In this new book, Michael Friedman argues that Kant's continuing efforts to find a metaphysics that could provide a foundation for the sciences is of the utmost ...

Kant's Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science is one of the most difficult but also most important of Kant's works. Published in 1786 between the first and second editions of the Critique of Pure Reason, the Metaphysical Foundations occupies a central place in the development of Kant's philosophy, but has so far attracted relatively little attention compared with other works of Kant's critical period. Michael Friedman's book develops a new and complete reading of this work and reconstructs Kant's main argument clearly (...) and in great detail, explaining its relationship to both Newton's Principia and eighteenth-century scientific thinkers such as Euler and Lambert. By situating Kant's text relative to his pre-critical writings on metaphysics and natural philosophy and, in particular, to the changes Kant made in the second edition of the Critique, Friedman articulates a radically new perspective on the meaning and development of the critical philosophy as a whole. (shrink)

Problems and Postulates: Kant on Reason and Understanding ALISON LAYWINE THE PURPOSE OF THIS PAPER is to think anew Kant's conception of reason and understanding, the relation between these two faculties and the principles that govern them. I am chiefly interested in the contributions of reason and under- standing to the advancement of knowledge. Hence the focus of my paper, so far as reason itself is concerned, is the theoretical rather than the practical employment of this faculty. On the other (...) hand, I think it is useful and fair to say, on Kant's account, that theoretical reason is itself practical -- at least to the extent that we regard scientific enquiry as some kind of activity, namely a research activity, involving practices such as proof and experimentation, under- taken for the sake of a certain end, namely, the acquisition of knowledge. One of Kant's concerns in the Critique of Pure Reason is to explain how this activity can be profitably pursued. To meet this concern, Kant must explain first of all how we set research goals for scientific enquiry. For without any such goals, Susan Neiman's book, The Unity of Reason , was the original stimulation for this paper. . I am more indebted to Susan.. (shrink)

Daniel Sutherland - Kant on Arithmetic, Algebra, and the Theory of Proportions - Journal of the History of Philosophy 44:4 Journal of the History of Philosophy 44.4 533-558 Muse Search Journals This Journal Contents Kant on Arithmetic, Algebra, and the Theory of Proportions Daniel Sutherland Kant's philosophy of mathematics has both enthralled and exercised philosophers since the appearance of the Critique of Pure Reason. Neither the Critique nor any other work provides a sustained and focused account of his mature views (...) on mathematical cognition, forcing readers to glean what they can from disparate contexts. Despite these hurdles, Kant's views have been of great interest to philosophers of mathematics. They have also been of interest to philosophers wishing to understand Kant's philosophy more generally, since Kant maintains that mathematical judgments are synthetic a priori and that the type of synthesis underlying mathematics is the same as that underlying the perception of objects . Our understanding of Kant's views has been greatly improved during the last four decades by work on Kant's philosophy of mathematics. Despite these advances, however, I think the recent work has largely neglected the importance of Kant's theory of magnitudes and the extent to which that theory is influenced by the Eudoxian theory of proportions presented in Euclid's Elements. As a consequence, an important feature of Kant's.. (shrink)

One of the most important philosophical topics in the early twentieth century and a topic that was seminal in the emergence of analytic philosophy was the relationship between Kantian philosophy and modern geometry. This paper discusses how this question was tackled by the Neo-Kantian trained philosopher Ernst Cassirer. Surprisingly, Cassirer does not affirm the theses that contemporary philosophers often associate with Kantian philosophy of mathematics. He does not defend the necessary truth of Euclidean geometry but instead develops a kind of (...) logicism modeled on Richard Dedekind's foundations of arithmetic. Further, because he shared with other Neo-Kantians an appreciation of the developmental and historical nature of mathematics, Cassirer developed a philosophical account of the unity and methodology of mathematics over time. With its impressive attention to the detail of contemporary mathematics and its exploration of philosophical questions to which other philosophers paid scant attention, Cassirer's philosophy of mathematics surely deserves a place among the classic works of twentieth century philosophy of mathematics. Though focused on Cassirer's philosophy of geometry, this paper also addresses both Cassirer's general philosophical orientation and his reading of Kant. (shrink)

The Duisburg Nachlaß is a bundle of Kant’s handwritten notes. These notes almost certainly go back to some time in 1775. Though very obscure, they replay issues in Kant’s early metaphysics just as clearly as they anticipate issues in the Critique of Pure Reason. This makes them an important way-station in Kant’s philosophical development—all the more important, because he published nothing in the 1770s and left no other extended writings in his own hand. A proper understanding of the Duisburg Nachlaß (...) might therefore explain some of Kant’s later ideas: their origins in his earlier thinking and their philosophical motivations. The purpose of this paper is to lay the groundwork for such an explanation—at least a partial one. I shall argue that Kant’s efforts in the Duisburg Nachlaß to correct certain difficulties in the Inaugural Dissertation of 1770 anticipate and naturally lead to the crucial claim in the Critique of Pure Reason that the understanding legislates laws to nature. (shrink)