- (1 other version)An Essay on Free Will.Peter van Inwagen - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The Significance of Free Will.Robert Kane - 1996 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.details
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Living Without Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2001 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Free Will and Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 2006 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.details
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.Peter van Inwagen - 1988details
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(1 other version)Living without Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):308-310.details
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(1 other version)Moral responsibility and determinism: The cognitive science of folk intuitions.Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):663–685.details
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Causation and Free Will.Carolina Sartorio - 2016 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions about free will and moral responsibility.Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer & Jason Turner - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (5):561-584.details
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(1 other version)Living without Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):494-497.details
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The Significance of Free Will.Robert Kane - 1996 - Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 60 (1):129-134.details
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An essay on free will.Peter van Inwagen & A. Phillips Griffiths - 1985 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 175 (4):557-558.details
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(1 other version)Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?Jason Turner, Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris & Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):28-53.details
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How Physics Makes Us Free.Jenann Ismael - 2016 - , US: Oxford University Press USA.details
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My Compatibilist Proposal.Alfred R. Mele - 2006 - In Free Will and Luck. New York, US: Oxford University Press.details
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The Lesson of Bypassing.David Rose & Shaun Nichols - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (4):599-619.details
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A Hard-line Reply to Pereboom’s Four-Case Manipulation Argument.Michael Mckenna - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):142-159.details
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(1 other version)Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions.Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe - 2008 - In Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Experimental Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Defeating Manipulation Arguments: Interventionist causation and compatibilist sourcehood.Oisín Deery & Eddy Nahmias - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (5):1255-1276.details
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Bringing moral responsibility down to earth.Adina L. Roskies & Shaun Nichols - 2008 - Journal of Philosophy 105 (7):371-388.details
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Free actions as a natural kind.Oisín Deery - 2021 - Synthese 198 (1):823-843.details
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Defusing Existential and Universal Threats to Compatibilism: A Strawsonian Dilemma for Manipulation Arguments.Andrew J. Latham & Hannah Tierney - 2022 - Journal of Philosophy 119 (3):144-161.details
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Manipulation and the Zygote Argument: Another Reply.Markus E. Schlosser - 2015 - The Journal of Ethics 19 (1):73-84.details
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A new approach to manipulation arguments.Patrick Todd - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (1):127-133.details
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The Zygote Argument remixed.J. M. Fischer - 2011 - Analysis 71 (2):267-272.details
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The Threat of Effective Intentions to Moral Responsibility in the Zygote Argument.Robyn Repko Waller - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (1):209-222.details
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(1 other version)Manipulating Morality: Third‐Party Intentions Alter Moral Judgments by Changing Causal Reasoning.Jonathan Phillips & Alex Shaw - 2014 - Cognitive Science 38 (8):1320-1347.details
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What Am I?J. T. Ismael - 2016 - In Jenann Ismael (ed.), How Physics Makes Us Free. , US: Oxford University Press USA.details
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Incompatibilism and "Bypassed" Agency.Gunnar Björnsson - 2014 - In Alfred R. Mele (ed.), Surrounding Free Will: Philosophy, Psychology, Neuroscience. New York: Oup Usa. pp. 95–112.details
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Resisting the Manipulation Argument: A Hard‐Liner Takes It on the Chin.Michael McKenna - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):467-484.details
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Effects of Manipulation on Attributions of Causation, Free Will, and Moral Responsibility.Dylan Murray & Tania Lombrozo - 2017 - Cognitive Science 41 (2):447-481.details
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The Conceptual Impossibility of Free Will Error Theory.Andrew J. Latham - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (2):99-120.details
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Pereboom and premises: Asking the right questions in the experimental philosophy of free will.Adam Feltz - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (1):53-63.details
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Traditional and Experimental Approaches to Free Will and Moral Responsibility.Gunnar Björnsson & Derk Pereboom - 2016 - In Wesley Buckwalter & Justin Sytsma (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Experimental Philosophy. Malden, MA: Blackwell. pp. 142–157.details
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Manipulation Arguments, Basic Desert, and Moral Responsibility: Assessing Derk Pereboom’s Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life.Michael McKenna - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (3):575-589.details
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(1 other version)Manipulating Morality: Third-Party Intentions Alter Moral Judgments by Changing Causal Reasoning.Jonathan Phillips & Alex Shaw - 2015 - Cognitive Science 39 (6):1320-1347.details
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The mad scientist meets the robot cats: Compatibilism, kinds, and counterexamples.Mark Heller - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2):333-37.details
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