - In J. Aaron Simmons & James Hackett (eds.), Phenomenology for the 21st Century. Palgrave-Macmillan.
    In this comparative study, we examine experiential disruptions of embodiment and affectivity in Moebius Syndrome and schizophrenia. We suggest that using phenomenological resources to explore these experiences may help us better understand what it’s like to live with these conditions, and that such an understanding may have significant therapeutic value. Additionally, we suggest that this sort of phenomenologically-informed comparative analysis can shed light on the importance of embodiment and affectivity for the constitution of a sense of self and interpersonal relatedness (...)
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  • Stop, look, listen: The need for philosophical phenomenological perspectives on auditory verbal hallucinations.Simon McCarthy-Jones, Joel Krueger, Matthew Broome & Charles Fernyhough - 2013 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7:1-9.
    One of the leading cognitive models of auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs) proposes such experiences result from a disturbance in the process by which inner speech is attributed to the self. Research in this area has, however, proceeded in the absence of thorough cognitive and phenomenological investigations of the nature of inner speech, against which AVHs are implicitly or explicitly defined. In this paper we begin by introducing philosophical phenomenology and highlighting its relevance to AVHs, before briefly examining the evolving literature (...)
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  • Self across time: the diachronic unity of bodily existence.Thomas Fuchs - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (2):291-315.
    The debate on personal persistence has been characterized by a dichotomy which is due to its still Cartesian framwork: On the one side we find proponents of psychological continuity who connect, in Locke’s tradition, the persistence of the person with the constancy of the first-person perspective in retrospection. On the other side, proponents of a biological approach take diachronic identity to consist in the continuity of the organism as the carrier of personal existence from a third-person-perspective. Thus, what accounts for (...)
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  • From Thoughts to Voices: Understanding the Development of Auditory Hallucinations in Schizophrenia.Peter Handest, Christoph Klimpke, Andrea Raballo & Frank Larøi - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (3):595-610.
    Drawing upon core phenomenological contributions of the last decades, the present paper provides an integrated description of the development of auditory hallucinations in schizophrenia. Specifically, these contributions are the transitional sequences of development of psychotic symptoms of schizophrenia as envisioned by Klosterkötter and rooted in the basic symptoms approach, Conrad’s Gestalt-analysis of developing psychosis, and Sass and Parnas’ self-disturbance approach. Klosterkötter’s contribution provides a general descriptive psychopathological approach to the transitional sequence of the development of auditory hallucinations. The key concepts (...)
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  • The phenomenology of Deep Brain Stimulation-induced changes in Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder patients: An enactive affordance-based model.Sanneke de Haan, Erik Rietveld, Martin Stokhof & Damiaan Denys - 2013 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7:1-14.
    People suffering from Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) do things they do not want to do, and/or they think things they do not want to think. In about 10 percent of OCD patients, none of the available treatment options is effective. A small group of these patients is currently being treated with deep brain stimulation (DBS). Deep brain stimulation involves the implantation of electrodes in the brain. These electrodes give a continuous electrical pulse to the brain area in which they are implanted. (...)
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  • The phenomenology of hypo- and hyperreality in psychopathology.Zeno Van Duppen - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (3):423-441.
    Contemporary perspectives on delusions offer valuable neuropsychiatric, psychoanalytic, and philosophical explanations of the formation and persistence of delusional phenomena. However, two problems arise. Firstly, these different perspectives offer us an explanation “from the outside”. They pay little attention to the actual personal experiences, and implicitly assume their incomprehensibility. This implicates a questionable validity. Secondly, these perspectives fail to account for two complex phenomena that are inherent to certain delusions, namely double book-keeping and the primary delusional experience. The purpose of this (...)
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  • Consideraciones críticas sobre la propuesta de Thomas Szasz. Entre filosofía de la mente, fenomenología y psiquiatría.Pablo López-Silva - 2014 - Revista Latinoamericana de Psicopatología Fundamental 17 (2).
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  • “An Equivocal Couple Overwhelmed by Life”: A Phenomenological Analysis of Pregnancy.Sara Heinämaa - 2014 - philoSOPHIA: A Journal of Continental Feminism 4 (1):12-49.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:“An Equivocal Couple Overwhelmed by Life”A Phenomenological Analysis of PregnancySara HeinämaaTwo conceptions of human generativity prevail in contemporary feminist philosophy. First, several contributors argue that the experience of pregnancy, when analyzed by phenomenological tools, undermines several distinctions that are central to Western philosophy, most importantly the subject-object distinction and the self-other and own-alien distinctions. This line of argument was already outlined by Iris Marion Young in her influential essay (...)
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  • Mineness without Minimal Selves.M. V. P. Slors & F. Jongepier - 2014 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 21 (7-8):193-219.
    In this paper we focus on what is referred to as the ‘mineness’ of experience, that is, the intimate familiarity we have with our own thoughts, perceptions, and emotions. Most accounts characterize mineness in terms of an experiential dimension, the first-person givenness of experience, that is subsumed under the notion of minimal self-consciousness or a ‘minimal self’. We argue that this account faces problems and develop an alternative account of mineness in terms of the coherence of experiences with what we (...)
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  • (1 other version)When actions feel alien: An explanatory model.Timothy Lane - 2014 - In Tzu-Wei Hung (ed.), Communicative Action. Singapore: Springer Science+Business. pp. 53-74.
    It is not necessarily the case that we ever have experiences of self, but human beings do regularly report instances for which self is experienced as absent. That is there are times when body parts, mental states, or actions are felt to be alien. Here I sketch an explanatory framework for explaining these alienation experiences, a framework that also attempts to explain the “mental glue” whereby self is bound to body, mind, or action. The framework is a multi-dimensional model that (...)
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  • Names, Descriptions, and Assertion.Ray Buchanan - 2014 - In Zsu-Wei Hung (ed.), Communicative Action. Springer. pp. 03-15.
    According to Millian Descriptivism, while the semantic content of a linguistically simple proper name is just its referent, we often use sentences containing such expressions “to make assertions…that are, in part, descriptive” (Soames 2008). Against this view, I show, following Ted Sider and David Braun (2006), that simple sentences containing names are never used to assert descriptively enriched propositions. In addition, I offer a diagnosis as to where the argument for Millian Descriptivism goes wrong. Once we appreciate the distinctive way (...)
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  • Narrative identity in schizophrenia.Stéphane Raffard, Arnaud D’Argembeau, Claudia Lardi, Sophie Bayard, Jean-Philippe Boulenger & Martial Van der Linden - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (1):328-340.
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  • Toward an explanatory framework for mental ownership.Timothy Lane - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):251-286.
    Philosophical and scientific investigations of the proprietary aspects of self—mineness or mental ownership—often presuppose that searching for unique constituents is a productive strategy. But there seem not to be any unique constituents. Here, it is argued that the “self-specificity” paradigm, which emphasizes subjective perspective, fails. Previously, it was argued that mode of access also fails to explain mineness. Fortunately, these failures, when leavened by other findings (those that exhibit varieties and vagaries of mineness), intimate an approach better suited to searching (...)
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  • (1 other version)The psychopathology of hyperreflexivity.Thomas Fuchs - 2010 - Journal of Speculative Philosophy 24 (3):239-255.
    The structure of human embodiment is fundamentally characterized by a polarity or ambiguity between Leib and Körper, the subjective body and the objectified body, or between being-body and having-a-body. This ambiguity, emphasized, above all, by Helmuth Plessner and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, is also of crucial significance for psychopathology. Insofar as mental illnesses disturb or interrupt the unhindered conduct of one’s life, they also exacerbate the tension within embodiment that holds between being-body and having-a-body. In mental illnesses, there is a failure of (...)
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  • Is minimal self preserved in schizophrenia? A subcomponents view☆.Aaron L. Mishara - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (3):715-721.
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  • Schizophrenic Thought Insertion and Self-Experience.Darryl Mathieson - 2024 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 15 (2):523-539.
    In contemporary philosophy of mind and psychiatry, schizophrenic thought insertion is often used as a validating or invalidating counterexample in various theories about how we experience ourselves. Recent work has taken cases of thought insertion to provide an invalidating counterexample to the Humean denial of self-experience, arguing that deficiencies of agency in thought insertion suggest that we normally experience ourselves as the agent of our thoughts. In this paper, I argue that appealing to a breakdown in the sense of agency (...)
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  • Psychosis and autism as diametrical disorders of the social brain.Bernard Crespi & Christopher Badcock - 2008 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (3):241-261.
    Autistic-spectrum conditions and psychotic-spectrum conditions (mainly schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and major depression) represent two major suites of disorders of human cognition, affect, and behavior that involve altered development and function of the social brain. We describe evidence that a large set of phenotypic traits exhibit diametrically opposite phenotypes in autistic-spectrum versus psychotic-spectrum conditions, with a focus on schizophrenia. This suite of traits is inter-correlated, in that autism involves a general pattern of constrained overgrowth, whereas schizophrenia involves undergrowth. These disorders also (...)
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  • Mapping the pre-reflective experience of “self” to the brain - An ERP study.Maria Chiara Piani, Gerber Bettina Salome, Koenig Thomas, Morishima Yosuke, Nordgaard Julie & Jandl Martin - 2024 - Consciousness and Cognition 119 (C):103654.
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  • Self-disorders in schizophrenia as disorders of transparency: an exploratory account.Jasper Feyaerts, Barnaby Nelson & Louis Sass - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    Understanding alterations of selfhood (termed self-disorders or self-disturbances) that are considered typical of the schizophrenia-spectrum is a central focus of phenomenological research. The currently most influential way of phenomenologically conceiving self-disorders in schizophrenia is as disorders of the so-called most basic or “minimal self”. In this paper, we first highlight some challenges for the minimal self-view of self-disorders, focusing on (1) problems arising from the supposedly “essential” or “universal” nature of minimal self with respect to phenomenal awareness and (2) the (...)
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  • In and Out of Character: Socratic Mimēsis.Mateo Duque - 2020 - Dissertation, Cuny Graduate Center
    In the "Republic," Plato has Socrates attack poetry’s use of mimēsis, often translated as ‘imitation’ or ‘representation.’ Various scholars (e.g. Blondell 2002; Frank 2018; Halliwell 2009; K. Morgan 2004) have noticed the tension between Socrates’ theory critical of mimēsis and Plato’s literary practice of speaking through various characters in his dialogues. However, none of these scholars have addressed that it is not only Plato the writer who uses mimēsis but also his own character, Socrates. At crucial moments in several dialogues, (...)
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  • On the Genesis, Continuum, and the Lowest Bound of Selves.Reshma Joy - 2024 - JOLMA - The Journal for the Philosophy of Language, Mind, and the Arts 4 (2):243-270.
    In the history of philosophy, the concept of self has been perennially elusive. The philosophical quest to understand the self is rife with phenomenological and metaphysical analyses, often overlooking other kinds of selves present in the biological realm. To systematically explore this question of non-human selves, I categorize the literature on philosophical and biological notions of self into the biogenic, the zoogenic, and the anthropogenic approaches to self. This article attempts to chart the genesis, the continuum, and the lowest bound (...)
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  • Measuring Phenomenal Consciousness in Delirium: The New Black.Eamonn Eeles, Andrew Teodorczuk & Nadeeka Dissanayaka - 2024 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 31 (1):31-50.
    Delirium has conventionally been considered a disorder of consciousness, but this remains a relatively unexamined precept. First, a review of the role of consciousness disruption in delirium is revised from an historical and diagnostic perspective. Second, consciousness measurement in routine assessment of delirium is considered. Conscious levels, comprising alertness and arousal, are most commonly used but are not representative of the multidimensionality of consciousness. Third, a justification for the exploration of phenomenal consciousness is presented. Three candidate dimensions of phenomenal consciousness (...)
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  • Towards a phenomenological approach to psychopharmacology: drug-centered model and epistemic empowerment.Marcelo Vieira Lopes & Guilherme Messas - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-18.
    The long-standing tradition of phenomenological psychopathology has been historically concerned with the nature of mental disorders, with a special focus on their basic experiential core. In the same way, much of the recent phenomenologically-inspired work in psychopathology consists in providing precise and refined tools for diagnosis, classification, and nosology of mental disorders. What is striking, however, is the lack of therapeutic proposals in this tradition. Although a number of phenomenological approaches refer positively to psychotherapeutic practices, psychopharmacological intervention has been mostly (...)
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  • Rational suicide and schizophrenia.Naista Zhand & David Attwood - 2024 - Clinical Ethics 19 (1):113-118.
    The concept of rational suicide argues that suicide could be a rational choice, in certain circumstances. Such an argument faces criticism when there is an accompanying mental illness, as many view suicide as a symptom of mental illness rather than as a rational choice about one's life. More specifically, the rational suicide debate has mostly excluded individuals with schizophrenia, as it is widely seen as a disorder that impairs rational decision making. This paper aims to examine the concept of rational (...)
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  • Transformationen in mentalen Zuständen der Traumatisierung.Bent Rosenbaum & Sverre Varvin - 2022 - Psyche 76 (9-10):826-855.
    Traumatisierte Menschen haben mit vorübergehenden oder anhaltenden Symbolisierungsschwierigkeiten zu kämpfen. Diese treten entweder in psychisch eingekapselter, umgrenzter Form in Erscheinung oder als psychische Funktionsabläufe, die sich in umfassenderer Weise auf die Lebensprojekte, politischen Einstellungen und kulturellen Normvorstellungen der Person auswirken, und zeigen sich in ihrer Körper-Welt-Beziehung, ihrer Individuum-Gruppen-Beziehung und/oder ihrer Individuum-Diskurs-Beziehung. Die Schwierigkeiten können in imaginativen und symbolischen Funktionsmodi auftreten. Gravierende Störungen der Symbolisierung lassen sich aus psychoanalytischer Sicht beschreiben als Begleiterscheinungen der paranoid-schizoiden und der autistisch-berührenden Position (Ogden), als Evakuierung (...)
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  • “Robbed of my life”: The Felt Loss of Familiar and Engaged Presence in Depersonalization/Derealization Disorder.Elizabeth Pienkos & Louis Sass - 2022 - Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 53 (1):51-81.
    Depersonalization/derealization disorder is classified as a dissociative disorder in the DSM5. It is noteworthy that the symptoms of depersonalization and derealization are commonly found in many other psychological disorders, including schizophrenia spectrum disorders, while phenomenological features of schizophrenia are commonly found in DPDR. The current study attempts to clarify these apparent similarities via highly detailed phenomenological interviews with four persons diagnosed with DPDR. The data revealed four interrelated facets: 1, Loss of resonance, 2, Detachment from experience, 3, Loss of self, (...)
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  • I overthink—Therefore I am not: An active inference account of altered sense of self and agency in depersonalisation disorder.Anna Ciaunica, Anil Seth, Jakub Limanowski, Casper Hesp & Karl J. Friston - 2022 - Consciousness and Cognition 101:103320.
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  • Phenomenology, Psychopathology, and Pre-Reflective Experience.Anthony Vincent Fernandez - 2023 - In J. Robert Thompson (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Implicit Cognition. New York, NY: Routledge.
    In this chapter, I introduce phenomenology and phenomenological psychopathology by clarifying the kind of implicit experiences that phenomenologists are concerned with. In section one, I introduce the phenomenological concept of pre-reflective experience, focusing especially on its relation to the concept of implicit experience. In section two, I introduce the structure of pre-reflective self-consciousness, which has been studied extensively by both classical phenomenologists and contemporary phenomenological psychopathologists. In section three, I show how phenomenological psychopathologists rely on an account of pre-reflective self-consciousness (...)
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  • Social epistemological conception of delusion.Alessandro Salice & Kengo Miyazono - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1831-1851.
    The dominant conception of delusion in psychiatry (in textbooks, research papers, diagnostic manuals, etc.) is predominantly epistemic. Delusions are almost always characterized in terms of their epistemic defects, i.e., defects with respect to evidence, reasoning, judgment, etc. However, there is an individualistic bias in the epistemic conception; the alleged epistemic defects and abnormalities in delusions relate to individualistic epistemic processes rather than social epistemic processes. We endorse the social epistemological turn in recent philosophical epistemology, and claim that a corresponding turn (...)
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  • Correction to: Methods of data collection in psychopathology: the role of semi-structured, phenomenological interviews.Mads Gram Henriksen, Magnus Englander & Julie Nordgaard - 2021 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (1):31-32.
    Research in psychopathology is booming in an unprecedented way, at least, in terms of increasing number of publications. Yet, a few questions arise: Does quantity also give us quality? Are the collected data generally of sound quality? How are data typically collected in psychopathology? Are the applied methods of data collection appropriate for this particular field of study? This article explores three different methods of data collection in psychopathology, namely self-rating scales, structured interviews, and semi-structured, phenomenological interviews. To identify the (...)
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  • Schizophrenia, Temporality, and Affection.Jae Ryeong Sul - 2022 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (4):927-947.
    Temporal experience and its radical alteration in schizophrenia have been one of the central objects of investigation in phenomenological psychopathology. Various phenomenologically oriented researchers have argued that the change in the mode of temporal experience present in schizophrenia can foreground its psychotic symptoms of delusion. This paper aims to further the development of such a phenomenological investigation by highlighting a much-neglected aspect of schizophrenic temporal experience, i.e., its non-emotional affective characteristic. In this paper, it denotes the type of an experience (...)
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  • (1 other version)Hacking into Cybertherapy: Considering a Gesture-enhanced Therapy with Avatars (g+TA).Alexander Matthias Gerner - 2020 - Kairos 23 (1):32-87.
    This paper will philosophically extend Julian Leff’s Avatar therapy paradigm (AT) for voice-like hallucinations that was initially proposed for treatment-resistant Schizophrenia patients into the realm of gesture-enhanced embodied cognition and Virtual Reality (VR), entitled g+TA (gesture-enhanced Avatar Therapy). I propose an philosophy of technology approach of embodied rhetorics of triadic kinetic “actions” in the sense of Charles Sanders Peirce that transforms the voice hallucination incorporated by an avatar- and that can confront acousmatic voice-like hallucinations with a method of gesture synchronization (...)
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  • DIE PSYCHOPATHOLOGIE DES ORDO AMORIS IN DER PERSPEKTIVE MAX SCHELERS UND BIN KIMURAS.Guido Cusinato - 2019 - Thaumàzein 7:108-142.
    In this paper I aim to re-think the question of the world of persons with schizophrenia from the perspective of the German phenomenologist Max Scheler and that of the Japanese psychiatrist Bin Kimura. So far, no comparison between these two authors has been made, even though there are several convergences and evidence of Scheler’s indirect influence on Bin Kimura through Viktor von Weizsäcker. In recent years, Dan Zahavi, Louis Sass, and Josef Parnas have interpreted the modus vivendi of schizophrenic patients (...)
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  • Self and mental disorder: Lessons for psychiatry from naturalistic philosophy.Şerife Tekin - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (1):e12715.
    The question “What is the relationship between the self and mental disorder?” is especially important for mental health professionals interested in understanding and treating patients, as most mental disorders are intimately tied to self‐related concerns, such as loss of self‐esteem and self‐control, or diminished agency and autonomy. Philosophy, along with the cognitive and behavioral sciences, offers a wealth of conceptual and empirical resources to answer this question, as the concepts of the self and psychopathology have occupied a central place in (...)
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  • Why Tourette syndrome research needs philosophical phenomenology.Lisa Curtis-Wendlandt & Jack Reynolds - 2020 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20 (4):573-600.
    Despite a recent surge in publications on Tourette Syndrome, we still lack substantial insight into first-personal aspects of “what it is like” to live with this condition. This is despite the fact that developments in phenomenological psychiatry have demonstrated the scientific and clinical importance of understanding subjective experience in a range of other neuropsychiatric conditions. We argue that it is time for Tourette Syndrome research to tap into the sophisticated frameworks developed in the philosophical tradition of phenomenology for describing experience (...)
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  • Effort, Uncertainty, and the Sense of Agency.Oliver Lukitsch - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (4):955-975.
    Orthodox neurocognitive accounts of the bodily sense of agency suggest that the experience of agency arises when action-effects are anticipated accurately. In this paper, I argue that while successful anticipation is crucial for the sense of agency, the role of unsuccessful prediction has been neglected, and that inefficacy and uncertainty are no less central to the sense of agency. I will argue that this is reflected in the phenomenology of agency, which can be characterized both as the experience of efficacy (...)
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