- Freedom, moral responsibility, and the failure of universal defeat.Andrew J. Latham, Somogy Varga & Hannah Tierney - 2023 - Philosophical Issues 33 (1):252-269.details
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Do people understand determinism? The tracking problem for measuring free will beliefs.Samuel Murray, Elise Dykhuis & Thomas Nadelhoffer - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy.details
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Intuitions About Free Will and the Failure to Comprehend Determinism.Thomas Nadelhoffer, Samuel Murray & Elise Dykhuis - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (6):2515-2536.details
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The Four-Case Argument and the Existential/Universal Effect.Andrew J. Latham & Hannah Tierney - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (6):2379-2389.details
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Belief in robust temporal passage (probably) does not explain future-bias.Andrew J. Latham, Kristie Miller, Christian Tarsney & Hannah Tierney - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (6):2053-2075.details
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Natural Compatibilism, Indeterminism, and Intrusive Metaphysics.Thomas Nadelhoffer, David Rose, Wesley Buckwalter & Shaun Nichols - 2020 - Cognitive Science 44 (8):e12873.details
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Minds, Brains, and Desert: On the relevance of neuroscience for retributive punishment.Alva Stråge - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Gothenburgdetails
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Quantum gravity, timelessness, and the folk concept of time.Andrew J. Latham & Kristie Miller - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9453-9478.details
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The Conceptual Impossibility of Free Will Error Theory.Andrew J. Latham - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (2):99-120.details
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Indirect Compatibilism.Andrew James Latham - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Sydneydetails
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Taking Responsibility for Responsibility.Neil Levy - 2019 - Public Health Ethics 12 (2):103-113.details
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Laypersons’ beliefs and intuitions about free will and determinism: new insights linking the social psychology and experimental philosophy paradigms.Gilad Feldman & Subramanya Prasad Mgmt Chandrashekar - 2018 - Social Psychological and Personality Science 1 (9):539-549.details
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Questions for a Science of Moral Responsibility.Marcelo Fischborn - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (2):381-394.details
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Compatibilism can be natural.John Turri - 2017 - Consciousness and Cognition 51:68-81.details
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(3 other versions)Experimental Philosophy.Joshua Knobe, Wesley Buckwalter, Shaun Nichols, Philip Robbins, Hagop Sarkissian & Tamler Sommers - 2012 - Annual Review of Psychology 63 (1):81-99.details
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Why compatibilist intuitions are not mistaken: A reply to Feltz and Millan.James Andow & Florian Cova - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (4):550-566.details
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Compatibilism and Incompatibilism in Social Cognition.John Turri - 2017 - Cognitive Science 41 (S3):403-424.details
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The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology.Herman Cappelen, Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Is Free Will Necessary for Moral Responsibility?: A Case for Rethinking Their Relationship and the Design of Experimental Studies in Moral Psychology.Carrie Figdor & Mark Phelan - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (5):603-627.details
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Experimental Philosophy and the Compatibility of Free Will and Determinism: A Survey.Florian Cova & Yasuko Kitano - 2014 - Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 22:17-37.details
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The Lesson of Bypassing.David Rose & Shaun Nichols - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (4):599-619.details
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Persistent bias in expert judgments about free will and moral responsibility: A test of the Expertise Defense.Eric Schulz, Edward T. Cokely & Adam Feltz - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (4):1722-1731.details
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Explaining the Abstract/Concrete Paradoxes in Moral Psychology: The NBAR Hypothesis.Eric Mandelbaum & David Ripley - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (3):351-368.details
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Experimental evidence for free will revisionism.Chris Weigel - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):31 - 43.details
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A Unified Empirical Account of Responsibility Judgments.Gunnar Björnsson & Karl Persson - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3):611-639.details
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We're All Folk: An Interview with Neil Levy about Experimental Philosophy and Conceptual Analysis.Neil Levy & Yasuko Kitano - 2011 - Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 19:87-98.details
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Distance, anger, freedom: An account of the role of abstraction in compatibilist and incompatibilist intuitions.Chris Weigel - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (6):803 - 823.details
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Cognitive Neuroscience and Moral Decision-making: Guide or Set Aside?Derek Leben - 2010 - Neuroethics 4 (2):163-174.details
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Free Will and the Bounds of the Self.Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols - 2001 - In Robert Kane (ed.), Oxford Handbook on Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Is Belief in Free Will a Cultural Universal?Hagop Sarkissian, Amita Chatterjee, Felipe de Brigard, Joshua Knobe, Shaun Nichols & Smita Sirker - 2010 - Mind and Language 25 (3):346-358.details
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Compatibilism.Michael McKenna - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Free will, moral responsibility, and mechanism: Experiments on folk intuitions.Eddy Nahmias, D. Justin Coates & Trevor Kvaran - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):214–242.details
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The Abstract/Concrete Paradox in Moral Psychology.Shane Reuter - unknowndetails
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The Fourfold Route to Empirical Enlightenment: Experimental Philosophy’s Adolescence and the Changing Body of Work.Robert Barnard, Joseph Ulatowski & Jonathan M. Weinberg - 2021 - Filozofia Nauki 29 (2):77-113.details
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The Compact Compendium of Experimental Philosophy.Alexander Max Bauer & Stephan Kornmesser (eds.) - 2023 - Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter.details
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Legal decision-making and the abstract/concrete paradox.Noel Struchiner, Guilherme da F. C. F. De Almeida & Ivar R. Hannikainen - 2020 - Cognition 205 (C):104421.details
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Morality and the imagination: Real-world moral beliefs interfere with imagining fictional content.Jessica Black & Jennifer Barnes - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (7):1018-1044.details
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Forget the Folk: Moral Responsibility Preservation Motives and Other Conditions for Compatibilism.Cory J. Clark, Bo M. Winegard & Roy F. Baumeister - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10:397001.details
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Enhancing responsibility: Directions for an interdisciplinary investigation.Marcelo Fischborn - 2018 - Dissertation, Universidade Federal de Santa Mariadetails
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Seeing Responsibility: Can Neuroimaging Teach Us Anything about Moral and Legal Responsibility?.David Wasserman & Josephine Johnston - 2014 - Hastings Center Report 44 (s2):37-49.details
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(1 other version)Intuition, Orthodoxy, and Moral Responsibility.John Ross Churchill - 2016 - Faith and Philosophy 33 (2):179-199.details
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Experimental philosophy of actual and counterfactual free will intuitions.Adam Feltz - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 36 (C):113-130.details
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Free will eliminativism: reference, error, and phenomenology.Gregg D. Caruso - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (10):2823-2833.details
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The demand and desert functions of moral judgment.Wesley Buckwalter - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 35 (7):1015-1035.details
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Is compatibilism intuitive?Daniel Lim & Ju Chen - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (6):878-897.details
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Does Watching a Play about the Teenage Brain Affect Attitudes toward Young Offenders?Robert Blakey - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8:259361.details
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An error theory for compatibilist intuitions.Adam Feltz & Melissa Millan - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (4):529-555.details
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The Effect of What We Think may Happen on our Judgments of Responsibility.Felipe De Brigard & William J. Brady - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (2):259-269.details
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Pereboom and premises: Asking the right questions in the experimental philosophy of free will.Adam Feltz - 2013 - Consciousness and Cognition 22 (1):53-63.details
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Explaining Away Incompatibilist Intuitions.Dylan Murray & Eddy Nahmias - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):434-467.details
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