- Nonhuman Moral Agency: A Practice-Focused Exploration of Moral Agency in Nonhuman Animals and Artificial Intelligence.Dorna Behdadi - 2023 - Dissertation, University of Gothenburgdetails
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“Free will” is vague.Santiago Amaya - 2023 - Philosophical Issues 33 (1):7-21.details
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Mechanical Choices: A Compatibilist Libertarian Response.Christian List - 2023 - Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-23.details
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Lemos on the Physical Indeterminism Luck Objection.Dwayne Moore - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (3):1459-1477.details
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Responsible AI Through Conceptual Engineering.Johannes Himmelreich & Sebastian Köhler - 2022 - Philosophy and Technology 35 (3):1-30.details
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Natural Compatibilists Should Be Theological Compatibilists.Taylor Cyr - 2022 - In Leigh Vicens & Peter Furlong (eds.), Theological Determinism: New Perspectives. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. pp. 119-132.details
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Causality, determination and free will: towards an anscombean account of free action.Niels van Miltenburg - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-20.details
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Libertarian Free Will, Naturalism, and Science.Stewart Goetz - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Theological Research 23 (3):157-172.details
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Undetermined Choices, Luck and the Enhancement Problem.Nadine Elzein - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (7):2827-2846.details
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Grounding and the luck objection to agent-causal libertarianism.Joel Archer - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (5):1763-1775.details
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The divine hiddenness objection is not costly for atheists.Benjamin L. Curtis - 2021 - Analysis 81 (3):402-404.details
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Libertarian Free Will and the Physical Indeterminism Luck Objection.Dwayne Moore - 2021 - Philosophia 50 (1):159-182.details
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The Principle of Sufficient Reason and Libertarianism: A Critique of Pruss.Brandon Rdzak - 2021 - Philosophia 50 (1):201-216.details
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Another Look at the Modal Collapse Argument.Omar Fakhri - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 13 (1):1-23.details
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The “Dual Sources Account,” Predestination, and the Problem of Hell.Adam Noel Wood - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 13 (1):103-127.details
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First-person representations and responsible agency in AI.Miguel Ángel Sebastián & Fernando Rudy-Hiller - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7061-7079.details
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Concomitant Ignorance Excuses from Moral Responsibility.Robert J. Hartman - 2021 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 10 (1):58-65.details
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The Disappearing Agent.Filip Čeč - 2017 - In Boran Berčić (ed.), Perspectives on the Self. University of Rijeka. pp. 235-253.details
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Taking Hobart Seriously.Taylor W. Cyr - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (4):1407-1426.details
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From Neuroscience to Law: Bridging the Gap.Tuomas K. Pernu & Nadine Elzein - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.details
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Divine Providence: Fine-Grained, Coarse-Grained, or Something in Between?Jean-Baptiste Guillon - 2020 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 68 (3):71-109.details
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Political Myths in Plato and Asimov.Nathaniel Goldberg - 2019 - Journal of Science Fiction and Philosophy 2:1-19.details
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Instrumental Robots.Sebastian Köhler - 2020 - Science and Engineering Ethics 26 (6):3121-3141.details
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Wiley-Blackwell: A Companion to Free Will.Joe Campbell, Kristin M. Mickelson & V. Alan White (eds.) - 2023 - Wiley.details
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Rolling back the Rollback Argument.László Bernáth & János Tőzsér - 2020 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 2 (39):43-61.details
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Barking Up the Wrong Tree: On Control, Transformative Experiences, and Turning Over a New Leaf.Marcela Herdova - 2020 - The Monist 103 (3):278-293.details
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Free Will and Luck: Compatibilism versus Incompatibilism.Alfred R. Mele - 2020 - The Monist 103 (3):262-277.details
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Moral Agents or Mindless Machines? A Critical Appraisal of Agency in Artificial Systems.Fabio Tollon - 2019 - Hungarian Philosophical Review 4 (63):9-23.details
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Buddhism, Free Will, and Punishment: Taking Buddhist Ethics Seriously.Gregg D. Caruso - 2020 - Zygon 55 (2):474-496.details
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Free Your Mind: Buddhism, Causality, and the Free Will Problem.Christian Coseru - 2020 - Zygon 55 (2):461-473.details
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Responsibility: the State of the Question Fault Lines in the Foundations.David Shoemaker - 2020 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 58 (2):205-237.details
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Free will and control: a noncausal approach.David Palmer - 2021 - Synthese 198 (10):10043-10062.details
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Manipulation Arguments and Libertarian Accounts of Free Will.Taylor W. Cyr - 2020 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 6 (1):57-73.details
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Agent Causation and the Phenomenology of Agency.Randolph Clarke - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (3):747-764.details
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The Place of the Trace: Negligence and Responsibility.Samuel Murray - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (1):39-52.details
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Free Will, Self‐Creation, and the Paradox of Moral Luck.Kristin M. Mickelson - 2019 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 43 (1):224-256.details
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Contingencies within Spacetime.Baptiste Le Bihan - 2015 - Dissertation, University of Rennes 1details
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Agent-Causation Revisited: Origination and Contemporary Theories of Free Will.Thad Botham - 2008 - Berlin, Germany: Verlag D Müller.details
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Free Will and Desire.Brian Looper - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (6):1347-1360.details
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Can Life Be Meaningful without Free Will?Drew Chastain - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (4):1069-1086.details
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Free Will, Causality, and Neuroscience.Bernard Feltz, Marcus Missal & Andrew Sims (eds.) - 2019 - Leiden: Brill.details
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Free Will and Mental Powers.Niels van Miltenburg & Dawa Ometto - 2020 - Topoi 39 (5):1155-1165.details
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Indirectly Free Actions, Libertarianism, and Resultant Moral Luck.Robert J. Hartman - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (6):1417-1436.details
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Why C-luck really is a problem for compatibilism.S. B. Schoonover & Ivan Guajardo - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):48-69.details
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(In)compatibilism.Kristin M. Mickelson - 2023 - In Joe Campbell, Kristin M. Mickelson & V. Alan White (eds.), Wiley-Blackwell: A Companion to Free Will. Wiley. pp. 58-83.details
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Hard incompatibilism and the participant attitude.D. Justin Coates - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):208-229.details
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The problem of free will and determinism: An abductive approach.Kristin M. Mickelson - 2019 - Social Philosophy and Policy 36 (1):154-172.details
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In the Beatific Vision, both Freedom and Necessity.Justin Noia - 2018 - TheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology 2 (2).details
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Moral Responsibility for Concepts.Rachel Fredericks - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):1381-1397.details
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A Modest Classical Compatibilism.Matthew J. Hart - 2017 - Disputatio (45):265–285.details
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