- Free Will and Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 2006 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?Jason Turner, Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris & Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):28-53.details
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Two accounts of laws and time.Barry Loewer - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (1):115-137.details
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Free will.Timothy O'Connor & Christopher Evan Franklin - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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(1 other version)Inference to the Best explanation.Peter Lipton - 2005 - In Martin Curd & Stathis Psillos (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science. New York: Routledge. pp. 193.details
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Difficulty and Degrees of Moral Praiseworthiness and Blameworthiness.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2016 - Noûs 50 (2):356-378.details
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The free will inventory: Measuring beliefs about agency and responsibility.Thomas Nadelhoffer, Jason Shepard, Eddy Nahmias, Chandra Sripada & Lisa Thomson Ross - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 25:27-41.details
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Moral Luck.Dana K. Nelkin - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Moral Responsibility.Matthew Talbert - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Autonomy and addiction.Neil Levy - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (3):427-447.details
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Explaining Away Incompatibilist Intuitions.Dylan Murray & Eddy Nahmias - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):434-467.details
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Dispositions, Abilities to Act, and Free Will: The New Dispositionalism.Randolph Clarke - 2009 - Mind 118 (470):323-351.details
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Skepticism About Moral Responsibility.Gregg D. Caruso - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2018):1-81.details
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(1 other version)Free will and luck: Reply to critics.Alfred R. Mele - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):153 – 155.details
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A Hard-line Reply to Pereboom’s Four-Case Manipulation Argument.Michael Mckenna - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):142-159.details
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Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will.Randolph Clarke & Justin Capes - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The objects of moral responsibility.Andrew C. Khoury - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (6):1357-1381.details
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Responsible AI Through Conceptual Engineering.Johannes Himmelreich & Sebastian Köhler - 2022 - Philosophy and Technology 35 (3):1-30.details
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Doxastic Responsibility.Neil Levy - 2007 - Synthese 155 (1):127-155.details
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Agent causation as the solution to all the compatibilist’s problems.Ned Markosian - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (3):383-398.details
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Moral Responsibility and Mental Illness: a Call for Nuance.Matt King & Joshua May - 2018 - Neuroethics 11 (1):11-22.details
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Justice without Retribution: An Epistemic Argument against Retributive Criminal Punishment.Gregg D. Caruso - 2018 - Neuroethics 13 (1):13-28.details
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Defeating Manipulation Arguments: Interventionist causation and compatibilist sourcehood.Oisín Deery & Eddy Nahmias - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (5):1255-1276.details
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Deciding as Intentional Action: Control over Decisions.Joshua Shepherd - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):335-351.details
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The Trouble with Tracing.Manuel Vargas - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):269-291.details
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Humean compatibilism.Helen Beebee & Alfred Mele - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):201-223.details
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What Makes a Manipulated Agent Unfree?Chandra Sekhar Sripada - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):563-593.details
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The truth about tracing.John Martin Fischer & Neal A. Tognazzini - 2009 - Noûs 43 (3):531-556.details
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Farewell to the luck (and Mind) argument.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):199-230.details
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What luck is not.Jennifer Lackey - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):255 – 267.details
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Do judgments about freedom and responsibility depend on who you are? Personality differences in intuitions about compatibilism and incompatibilism.Adam Feltz & Edward T. Cokely - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):342-350.details
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Reasons and Impossibility.Bart Streumer - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (3):351-384.details
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From knowledge to wisdom: a revolution in the aims and methods of science.Nicholas Maxwell - 1984 - Oxford: Blackwell.details
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The Explanatory Component of Moral Responsibility.Gunnar Björnsson & Karl Persson - 2012 - Noûs 46 (2):326-354.details
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Free Will and Epistemology: a Defence of the Transcendental Argument for Freedom.Robert Lockie - 2018 - London, UK: Bloomsbury Academic.details
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Manipulation and constitutive luck.Taylor W. Cyr - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2381-2394.details
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Free actions as a natural kind.Oisín Deery - 2021 - Synthese 198 (1):823-843.details
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Compatibilism.Michael McKenna - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Personal autonomy.Sarah Buss - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The Limits of Free Will: Selected Essays.Paul Russell - 2017 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.details
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Truth and freedom.Trenton Merricks - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (1):29-57.details
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Indirectly Free Actions, Libertarianism, and Resultant Moral Luck.Robert J. Hartman - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (6):1417-1436.details
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Robot sex and consent: Is consent to sex between a robot and a human conceivable, possible, and desirable?Lily Frank & Sven Nyholm - 2017 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 25 (3):305-323.details
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The folk psychology of free will: Fits and starts.Shaun Nichols - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (5):473-502.details
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Another Look at the Modal Collapse Argument.Omar Fakhri - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 13 (1):1-23.details
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The Physiognomy of Responsibility.John Martin Fischer & Neal A. Tognazzini - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (2):381-417.details
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Moral responsibility.Andrew Eshleman - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Freedom, Creativity, and Manipulation.Eric Christian Barnes - 2013 - Noûs 49 (3):560-588.details
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Against Luck-Free Moral Responsibility.Robert J. Hartman - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2845-2865.details
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The complex tapestry of free will: striving will, indeterminism and volitional streams.Robert Kane - 2019 - Synthese 196 (1):145-160.details
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